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ABSTRACT 
 
This study uses Frantz Fanon‟s thoughts on race and blackness, the black elite and black 
public intellectuals as the theoretical framework and examines the positionality of Sipho Seepe, 
Xolela Mangcu and Andile Mngxitama as black public intellectuals in order to understand how 
they view the post-1994 political discourse. Seepe, Mangcu and Mngxitama‟s views are 
studied by analysing themes emerging from newspaper columns they have written. This study 
reveals that the three black public intellectuals examined have been radical and forthright, 
though they display different understandings of race and blackness, the black elite and black 
public intellectuals. However, the study reveals that only Mngxitama‟s postionality has been 
consistently radical, whereas Seepe and Mangcu‟s views have been fluid and are now 
considered moderate. This study concludes by highlighting the relevance of Fanon‟s thoughts 
in enabling a new reading of post-1994 South Africa. Of central importance is the creation of 
the „new being‟, who is informed by the process of liberation, which is the antithesis of the 
black condition.  
Key terms: Fanon, black public intellectuals, positionality, black condition, race and 
blackness, black elites, liberation 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Background to the study  
This study applies a Fanonian perspective in an attempt to understand post-1994 South 
African political discourses. More specifically, this study is concerned with the problematics of 
race and blackness, the means of accumulation by the black elite and the dilemma of black 
public intellectuals, with specific reference to power and ideas. These problematics are 
explored through the positionality of Sipho Seepe, Xolela Mangcu and Andile Mngxitama, by 
means of case studies and a literature review in various chapters.  
Fanon‟s work provides a critique of colonial, liberation and post-liberation political settings. The 
South African situation since the first democratic elections in 1994 is fraught with complexity, 
contestations and contradictions. South Africa is recovering from the clutches of apartheid, so 
that its transition to democracy makes it typical of a post-liberation state.  It is the purpose of 
this study to introduce Fanonian thought into an analysis of the post-1994 era in South Africa 
and to use this lens to understand the positionality of Seepe, Mangcu and Mngxitama as black 
public intellectuals in this arena.  
Seepe, Mangcu and Mngxitama‟s views originate from the Black Consciousness political 
tradition and they claim to be influenced by its philosophy. Their critical contributions also 
invariably resonate with Fanonian thinking on the post-liberation condition of betrayal of the 
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poor by elites who have access to make into state power. All three are black public intellectuals 
known for their controversial analysis and commentary in post-1994 South African political 
discourses. Their intellectual contributions refer to various spheres of society, but the focus of 
this study is on selected columns published in newspapers on selected themes and issues 
relating to race and blackness, black elites and the space occupied by black public 
intellectuals.  
Problem statement 
The focus of this study concerns the relevance of Fanon‟s ideas to an understanding of the 
post-1994 realities in South Africa. In part, this entails asking fundamental questions and re-
thinking the political life in the post-1994 era using Fanonian lenses. The problem addressed in 
this study is the way in which Fanon articulates race and blackness, the black elite and black 
public intellectuals. The study also seeks to investigate whether or not the political and 
intellectual views of Seepe, Mangcu and Mngxitama in the post-1994 political discourses are 
indeed fundamental in understanding the aforementioned issues.  
 
Furthermore, the study also investigates how Seepe, Mangcu and Mngxitama build on Fanon‟s 
and each other‟s work, and complicate each other‟s views and intellectual perspectives on the 
South African political discourse. This focus in the study also entails a critical interrogation of 
the terms in which post-1994 South African realities are [re]formulated in relation to the thrust 
of the intellectual debates of Seepe, Mangcu and Mngxitama since 1994. Taken together, 
these issues reflect the character of the post-1994 dispensation as a complex terrain of 
unfulfilled dreams of liberation and as a sphere that is still enmeshed in complex racial 
problems that exacerbate the black condition.  
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Aim  
The aim of this research is to apply Fanon‟s political thought by examining his politics within 
the limited context of race and blackness, the means of accumulation by the black elite and the 
dilemma of black public intellectuals in relation to power and ideas in South Africa.  Fanon‟s 
political thought is analysed to ascertain the extent to which Seepe, Mangcu and Mngxitama, 
as black public intellectuals, connect their intellectual contributions to these key issues in post-
1994 political discourse. Examining the positionality of these three black public intellectuals by 
means of a Fanonian perspective will help to gauge the manner in which they advance the 
understanding of the post-1994 era with regard to the aforementioned political issues.  
Research question 
The research question for this study is formulated as follows:   
What is the relevance of Fanon in post-1994 South Africa and how do his ideas on race and 
blackness, the black elite and black public intellectuals inform the discourses of Seepe, 
Mangcu and Mngxitama?   
The sub-questions are the following: 
1. In what ways do Seepe, Mangcu and Mngxitama address the politics of race and blackness, 
the black elite and black public intellectuals as articulated by Fanon? 
2. What is their positionality or what ideological standpoint have they adopted, and to what 
extent do the newly authorised discourses of the black public intellectual confirm or subvert 
post-1994 realities?  
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3. Is the articulation of the post-1994 era by Seepe, Mangcu and Mngxitama as original as 
Fanon‟s articulation of the post-liberation state?  
Rationale 
The framing of the black public intellectual from Fanon‟s vantage is helpful in understanding 
the dynamics in which Seepe, Mangcu and Mngxitama exist and operate, with particular 
reference to the notion of positionality in post-1994 political discourse. Positionality is 
understood here as the ideological location of Seepe, Mangcu and Mngxitama in articulating 
their notions of race and blackness, the black elite and black public intellectuals in order to 
understand post-1994 political discourse. In short, positionality encapsulates a locus for the 
enunciation of issues. The examination of Seepe, Mangcu and Mngxitama as black public 
intellectuals through Fanon‟s perspective is the contribution this research will make to the 
discourses that prevail in the post-1994 era.  
Admittedly, Seepe, Mangcu and Mngxitama are not the only black public intellectuals in the 
post-1994 political landscape. Others, such as Pumla Dineo-Gqola, William Gumede, Mohau 
Pheko, Prince Mashele, Eusebius McKaiser, Mcebisi Ndletyana and Achille Mbembe, amongst 
others, are associated with black public intellectualism. Black public intellectuals have a unique 
positionality in the post-1994 era, since „politics have coloured them differently from other racial 
groups‟ (Sono 1993:58).  
The selection of Seepe, Mangcu and Mngxitama as the units of analysis for this study rather 
than other black public intellectuals is informed by the association of these three intellectuals 
with, and their advocacy for, Black Consciousness. Their selection is justified on the basis of 
their common views regarding the strength of Fanon‟s views on the lived experience of blacks. 
Hence, the contribution of the comparative study of these three black public intellectuals is 
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studied through the Fanonian lens. Furthermore, these three South African black public 
intellectuals have articulated some of Fanon‟s ideas in their writings and have attempted to link 
these ideas to post-1994 South African realities. Consequently, the study focuses solely on 
Seepe, Mangcu and Mngxitama in terms of their positionality as black public intellectuals and 
the contribution they make in understanding the post-1994 political discourse. 
Research methodology 
The study is embedded in the relationship between text and context. Fanon‟s thoughts were 
articulated in texts written more than fifty years ago, whereas the study is located in the post-
1994 era, which is the context. The study merges the two by applying Fanon‟s perspectives to 
ascertain his relevance to South African post-1994 discourse. The study was mainly 
qualitative, because it „encompasses many dimensions and layers‟ (Leedy & Ormrod 
2005:133), since the central issue of this study is multifaceted.  
The qualitative bent of this study allowed the „necessary modification or adjustment based on 
the views emerging during the course of the study‟ (Creswell 2009:65). A thematic analysis of 
Seepe, Mangcu and Mngxitama‟s newspaper columns was undertaken to understand their 
ideological positionalities in relation to post-1994 political discourses. Thematic analysis was 
used, since this research aimed to identify themes in the texts and the data that they contain to 
the larger scheme of understanding the positionality of these black public intellectuals in 
relation to post-1994 political discourse. Since thematic analysis is descriptive, the nature of 
the description can also lead to exploration in relation to what the text reveals.  
Thematic analysis does not aim to generate a theory, but rather „pays greater attention to the 
qualitative aspects of the material analysed‟ (Joffe & Yardley 2003:56). It is a process of 
induction which focuses on describing and exploring the nature of the theory. This is because 
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the specific patterns that were analysed required interpretation. Hence, this study is about text 
and context. As Stone (1997) argues, text analysis needs to take the context in which a text 
was generated into account, because context dictates how public intellectuals articulate their 
ideological positionality in a particular political discourse. 
A thematic analysis is a form of a discourse analysis, since there are conversations in the text 
(newspaper columns) in which similar or related ideas are merged. Seepe, Mangcu and 
Mngxitama as black public intellectuals have focused and still focus on a variety of issues that 
are part of post-1994 political discourse. However, the analysis was limited to the selected 
themes, namely, race and blackness, the black elite and the black public intellectuals which 
dominated the columns that were analysed. The analysis was limited to these selected themes 
since they resonate with Fanonian thought and this enabled a deeper understanding of the 
themes under review. Furthermore, it was essential to identify aspects that are representative 
of the contrasting development of these three black public intellectual‟s political narratives. 
The themes were collated and reported upon to understand the positionality of these three 
black public intellectuals in relation to post-1994 political discourses. This extends to engaging 
the different discourses within the text and different ways in which they are engaged. The 
themes on their own have no coherent meaning unless they are read in the larger scheme of 
the research process by means of collation and analysis.   
Firstly, data was drawn from the major themes through selected columns, because thematic 
analysis allows a decision on the themes to look for in the data. Secondly, the themes which do 
not relate to the focus of this study were filtered out. Thirdly, the motives of the three black 
public intellectuals with regard to what they write were interpreted. This was necessary for the 
purpose of in-depth understanding arising from interpreting and making sense of the 
phenomena being studied, as suggested by Leedy and Ormrod (2005).  
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Thematic analysis was also fundamental to analysing selected texts, which are the columns 
written by Seepe, Mangcu and Mngxitama. This methodology was necessary for this research 
because it could shed light on the dynamics and complexities of the political discourse after 
1994. As such, it was useful in terms of identifying the ways in which Seepe, Mangcu and 
Mngxitama articulate race and blackness, the black elite and the black public intellectuals in 
the post-1994 era through the lens of a Fanonian perspective.  
Limitations of the study 
The number of post-1994 South African political issues and phenomena is, vast and thus they 
cannot be captured in a single study. The scope of Fanonian thought is also broad and there 
are many interpretations of this thought. It falls beyond the scope of this study to analyse 
Fanon‟s entire oeuvre. It was therefore necessary to limit this study to Fanonian interpretations 
of race and blackness, the black elite and black public intellectuals.  
The discourse of black public intellectualism is not homogeneous, and this study could not 
trace and analyse all possible examples. Instead, as stated earlier in the chapter, this study 
focuses only on Seepe, Mangcu and Mngxitama. Another limitation to the study is the number 
of columns studied. The selection of the columns was based on their relevance to the themes 
of race and blackness, the black elite and the black public intellectual.  
Chapter outline 
This study consists of six chapters.  
Chapter One provides the introduction and discusses the scope of the study with reference to 
the background, aim, rationale, research methodology, limitations and chapter outline. 
Essentially, this chapter outlines what the study entails.  
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Chapter Two provides the theoretical framework, focusing on Fanon and his theories to provide 
a foundation for this study.  
Race and blackness, in relation to the positionality of Seepe, Mangcu and Mngxitama, are 
examined in Chapter Three.  
In Chapter Four, the focus falls on examining the problems regarding the modes of 
accumulation of the black elite, as articulated by Seepe, Mangcu and Mngxitama.  
Chapter Five engages with the concept of the black public intellectual and examines the 
positionality of Seepe, Mangcu and Mngxitama regarding this topic.  
Finally, Chapter Six draws conclusions on the study by interrogating the notion of liberation, 
and illustrating Fanon‟s relevance for the public political discourse since 1994.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
FRANTZ FANON: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Introduction  
This chapter provides the theoretical framework for the study, which is presented with specific 
reference to three themes that feature in Fanon‟s thinking.  The first of these themes is race 
and blackness, and it relates to Fanon‟s thinking about the African colonial situation, which 
continues to haunt the continent even in the post-liberation era. Secondly, Fanon is famous for 
his critique of a national bourgeoisie. This chapter maps Fanon‟s thoughts and debates the 
relevance of this critique for a deeper understanding of the post-liberation political state. 
Finally, his thinking includes the notion of a native intellectual consciousness, a topic which is 
explored in this study with a view to investigating how such native intellectuals are related to 
the socio-political landscape, and what those relations should be and their role.  
The chapter focuses on Fanon‟s prophetic articulation of liberation as a state of becoming, with 
the potential to create a new world or to be betrayed. This argument can be used to 
understand the complexities and dynamics that form a large part of liberation, especially in the 
post-liberation era. This chapter examines Fanon‟s ideas to provide a backdrop against which 
the thinking of Seepe, Mangcu and Mngxitama may be analysed. This is an attempt to read 
Fanon‟s texts in the context of post-1994 South Africa. As a theoretical framework, this chapter 
helps to situate Fanon‟s thoughts in post-1994 South Africa, as discussed in more detail in the 
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subsequent chapters in relation to the themes of race and blackness, the black elite and the 
black public intellectual.  
Fanon on race and blackness 
The question of race and blackness continues to haunt the post-colonial world. In the case of 
South Africa, this situation continues because of the legacy of apartheid. Fanon ([1952] 2008) 
detects and unmasks racism at the psychological and social level where human oppression 
resides. According to Fanon (1967:32), „[r]acism is not the whole but the most visible, the most 
day-to-day and, not to mince matters, the crudest element of a given structure‟.  
Fanon argues that racism mutates its melanin (the pigment that gives skin its colour) to adapt 
itself to the socio-political condition of the context it finds itself. Racism tends to change its form 
in order to create and re-create blackness in order to sustain itself. This is done in multiple 
implicit ways. In contexts where people declare that race does not exist or where racism is 
condemned, racism usually occurs in an institutionalised form. In this form, the logic of its 
operation is hidden, but continues to give effect to racism. However, paradoxically, the effect 
will be declared not to be racism, because it is effectively normalised and institutionalised. 
Fanon sees racism is a systemic form of oppression of a people which is justified to such an 
extent that it remains a part of reality.  
Blackness emerged as a matter of racial „othering‟, involving tormented and troubled psyches. 
Blackness is related to pathology, and stands in a position that renders it devoid of being; 
blackness operates in an anti-black world, where „the Negro, the African, the native, the black, 
the dirty, was rejected, despised: cursed‟ (Fanon 1967:26). This attitude creates an inferiority 
complex which is imposed and reinforced in the form of the existence of blackness as the 
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universe of whiteness. Consequently, blacks desire to be white. To counter this attitude, Fanon 
calls for combined action from the black standpoint, from both individuals and groups.  
Fanon‟s conception of race can be understood from the manner in which he unpacks the 
notion of blackness. Fanon ([1952] 2008) suggests that blackness is always read in 
comparison with, and aspires to, whiteness in a self-loathing manner. Blackness, according to 
Fanon, is preoccupied by constant comparison – that is, it mirrors itself in relation to whiteness. 
In other words, it is whiteness that manufactures blackness. As Vergès (1997:583) puts it, „[t]he 
white world makes the “Negro”‟. Self-evaluation and the ego-ideal in terms of Fanon‟s thinking 
renders blackness devoid of the self, as the self is constructed by whiteness. Furthermore, 
Fanon ([1952] 2008:165) points out that „[s]ince in all periods the Negro has been an inferior, 
he (or she) attempts to react with a superior complex‟.  
A superiority complex corresponds interchangeably with inferiority, something which is 
expressed in the social, political and economic spheres: „Once [the] black skin is catergori[s]ed 
as a sign of moral inferiority, black individuals become interchangeable units of an evil group‟ 
(JanMohamed 1983:269). An inferiority complex combined with skin colour is associated with 
blackness. This allows blackness to be frowned upon. As a result, accommodation is sought 
outside blackness. Fanon adds that what the black subject desires is to be white. According to 
Fanon, discussing the inhabitants of Martinique, which remains under French rule, as an 
example of people trapped in such an experience of blackness, 
The Martinicans are greedy for security. They want to compel the acceptance of their 
fiction. They want to be recogni[s]ed in their quest for [humanity]. They want to make 
an appearance. Each one of them is isolated, sterile, salient atom which sharply 
defined rights of passage, each one of them is. Each one of them wants to be, to 
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emerge. Everything the Antillean does is done for The Other. (Fanon [1952] 2008:165, 
original emphasis).   
The whole weight of blackness presses down on blacks in a form of a neurosis – the problem 
of an inferiority complex produced by the white racial gaze and socio-economic realities. This 
gives life to structures which militate against black humanity and leaves blackness with the 
absence of recognition of humanity. This creates the black condition, where the ontology of 
blackness is objectification, since blacks are regarded as objects and not as subjects. 
Blackness cries out for a humanity which is denied to those who are black by an anti-black 
world. To understand the anti-black world, it is important to understand „its real coordinates‟ 
(Fanon [1952] 2008:61). Gibson cautions: 
It is not Blacks who are neurotics, but the anti-Black society; yet it is the analysis of 
the neurotic, who happen to be Black, that gives insight into the sociodiagnostic of the 
quest for recognition. There symptoms are expressed in racial terms. (Gibson 2003:9).  
Fanon ([1952] 2008:2) claims that „[t]here is a zone of nonbeing, an extraordinary sterile and 
arid region, an utterly naked declivity where an authentic upheaval can be born‟. Blackness 
symbolises the negation of being and this is the aspect of the black life which breeds 
aggressiveness (Fanon [1961] 1990). In the dynamics of the black condition, the self-
destruction that seems to be the nature of the black being takes centre stage. The subject 
position of blackness implies being restricted, excluded, dehumanised and to the lesser extent, 
acted upon.  
In short, blackness has been and is still that which is objectified, because „every ontology is 
made unattainable‟ in that „it does not permit [the] understanding of the black being in the anti-
Black world which is unethical par excellence’ (Fanon [1952] 2008:82, emphasis added). To 
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study blackness is to examine the ways in which blackness is interlocked and confused with 
emancipation instead of liberation in the post-colonial or post-liberation period. 
Blackness is a negation which exists as a result of the white gaze. This gaze, even if it does 
not recognise blackness, means that the inferior complex is still in operation, since blacks want 
to be afforded concessions by whites – they want recognition and affirmation. The existence of 
blackness is not only problematic, but it is a scandal, as it exposes as a lie the notion of 
universal liberal democracy, which propounds human equality whilst masking injustice.   
In framing Fanon‟s thought within the twin loci of race and racism, Kane (2007) argues that 
race is embedded in human ontology and that Fanon‟s work is seminal in engaging in 
conversations on race in the global landscape. According to Kane (2007:360), „race is not 
essential but rather socially constructed and culturally imposed‟. Blackness determines the way 
politics of race are lived and experienced, because racism modifies social constellations and 
political conditions (Fanon 1967).  
Kane‟s (2007) stance opposes the absence of a „racial optic‟, and allows an exploration of the 
context of Fanon‟s thinking. An erasure of race and racism through colour-blindness is a re-
formulation of racism, since, historically, capitalism in itself is a racial structure in the way it 
organises the division of labour. Racism remains pervasive and, once it has been denied, can 
take on new guises of allegedly non-racialism. 
Although some claim that we live in a post-racial world, which means a world where race is 
considered irrelevant, blackness remains a predicament in terms of Fanon‟s understanding of 
racism during and after colonialism. Fanon‟s thinking can be applied in various ways, as he 
calls for the creation of emancipatory potential within the realm of post-colonial or post-racial 
socio-political contexts. Kane (2007) suggests that Fanon calls for a rejection of essentialist 
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racial categories and, by doing so, giving birth to racial equality, which comes into being when 
the notion of race as the organising principle of colonisation is unpacked, bringing about 
understanding and advocacy for creating a forum for human emancipation from oppressive 
structures. 
Gordon (2007) warns that blackness is often associated only with the lived experience; and 
both blackness and the lived experience often lead to a collapse, or symbiosis – hence the 
danger of the experience itself. As a result, this denies or negates the agency of the black 
experience, the experience which reflects blackness as a problematic stance in a world which 
is constructed by race, where blackness features at the lower level of humanity or absence of 
humanity. Gordon (2007) argues that it is essential to look into the lived-reality of people 
hidden in plain sight – people who are submerged and, consequently, do not exist.  
Gordon (2007) notes that Fanon understood the grammar of meaning which enables the 
articulation of the imaginary of human subordination in the modern world. In terms of the lived 
reality, Gordon adds that Fanon, in his thinking and articulation, engaged with what is referred 
to as „speaking from that grammar of articulation‟ (Gordon 2007:10), because Fanon wrote of 
disaster in all his works – a „hellish zone‟ within which blackness is entrapped.  
Welcome (2007:179) suggests that there is a struggle for blackness to articulate its existence 
in the mode of race-in-itself, and race-for-itself. Such a struggle occurs within the possibility of 
creating a new society, and this society has the possibility of becoming more egalitarian 
(Welcome 2007:179). It is this change that will transform the entire social, political and 
economic reality, since those who were marginalised and oppressed will be afforded new 
forms of life. This means that they must be given liberation in the form of justice and 
reparations to restructure their lives in such a way that they will attain human dignity. This 
affordance is not one of racial showcasing where a select few can amass wealth while 
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excluding the majority. Race-in-itself is what blackness should assert in its route toward or 
against both explicit and implicit domination. Welcome argues that race-in-itself and race-for-
itself are central to, and intimately part of, a programme for black liberation in which the 
racialised subjects articulate their racial existence: „The situation faced by individuals plays a 
major role in the dynamics of race‟ (Welcome 2007:182).  
According to Manganyi (1973:7), „a tolerable environment maintains a distinction between „the 
people‟ (whose rights and existence are recognised) and the „non-people‟, whose existence 
and rights are not seriously considered. In this regard, „the people‟ are the subject, while the 
„non-people‟ are the object – the patterns which fits well with the making and the operation of 
the Manichean structure. Manganyi argues that an individual experiences the body as an 
object, the body outside itself. This brings about alienation, as Fanon ([1961] 1990:122) 
argues, which means that the condition is a „pathological state‟. This refers to an illness which 
is institutionalised and naturalised, since the normal state of being black is a perpetual state of 
dehumanisation and terror. By contrast, the body that sees itself as the subject „does not 
experience the body as something outside itself‟ (Manganyi 1973:30).  Manganyi‟s articulation 
of blackness brings to the fore the existential category of being-in-the-world with objects or 
things. A person‟s attitude to objects is determined by the social, economic, political and 
cultural conditions that the subjects exist in.  
Being-in-the-world implies that existence is a given, as the basic structure of existence is 
historical (Manganyi 1973). The human mode of existence is characterised by being black-in- 
the-world and being white-in-the-world, which suggests that there are differences, and 
sometimes this negates blackness. Put simply, black humanity becomes absent in the world, 
as the body itself carries with it the undesirable, and ceases to be part of the view and 
therefore has to register to the world.  
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More (2008) argues that by virtue of the historical fact of oppression, the reality of blacks is that 
of race and racism. He states that the selfhood of blacks deals with being-black-in-the-world, 
where the question of existence is embodied in the lived experience of black. Thus, for a black, 
there are questions and struggles around the issues of existence and suffering which embody 
the predicament of race and racism. According to More (2008), racism not only constitutes 
(mere) discrimination, but includes the manner in which power is practised, exercised and 
manipulated to control the lives of oppressed and excluded blacks. This allows the issue of 
race to claim hierarchy and, as such, it is reduced to a level where racism is normalised and 
naturalised. As a result, a life of blackness is that of a racialised reality.    
Zahar (1974) posits that blacks suffer principally for not being white. A racist infrastructure 
indicts blackness, and that is why racism systematically and crudely attacks the black body. 
According to JanMohamed (1983:5), „the colonialist ideology is designated to confine the 
native in a confused and subservient position‟.  The black body which is the object, and also a 
possession, stands to be emptied of all humanity, and is associated with negativity. Zahar 
(1974) also points out that blackness is alien to whiteness – in this regard, Fanon states clearly 
that blackness cannot integrate itself into whiteness, since blackness is seen everywhere; that 
is, blackness is over-determined without. Zahar (1974:35) writes that „racial discrimination 
which is mediated by all the institutions of colonial society, determines the individual and social 
conduct of the coloni[s]ed person both in his living together with the other coloni[s]ed and his 
relations with the coloni[s]er‟.   
Gordon (1995:17) points out that „[t]he dynamics of visibility and invisibility play important roles 
not only in Fanon‟s thought, but also in the whole corpus of phenomenological efforts to 
describe social reality‟. Skewed visibility in terms of existential experience amounts to bad faith. 
Gordon states that the dimensions of bad faith, which assume the form of the individual and 
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the institutional, determine whether the black subject is seen or not, since the dimension itself 
is about „the seer and the seen‟.  
Gordon (2007) engages with the primary condition of appearance, the black skin. It is through 
this condition of experience where the non-existence of black is unravelled: „There is a zone of 
nonbeing, an extraordinary sterile and arid region, an utterly naked declivity where an authentic 
upheaval can be born‟ (Fanon [1952] 2008:2). Since the structures of oppression use race as 
the organising principle, Gordon (2007:5) argues that such structures are „embedded in anti-
black racism and the problematic presence of the black‟s subject‟. Gordon (2007) foregrounds 
the condition of appearance which is a form of emergence, namely black skin reflecting an 
ontology of non-being. His thinking can be connected with Fanon‟s existential political thought, 
in which the black subject appears as something that is ultimately turned into an object. The 
objectification of blackness can be directed at the black condition which is pathology par 
excellence.  
According Zahar (1974:27), „Fanon formulates his own experiences with the intention of 
demonstrating to his fellow-sufferers the socio-psychological mechanisms which conceal the 
causes of their oppression‟ as a way to rid them of the complexities of colonialism that are 
packaged in racial discrimination and its ideological function of oppression. The modes of 
oppression are hidden to make it impossible to point out the real source of oppression.   
According to JanMohamed (1983:3), „[s]ocial pathology is produced by the fact of domination 
and race‟. Blackness is an experience that often finds itself in structural violence. Such 
violence takes the form of slavery, colonialism and racism. This means that blackness is 
negated by structural violence to realise its agency, and therefore, blacks are organised by 
violence as the workings of race and racism take shape as something „normal‟. 
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The facts of the historical scandal and conditions of those who are affected come to light when 
one studies Fanon (Bulhan 1985). According to Bulhan (1985), the oppressor dehumanises the 
oppressed to maintain power and privilege, the oppressed forfeit their humanity and fear 
confronting institutional violence. This state of affairs allows the black condition to remain 
intact. This dehumanisation, as Bulhan (1985:12) shows, is something that can be referred to 
as „physical, psychological and social death‟. It is in this state of affairs that the black condition 
is a challenge that needs to be met to make a life of blackness sufficiently bearable to survive 
in the hellish zone of non-being (Gordon 2007).  
Bulhan (1985) argues that the life of blacks is characterised by violence which dehumanises 
the personality of blacks. He identifies three forms of violence, namely personal, institutional 
and structural violence, none of which can exist and operate in isolation, as they reinforce and 
depend on each other. However, Bulhan warns that these three levels of violence are 
contextual – therefore, they cannot always be looked at together, because in some societies 
they serve a common purpose and in others a different purpose. This creates a condition 
between victims and perpetrators whereby „structural violence enjoys sanctions of ruling 
authorities and appears diffuse and very much linked with social reality‟ (Bulhan 1985:136).  
Bulhan‟s (1985) conceptualisation indicates that structural violence cannot occur without 
institutions and persons, through which it finds expression. 
Wilderson III (2008) argues that blacks do not possess a human life, but a „black life‟ – that is, 
a life that is already dead, since blacks die because they lived. Building on Gordon‟s 
ontological schema of presence as absence, Wilderson III (2008) introduces three layers of 
black absence. The first layer is absence as subjective presence, which means that the world 
cannot accommodate blackness at the level of subjectivity. In terms of this layer, seeing a 
black is seeing a black – something which precedes humanity because of the visibility of 
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blackness is a priori. Wilderson III (2008:98) argues that blackness is „an ontological freeze 
that waits for a gaze, rather than a living ontology moving with agency to the field of vision‟. 
The second layer is the absence of a cartographic presence, which means that the life of the 
black is about fate, while that of the white is about freedom. According to Wilderson III, the life 
of blacks is about „when‟. In other words „when will I be arrested, stopped by police, get 
violated‟ and so forth. The third and final layer is the absence of political presence, which does 
not allow for „the temperature of the black‟s grammar of suffering‟ (Wilderson III 2008:99). This 
implies that when blacks make demands, these demands are not met, since they are rendered 
impossible. The agency of blacks is thus negated, since blackness is something that is absent 
from the political world.  
Wilderson III (2003) argues that blackness is a scandal in that its structural position threatens 
the status quo. He suggests that blackness as a subjective position presents an antagonism 
that cannot be satisfied. The existing structures deprive black modes of articulation; as such 
blacks, who are slaves, have no transactional value. Blackness does not call for taking into 
account and the plague of pathologies that befall blacks in the black condition reduces them to 
non-entities.  
Hook (2004:115) is of the view that in the Fanonian sense, human psychology is intimately 
linked to socio-political and historical forces, which explains how the workings of power come 
into play. Hook also maintains that analysing power brings to light ways in which the logic and 
workings of power are dramatised, particularly those of colonial racism. Such analysis is 
possible through the critique and excavation of power in which the conceptual and theoretical 
framework is related to the black experience and the black condition.  
Furthermore, Hook (2004:115) argues that in analysing power, race needs to be taken into 
account. Hook (2004:128) defines racism as a complex phenomenon as „a system of values 
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using both the racism of the body and racism of the mind‟. According to Hook, racism of the 
body is related to concrete physical or material defects, while racism of the mind is abstract 
and includes intangible attributes such as culture, psychology and values, to name but a few. 
Each is used to justify and legitimate the other, on the basis of Manichean thinking and 
structures, which are dynamic in fertilising self-perpetuating cycles of racism. However, not all 
blacks are subject to an in-between position, as some are well off economically and socially 
and „they might not be subject to the level of racist objectification, that is a scandal‟ (Hook 
2004:136).  
The national bourgeoisie as parasites  
Fanon ([1961] 1990:123) is a severe critic of „the national middle class [as they] have nothing 
better to do than to take the role of the manager‟. This means they are content with an 
intermediary role rather than a revolutionary role. In this form, the national bourgeoisie 
assumes the role of being a manager for the capitalist system. Because they are reduced to 
mere managers, the national bourgeoisie have no control or ownership of the economy or in 
fact of the political system other than to ensure the status quo. Fanon emphasises this notion 
as follows:  
Seen through its eyes, [the bourgeoisie‟s] mission has nothing to do with transforming 
the nation; it consists; prosaically, of being the transmission line between the nation 
and a capitalism rampant though camouflaged, which today puts on the masque of 
neo-colonialism. (Fanon [1961] 1990:122).  
 
Fanon ([1961] 1990:122) accuses the bourgeoisie by pointing out that „the spirit of indulgence is 
rife among the national bourgeoisie‟ even in the face of abject poverty. Thus a politics of 
acquisition, pleasure and consumption, do not transform the economy for the benefit of the 
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people and they are rampant. In essence, the role of a black national bourgeoisie is taking over 
from the white master without changing anything, which demonstrates the paralysis of this 
class. Fanon ([1961] 1990:122) argues that „nationali[s]ation quite simply means the transfer 
into the native hands of those unfair advantages which are the legacy of the colonial period‟.   
 
Fanon‟s contempt for a national bourgeoisie arises from his view that they insult the black 
majority by using collective rhetorical phrases such as „our people‟ or „we as the nation‟ while 
serving their own interests at the expense of the excluded black majority. These interests are 
sectional and narrow, but may be concealed by the claim of serving national interests (Pillay 
2004). Such rhetoric, though it is a lie, is something that has turned into a truism which is 
regarded as blasphemous to oppose, and whose merits may not be questioned. Their role is to 
enjoy privileges wedded to political patronage, and they will fight to the bitter end to remain part 
of the cabal of the ruling elite. 
Intellectual alienation is a creation of middle class society. What I call middle class-
society is any society that becomes rigidified in predetermined forms, forbidding all 
evolution, all gains, all progress, all discovery. I call middle-class a closed society in 
which life has no taste, in which the air is tainted, in which ideas and men are corrupt. 
And I think that a man who takes a stand against this is in a sense a revolutionary. 
(Fanon [1952] 2008:175)  
 
The black bourgeoisie are mere poseurs as when they are „reduced in numbers and without 
capital... [and they] will fall into deplorable stagnation‟ (Fanon [1961] 1990:121). They are 
devoid of rootedness, as their status does not reflect the reality of the black majority, who are 
the damned as Fanon calls them, they are trapped in the black condition of dispossession, 
landlessness and oppressive labour relations, which a black bourgeoisie tends to perpetuate, 
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because revolutionary change is absent from their political imagination. They were and are 
characterised by paralysis, which creates a form of contemporary slavery for the black majority.  
The black national bourgeoisie are a comprador class, who are the poor imitation of the 
colonialist bourgeoisie, as their race betrays the condition of their parasitic accumulation and/or 
possession of wealth. They live a life of capitalism without being capitalist, that is, they are 
mere appendages of capitalism. Fanon ([1961] 1990:122) points out that „the national middle 
class consistently demands the nationali[s]ation of the economy and of the trading sectors‟. 
This demand is not underpinned by crude plans to distribute wealth to the masses but is 
intended purely to serve the bourgeoisie‟s own interests.  
According to Hansen (1977), the national bourgeoisie have little or no revolutionary potential, 
and this constitutes an absence of consciousness. Any revolutionary potential that the national 
bourgeoisie might possess disappears as soon as political reform sets in, either by means of 
independence or liberation. Hansen (1977) states that the unchangeability of the colonial 
institutions suggests that there will be no change in the relations between the ruler and the 
ruled. Put simply, if the institutions remain the way they are when liberation takes place, there 
will be no fundamental change to the lives of those who are or were oppressed. As a result, 
oppression will continue in many guises, since these institutions militate against the 
fundamental change that should take place in the lives of the oppressed. Change means the 
recreation and destruction, if necessary, of the colonialist institutions and structures in order to 
create the new forms of life.  
It is argued that when the national bourgeoisie assume power and have access to such 
untransformed institutions, they reproduce, even in the worst perpetual form, much that 
militates against the interests of blacks who are excluded and oppressed. As Fanon ([1961] 
1990) argues, the intellectual laziness of the black elite blocks all forms of political imagination, 
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as they would prefer to maintain the status quo. Hansen (1977) suggests that the intellectual 
laziness of the black elite allows the phenomenon of alienation of the oppressed to persist, 
since change is abstract and cosmetic, allowing regression to occur.  
The national bourgeoisie are slavish in their mimicking of the colonialist bourgeoisie. Moreover, 
they are worse than their model, in that they are mere midwives, since they do not produce 
anything to the benefit of the nation. Hansen (1977) warns that Fanon‟s characterisation of the 
national bourgeoisie is sometimes flawed. Firstly, Fanon sees the black elite in a mechanistic 
way in that he suggests that they operate in a deterministic manner. Secondly, he 
homogenises them, as if there are no conflicts among them. Lastly, Fanon is criticised for not 
taking the contextual factors into account with regard to the bourgeoisie and the non-
bourgeoisie, because relations between them are not always antagonistic.  
Hansen (1977:139) argues that „Fanon‟s attitude toward the national bourgeoisie is also 
ambivalent‟ because Fanon argues for the abolition of the native bourgeoisie, while he also 
argues that they could play a progressive role. However, it is clear from Fanon‟s account that 
the native bourgeoisie are discounted and disfavoured since they are devoid of the 
revolutionary spirit that Fanon advocates because they are caught in the dilemma of mimicry. 
Regarding this mimicry, Fairchild (1994) goes further, claiming that the mentality of the national 
bourgeoisie is colonised, in that they have turned into the spokespersons of the coloniser. This 
is done at the expense of the peasants on whom the national bourgeoisie turn their backs to be 
closer to whiteness. „Moreover, the nationalist bourgeoisie – those who assume leadership 
after the revolution – are caught in an approach-avoidance conflict in seeking to be 
independent of the colonial system but friendly to it‟ (Fairchild 1994:195). In this friendliness, 
there is a high level of fiscal dependence and indebtedness to former colonialist structures and 
some fear of recreating or overhauling the whole system. This means, „government should be 
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deconstructed and decentralised, and privileged classes are to be vigorously opposed‟ 
(Fairchild 1994:197). 
Mbeki (2009) argues that independence did not bring about economic change in Africa but 
entrenched inequalities inherited from colonialism. This means that change only occurred at 
the political level. According to Mbeki, this creates a situation, as Fanon puts it, where the 
national bourgeoisie replace white bourgeoisie. Such elites do not address the real change that 
is desired, and nor does it direct change towards changing the template of the economy and 
redistributing and empowering those who are marginalised. Instead „the exploitation of the 
black masses continue[s] as before‟ (Mbeki 2009:7). According to this view, the national 
bourgeoisie are a liability.  
Agreeing with Fanon, Mbeki (2009:19) writes: „African elites today sustain and reproduce 
themselves by perpetuating the neo-colonial state and its attendant socio-economic systems of 
exploitation, devised by the colonialists‟. Mbeki also concurs with Fanon that this state of affairs 
does not benefit the masses, but only a politically connected few. In other words, this does not 
benefit the nation, rather, it benefits only the national bourgeoisie, who merely consume and 
who are unable to absorb the new methods in which the economy can benefit the masses. This 
puts the national bourgeoisie into perpetual defeat, as there is a lack of political organisation 
for the poor; hence their demands are frowned upon as impossible. However, the national 
bourgeoisie continue to live in a manner that is an insult to the excluded.  
Furthermore, the national bourgeoisie bring the economy to stagnation, as they only consume 
without producing anything.  Mbeki adds that they are made into new masters who are junior 
partners anyway, and they are corrupted to defeat their own nation and fail their own people 
whilst thinking they are progressive. This situation reflects the artificiality that Fanon is against, 
and the corruption of the national bourgeoisie then refers to those who are mere managers and 
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who use the same template of exclusion and exploitation that has been used by the colonial 
masters, but possibly in an exacerbated form.    
In this state of affairs, the national bourgoisie become the midwife of a white capitalist economy 
in that, like whites, they perpetuate black suffering and make no contribution to bringing about 
fundamental changes in the lives of the black majority, even though they themselves are black. 
The national bourgeoisie live a political life that is in most instances non-democratic and in 
opposition to the will of the people. Their political imagination is a mirage, devoid of any sense 
of liberation. This is confirmed by Salih: 
The elite‟s monopoly of the democratic process, through non-democratic structures, 
has strengthened its control over the state and development. Rather than being 
democratised, state and development have become instruments for the political 
legitimisation of an exclusive political elite. (Salih 2001:39)   
The national bourgeoisie represent themselves, and they can claim in rhetoric that they have 
the best interests of the people at heart. However, they enrich themselves at the expense of 
the people who voted them to power (Salih 2001). Self-interest typifies the national 
bourgeoisie, who manipulate and suppress the consciousness of the oppressed to keep them 
docile. Salih (2001) argues that legitimacy, leadership and opportunities for political 
participation in a post-colonial context are artificial, since they are undermined or do not exist in 
totality.  
Salih (2001) proposes that there should be greater political education to increase political 
awareness to counteract indoctrination. In his view, raising the political consciousness of the 
black masses is desirable. An embryonic national bourgeoisie has no strong base, which 
shortens their political imagination so that they fail to see the importance of building a nation 
from the ruins of colonialism and do not recognise the predicament of a post-liberationist state. 
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Hence, they act in a manner that serves the status quo, in line with a desire to fill their own 
pockets.  
Gibson (2003:113) believes that „the national bourgeoisie cannot be real... but only a poor 
copy, a huckstering caste‟. They cannot create a condition where there are new ways of life 
which are necessary to bring fundamental change to the oppressed. As a result, they 
themselves will end up as oppressors and will engage in witch-hunts to eliminate those who 
question their self-interested and contradictory lives. This situation implies that the legacies of 
the colonial world will be reinforced and that what is claimed to be liberation will be a mere 
illusion since things will remain the same for the oppressed.  
The national bourgeoisie do not want to be awakened, because their only long-held fantasy is 
to replace the master. Such a replacement will ultimately serve the master, since structures 
and conditions remain unchanged. Gibson (2003) argues that the national bourgeoisie will not 
have any hostility to the master, but may become hostile towards their own people: „The 
native‟s mimicry of colonial action, which represents a reaction to colonialism, is expressed in 
the wish to take the masters‟ place‟ (Gibson 2003:114).   
Native intellectuals’ consciousness 
Native intellectuals should derive their ideas from the people‟s lived experiences and they 
„must fashion the revolution with the people‟ (Fanon [1961] 1990:167). It is in this form that the 
ideas of the intellectuals will be the rhythm of the people. A native intellectual‟s role should be 
central to the processes of acting and practising with the masses. The claims of the native 
intellectual are a „necessity in a coherent programme‟ (Fanon [1961] 1990:170). Fanon 
therefore engaged with the notion of the native intellectual, and calls for intellectual activity to 
be grounded and mainly focused on dismantling the denial of human agency: 
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The native intellectual who takes up arms to defend his nation‟s legitimacy and who 
wants to bring proofs to bear out that legitimacy, who is willing to strip himself naked to 
study the history of his body is obliged to dissect the heart of his people. (Fanon 
[1961] 1990:170) 
Following his sustained critique on the predicaments of the decolonisation phase and its 
aftermath, Fanon argues that a native intellectual should think with the people. Intellectual work 
should not be about enlightening people through opinion and analysis – but rather the creation 
of a reality that dismantles the conditions that oppress and dehumanise blacks.  
Fanon ([1961] 1990:178) warns that the native intellectual should not „talk down‟ to people, 
since doing so is „a banal search for exoticism‟. He adds that a „native intellectual who comes 
to his people by way of cultural achievement behaves in fact like a foreigner‟ (Fanon [1961] 
1990:180). This implies that native intellectuals who write with the high sense of cultural 
purpose could be deemed irrelevant because they perpetuate the civilising mission and are not 
in sync with the lived experience of black people. Fanon also adds that such behaviour is 
opportunistic, since such an intellectual does not have the interests of the people at heart but is 
merely furthering his or her own interests.  
Native intellectuals should think with the oppressed people in a manner that allows the people 
to question their ways of existence. Fanon warns: 
Colonialism is not satisfied with merely holding a people in its grip and in emptying the 
native‟s brain of all form and content. By a kind of a perverted logic, it turns the past of 
the oppressed people, and distorts it, disfigures and destroys it. (Fanon [1961] 
1990:169) 
The distortions which are propagated as the truth and the complexities that are found in the 
spider‟s web of this state of affairs are the issues that the native intellectuals should 
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disentangle. That is to say that the native intellectuals as the torch bearers for the people must 
think with the masses in a manner that ensures mutual cooperation and, to a large extent, 
solidarity. Fanon ([1961] 1990) suggests that the role of native intellectuals in the process of 
decolonisation must be directed towards bringing about agency, which is brought into being 
through consciousness.  
Fanon mentions three phases of the activity of native intellectuals. In the first phase, there are 
native intellectuals who give proof that they have been assimilated. In the second phase, the 
native intellectual is disturbed and tries to remember what he or she is. The third and final 
phase, the intellectual will awaken the people, and this is the phase that Fanon regards as the 
fighting phase: „If the action of the native intellectual is limited historically, there remains 
nevertheless the fact that it contributes greatly upholding and justifying the actions of 
politicians‟ (Fanon [1961] 1990:175).  
Fanon points out that the predicament of the native intellectual arises from a desire to be 
assimilated. This occurs in the form of native intellectuals‟ often adopting intellectual tools that 
are alien to the condition that they must address, and thus often the thought pattern of the 
colonial bourgeoisie (Fanon [1961] 1990). He states that this creates a condition where native 
intellectuals carry out two-sided discussions in which they „can eliminate themselves when they 
are confronted with an object or idea‟ (Fanon [1961] 1990:38). Such a native intellectual has a 
slim chance of credibility, since he or she is uncritical and may even claim to be the 
mouthpiece of the masses and/or the colonial masters.  
According to Fanon ([1961] 1990:47), „[t]he native intellectual has clothed his aggressiveness 
in his barely veiled desire to assimilate himself to the colonial world. He uses his 
aggressiveness to serve his own individual interests‟. Such a person, living in the mode of 
double discussion, is caught up in the dilemma of being accepted and rejected by both worlds. 
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Fanon ([1961] 1990:39) explains that „[t]he native [intellectual] replies to the living lie of the 
colonial situation by an equal falsehood‟. 
Fanon also argues that there is a possibility of rehabilitation of the native intellectual only if the 
intellectual understands the direction in which resources should be pulled. The native 
intellectual should be astute enough to understand the condition which affects the masses, as 
well as the masses‟ desire, though they do not spell it out, to stand in a place that allows them 
to live the life due to them. This life will make them humans, subjects, not objects. Native 
intellectuals should ground their work in the realities of the masses, but this is possible only 
through „having nothing to lose and everything to gain‟ (Fanon [1961] 1990:47).  
With the call to ground their intellectual work, Fanon (cited in Gibson 2007:37) puts forward a 
challenge to native intellectuals to „locate the site of their struggle with the poor‟. Intellectuals 
are often in a dilemma in rejecting the colonialist world and at the same time being in 
collaboration with it. Gibson (2007) argues that an intellectual who claims to have rejected 
colonialism may fail to understand the notion of the anti-colonial struggle and the contradictions 
which inform, or are part of, the struggle itself. In this regard, nationalist intellectuals are 
sometimes opportunistic and haphazardly propagating the essentialist the aspects of culture 
through populist rhetoric which holds no benefits for the national struggle. Gibson (2003) 
believes that one of the pitfalls for intellectuals and the middle class is their unpreparedness 
with regard to national liberation as they lack political imagination. The native intellectual‟s role 
is that of being informed by action, while agency is brought about by a dialectic from below 
(Gibson 2003).  
Native intellectuals struggle between the poles of being progressive and being reactionary. 
Those who are progressive are a bane to the hegemony, and face marginalisation, or worse, 
they may face being incarcerated for their ideas. Gibson (2003) argues that Fanon‟s 
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understanding of the native intellectual suggests that such a figure plays both a critical and a 
problematic role in the movement toward liberation, but should be part of the nucleus of the 
struggle for liberation. This is the movement which is agitating for liberation, a movement that is 
in the interests of the people, and critical of those in power. Those at the other pole are indeed 
enjoying the benefits when they stand for the powers that be. This polarisation has 
characterised the political world to a large extent.  
According to Fanon ([1961] 1990:179), political education advocates action, which then makes 
the native intellectual „the awakener of the people‟. Gibson (2003) argues that political 
education brings fundamental shifts to politics in which the dialectic of black liberation is 
continuous and deepened. Political education should encourage the excluded black majority to 
think and to speak for themselves, not to be spoken for by native intellectuals. He explains that 
it is of „central importance, even as Fanon introduces the need for organising, [to build] up the 
self-confidence of the masses‟ (Gibson 2003:165).  
Maldonado-Torres (2005) comments that intellectualism faces the predicament of conformity, 
which is a denial of humanity in an anti-black world. He therefore calls for intellectual activity to 
be grounded and to focus mainly on dismantling a denial of injustices that goes against 
humanity. By virtue of being black, native intellectuals are positioned in a predicament of 
subject formulation, as they are considered „to be devoid of any rationality‟ (Maldonado-Torres 
2005:151). According to Maldonado-Torres, Fanon followed a route of a sustained critique of 
the colonial project. „The task is to end up with inhumanity and to restore humanity‟ 
(Maldonado-Torres 2005:159). Intellectual work should be about awakening people‟s 
consciousness and to create a reality that is not antithetical to this consciousness.  
Gibson (2007:38) describes the militant on the run, expelled from the nationalist party and 
trade union – one who finds protection in shantytowns and marginal spaces outside the 
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colonial city. Political organisation and mobilisation occurs at the „local zones‟ and this has 
seen the growth of grassroots organisations and social movements. The militant intellectual is 
located within this zone and builds an existence among those whom Fanon calls the damned 
(Gibson 2007:38). The limitation to or the dilemma in this lies in the question of whether the 
militant might not be a spokesperson for the poor under the guise of revolution while in fact 
benefiting from the exploitation and exclusion of the poor.  
The pursuit of the creation of a new society for new personhood, the disruption and upsetting 
of social relations and arrangements of the (neo-) colonial structures and thinking, requires 
both the intellectuals and the people – what Fanon calls the damned of the earth (those blacks 
who are excluded, criminalised, and who live in the indignity of the black condition). 
Gibson (2007:39) claims that „[a]ll slogans and rhetoric on national unity, liberation and 
freedom fall away to reveal that the political kingdom is nothing other than a means to get rich‟. 
This argument holds water if intellectuals become elitist and as a result are co-opted or 
silenced, and the struggle is demobilised, which results in the collapse of the new forms of life. 
However, as a result of this, „[t]he honest intellectuals are imprisoned, the military takes over 
and the demonstrations are crushed‟ (Gibson 2007:40).  
Gordon (1995) argues that liberation constitutes existential dimensions, and it is in this case 
that masked reality should be uncovered. Gordon warns against bad faith, which involves 
writing away reality, and introduces a state where the alternative reality is written by the native 
intellectual. The native intellectual needs to engage on a deeper level with the absence of the 
black subject, since presence can only be brought about if there is recognition and awareness. 
In contrast to this role, native intellectuals can choose to be seduced by privileges and profits. 
Whether they do so determines their stance. If they succumb to this seduction, they will indeed 
act in the interests of capital and at the expense of the people. Essentially, what this means is 
32 
 
that, if the logic of capital does indeed deny the oppression of black people, such intellectuals 
would be intellectualising in a manner that is alien to black ways of life.  
According to Sono (1993), there are members of the political intelligentsia who toe the party 
line. These are the loyal and disciplined cadres who defend the party and government line by 
all means necessary. The political intelligentsia often becomes radical before being 
incorporated into power structures. Once they are in power and enjoy its trappings, they 
change. Sono (1993:55) argues that they are „always at the heart of representative politics‟. It 
is in this kind of political order where they must engage in a politics of promise, as they bow to 
the necessity of attaining and preserving political power.  
Such positionality differs from the power of intellectual analysis which aims to critique the site 
and the operations of power, which is possible through the „transformative power of ideas‟ 
(Crick 2006:131) and seldom sits well with the commissars of power or the political 
intelligentsia, as they propagate the hegemony of ideas. The politics of promise that are 
advocated by political intelligentsia or the commissars who serve power are based on 
manipulation, because the promises are never fulfilled while the politicians are in power. Thus, 
the political intelligentsia is necessary to propagate these promises as gospel truth and to the 
level where the fact that the promises are not fulfilled is often justified in a politically correct 
manner. The political party‟s or government‟s line is entrenched, to the point where populism 
may masquerade as intellectual analysis. The political intelligentsia reduces society to objects 
which must simply accept political rhetoric. Society in the gaze of the political intelligentsia is 
reduced to an „ideological prism and prison‟ (Sono 1993:57).  
Gagnon (1987) believes that intellectuals serve a duality that renders them both servants and 
critics of power. The intellectuals‟ perspectives suggest that there are varied interrelations 
between intellectuals and power. There are some intellectuals who subordinate themselves to 
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the ideas of the elites and others who maintain a critical stance. This also includes the issue of 
being passive and that of being active in the political discourse. Gagnon argues that 
intellectuals provide competing views, ideas which are diluted with access to power. There are 
some who legitimise dominant political views. They tend to be closer to power and therefore 
serve as protectors of power. By contrast, there are intellectuals who reject dominant political 
views by calling them into question if they are not in line with the public spirit or good. They are 
often not close to power, and are at times, marginalised. They are forces of change who 
maintain the line of speaking out against the status quo.  
West (1993) argues that black intellectuals should live the life of the mind, which is an isolated 
and much-insulted world. According to West (1993), becoming a black public intellectual 
presents a dilemma, which consists of wanting to remain within the realm of blackness (which 
implies being stigmatised) and at the same time wanting to stop resisting the pressure to 
achieve status, recognition, affluence and benefit from materialistic gains. Public intellectuals in 
their mid-way role are located between the great minds and the people as they transmit and 
popularise philosophical knowledge (Crick 2006).  
West (1993:67) argues that becoming a black intellectual is „a self-imposed marginality 
resulting to marginality in the black community and also to it‟. West adds that there are two 
camps of predicament of the black intellectuals, namely successful and unsuccessful ones. 
The successful ones are distant and condescending towards the black community. The 
unsuccessful ones are disdainful of the white intellectual world, as they are also scornful about 
white rejection. Both dangle between two worlds, as they have no institutional infrastructure. By 
their very nature, native intellectuals thus tend to respond with anger and are in fact 
antagonistic, because they are located in a problematic existence. Being black, and being 
intellectuals, Fanon ([1961] 1990) argues that they are by nature aggressive in response to 
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colonialism. According to Fanon, intellectuals substantiate the proof of the nation in the fight 
against oppression, and they must not be latecomers.  
Fanon and the meaning of liberation and being free 
The struggle for freedom and national liberation is dialectically linked to the struggle against 
colonialism (Fanon 1967). According to Fanon‟s thinking, this struggle requires a re-conversion 
of the colonial oppression. Liberation is informed by action and this is brought into being by „the 
dialectics of liberation‟ (Fanon 1967:173). Solidarity or agitation towards the realisation of 
liberation should not be just a rhetorical device – a mere voice devoid of action. Rather, as 
Fanon ([1952] 2008:135) argues, there should be „knock[ing] down the system and break[ing] 
the treaties‟. This is because freedom must be taken and defended, as it is not something 
given (Bulhan 1985; Gibson 2001, 2003; Gordon 1995). Fanon calls for the ethical reform of 
the world, where the black subject must be liberated from the yoke of oppression and its effects 
in a post-colonial situation.  
 
For Fanon (1965), the struggle for liberation undergoes modifications and does not follow a 
doctrine or dogma, because the struggle is based on an overarching reality. In the quest for 
liberation, there should be a concerted effort to break away from the status quo, and this 
requires political imagination. Fanon ([1952] 2008) thus argues that risking life is not the only 
method to obtain freedom, but rather, going beyond life towards the invention of the „new self‟ 
and living for the other.  
 
Fanon ([1952] 2008:171) also refers to a pseudo-liberation, which he finds unsettling, namely 
that the „black man was acted upon‟, and it is in this instance where there is no fundamental 
change in the post-liberation phase. For there to be a fundamental change, there needs to be a 
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concerted effort in which the masses effect the change. If they do so, such a change should 
speak directly to their condition. Since change signifies the invention of a new self, there 
should a modification of the problem(s) that the masses encounter (Fanon 1965).  
In putting Fanon‟s thinking into the context of national liberation, consciousness and freedom, 
Wright (1992:427) argues that „the pre-colonial nation is liberated and the creation of the „new‟ 
is the result of the national struggle‟. The discourses of decolonisation, nationalism and the 
problem of freedom are disrupted by colonialism and the complicity of the black compradors 
who are still fond of the colonial residue that they reproduce. This situation reproduces black 
suffering with the complicity and willing collusion of the black „comprador class‟. Fanon 
expresses this notion by arguing that oppression may wear a black face. For a new society to 
be created, „the colonial paradigm needs to be eliminated and destroyed altogether‟ (Wright 
1992:428).  
To counter this „law of repetition‟, Fanon (1965:6) argues that „it is inevitable that the people 
must take its destiny into its own hands‟. It is they, not the national bourgeoisie, who are at the 
forefront of suffering, and are caught in the trap of the effects of colonialism and post-colonial 
cosmetic changes. Thus, the people must create and achieve their own liberation. For there to 
be fundamental change, there needs to be people-driven social change, not change which is 
managed to perpetuate historical exclusions, which are then legitimated in the contemporary 
post-colonial condition. Such legitimacy exists on the basis that the beneficiaries of the colonial 
crumbs seek to stand for all the formerly oppressed, and they become annoyed when they are 
reminded that they are not in service of the nation, as Fanon points out. 
The consolidation and unification of the people – the oppressed in particular – is of cardinal 
importance (Fanon 1965). This allows them to push for change, since they are should belong 
to the world in which they sense reality, and their expression should not be in vain. The 
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oppressed must be new beings in the world, and as such, they must be their own political 
directors, who should not be spoken for, or acted upon. Fanon (1965) argues that change 
resulting from liberation is not a back-and-forth emergence from ambivalence, but it is a 
„dialectical progression‟. This is not a romanticisation of the African past and culture, but a new 
language articulated to pursue the very basis of the consciousness that will speak directly to 
liberation.   
The precondition for liberation is that the oppressed must confront their reality by objecting to 
its negative aspects and acting upon that reality (Freire 1972). This is only possible if the 
oppressed agitate for genuine liberation, which is the anti-thesis to the black condition, for 
there cannot be any liberation in the presence of the black condition of oppression. In this 
sense, the oppressed should be part of the process of liberation and it should not be mediated 
on their behalf, as  happened during the transition from apartheid to democracy, which led the 
oppressed into „the populist pitfall which transform[s] them into masses which can be 
manipulated„ (Freire 1972:41, original emphasis).  
In most post-liberationist societies, there are often calls to turn back to a given culture, in which 
narratives of rigid traditionalism dominate and appeals are made to return to an overly 
romanticised and idealised culture. Such an approach assumes that culture is static and serves 
as an important source of liberation. Wright (1992) argues that Fanon rejects such a stance 
because it will not yield black liberation in the sense of bringing about a new personhood. For 
there to be a national liberation, the „social revolution must distribute the fruits of national 
liberation struggle to the nation„ (Wright 1992:432). This is not often the case, because national 
liberation is still unborn and the majority of blacks are suffering and are still excluded from the 
forms of lives that will bring liberation.   
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True liberation is a politics of renewal, where there is a (re)construction of the oppressed who 
have been deprived of humanity and subjectivity. Wright (1992:432) argues that „this new order 
must eradicate the inequalities that are an integral part of the colonial society„. This reflects 
genuine liberation in which the new personhood emerges in a new order in which blacks enjoy 
the fruits of liberation. In support of such a revolution, Wright (1992:433) supports a liberation 
struggle as necessary for a construction and deconstruction of the new order.  
According to Wright (1992:428), the „elimination of the colonial paradigm is a vital part of the 
(re)construction of the new social reality„. Wright sees this elimination through the prism of the 
national liberation struggle and social revolution, both which can occur in isolation or in tandem 
and at a personal and/or national level. Such a (re)construction is necessary because colonial 
society is in constant flux, and creates its own structures that militate against the oppressed.  
The oppressed need to take into account that colonisation is about a domination and 
exploitation that dehumanises and objectifies blacks. The lines of the national liberation 
struggle and social revolution are the atomised machinery of blacks, which Fanon describes as 
the site where the leadership of the national liberation struggle and social revolution is 
contested. It can be argued that colonialist institutions remain intact, hence the psychological 
bondage of blacks. 
Gordon (2007) insists that whites are the ones that should render life to blacks; even freedom 
should be „from‟ white – that is, blacks are wholly dependent on whites for their existence. 
However, such an existence is disastrous in terms of the recognition of people; hence, Gordon 
(2007:11) argues that „damnation means that the black lives the irrelevance of innocence„. He 
suggests that the absence of the self-other dialectic in racist situations implies an ethical 
eradication of relations. Maldonado-Torres (2008:103) holds a similar view and argues against 
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a „radicali(s)ation and naturali(s)ation of [an] ethics of war„. The absence of a self-other 
dialectic means living in the possibility of subjective death (Gordon 2007).  
Gordon (1995) also argues that human reality is characterised by contradiction, and human 
survival is the manifestation of that struggle. Such contradiction, Gordon (1995:16) posits, is 
„linked both to the free and unfree‟ mode of existence of human beings. Liberty extends itself in 
relation to desire, fulfilment and completeness, but the „factual horizon‟, that is, the black 
condition under the Manichean structure determines how that reality can extend. „Individual 
bad faith is lived by individuals in different situations in their lives‟ (Gordon 2007:19). Individual 
bad faith discourages recognition, and it takes the form of attracting humanity in the name of 
humanity, whereas there is no humanity with regard to blackness.                                                                                
According to Hansen (1977), Fanon was committed to praxis in pursuit of the liberation of the 
colonised subject. Hansen points out that Fanon‟s thinking in the quest for liberation is an 
action-oriented programme. A liberation of the consciousness is achieved through political 
education, because „freedom is the supreme destiny‟ of humankind, especially for blacks, „who 
have been denied such freedom„ (Hansen 1977:202).  
Freedom and liberation are inseparable for the black being; they should be achieved in totality 
in order to be realised. Hansen (1977) adds that alienation is an obstacle to the realisation of 
liberation, and needs to be overcome in order for liberation to be realised. According to Hansen 
(1977:119), it „is a fundamental change in the consciousness of the people of the country„. This 
is the change that permeates all structures of society, be they be political, social, cultural 
and/or economic. This is a new consciousness that changes even the perspective and manner 
in which blacks relate to the world – a new consciousness and a new form of life. 
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Conceptions of liberation, though much-lauded, often fall short when it comes to the black 
condition. The struggle for the decolonised is the articulation of the ideas of freedom. 
„Individual liberation cannot proceed without social liberation‟ (Maldonado-Torres 2005:157). 
The structural oppression which militates against black humanity and the recognition of this 
oppression creates a situation in which blacks by their lived experience are in a position to 
choose. Such a choice is dictated by action as a result of the „formation of subjectivity, self-
reflection, and the praxis of liberation‟ (Maldonado-Torres 2005:159). „Liberation can be 
achieved only through praxis, not with brass bands and national anthems, not with a flag and a 
few reforms at the top while faceless and “medieval” masses continue to stir down below‟ 
(Cherki 2006:176). Fanon calls for fighting for genuine liberation in which there will be no flag 
freedoms. For this genuine liberation to exist, there must be a confrontation with the colonialist 
regime, and the aim and the mission which is actional should be a way of totally dismantling 
that regime. The mercy of the colonial master is something to be rejected, since the master has 
no interest in the freedom of the slave or former slave.  
The audacity to transform and expand the political imagination is the driver of a quest for 
liberation for which there should be no ceiling. People in a struggle towards liberation should 
have one common goal: winning. Fanon ([1961] 1990:136) admits that „it must be said that the 
masses show themselves totally incapable of appreciating the long way they have come‟. For 
Fanon, it is not only important to fight oppression and advance liberation. It is equally important 
to forge ahead to continue to fight in the post-liberation phase against liberators who might 
oppress their own people. 
Liberation is often seen as a necessary condition for freedom. For the black world to reclaim 
itself and unshackle itself from captivity and bondage, it needs „complete independence from 
colonial power‟ (Pillay 2004:94). For Pillay, national consciousness comes into being with the 
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realisation of liberation. It is a self-awareness that provides agency towards a realisation of a 
new self. Essentially, this means that the realisation of the new being is an awareness of the 
absence of recognition in relation to the black subject. Pillay (2004) argues that Fanon‟s new 
(hu)man emerges through a national consciousness which is universal, not nationalism, which 
Fanon regards as sectional and narrow.  
Gibson (2003) argues that liberation has to be fought for, since independence that arises from 
a struggle to realise liberation is something that will make real gains, as opposed to cosmetic 
changes. If cosmetic changes continue to prevail, genuine liberation will continue to elude the 
masses. The masses will witness what Fanon refers to as pseudo-liberation in the form of flag 
parades and the singing of anthems. Fanon ([1961] 1990) regards pseudo-liberation or flag 
freedoms as a transfer of colonial power into the hands of national bourgeoisie who were in the 
forefront of black liberation, but who are quick to make concessions to their former masters. 
Such concessions will not result in changes aimed at unsettling the political reality.  
The national bourgeoisie will not bring about change, but will block the process of full 
decolonisation and will not allow the contradictions to the status quo to emerge (Gibson 2003).  
If these contradictions were to emerge, society will witness new rules as the old ones are 
abolished, so that the liberation that is afforded to the oppressed is not a mere masquerade 
instituted by parasitic national bourgeoisie, but one of „land and bread‟. Simply put, Gibson 
argues that social change is real change, where mass activity agitates for fundamental change, 
as opposed to the pseudo-equality assumed by the national bourgeoisie. The change they 
have undergone is superficial and deceptive, since it is merely a shift from one life to the other 
(Bulhan 1985). 
In true liberation, the oppressed are infused with a new sense of consciousness in which self-
determination and revolution are wedded to realise their being, as they transcend the state of 
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non-being – that is, an absence of subjectivity. Bulhan (1985) points out that self-determination 
and freedom should be claimed, and this is the contradiction to the misguided converts and 
assimilated elites who are „self-delusions elaborated into a culture of lies‟ (Bulhan 1985:117). 
These contradictions do not point to the reformist politics of the national bourgeoisie which 
cannot come to terms with the notion of social change, but are contaminated by the goal of 
taking the place of the master without changing anything (Gibson 2003).  
Wilderson III (2010) asks what it means for blackness to be free. He argues that a liberation 
which constitutes a structure of recognition and cooperation is far from blacks, which implies 
that blacks have no access to liberation, and blackness is peripheral to the structure of 
recognition and cooperation. The agency of blacks, which can inject enthusiasm for attaining 
freedom by themselves, is negated and to a large extent absent, in that agency is withheld.  As 
a result, there is no mode of blackness raising questions of recognition and cooperation. The 
liberation of blacks needs to occur at a deeper level, namely praxis. Wilderson III (2010:138) 
argues that blacks do not belong to themselves but „are already claimed by direct relations of 
forces‟. These forces have made blacks, even in the post-liberation era, unable to rid 
themselves of the curse of subservience and dependency.  
The world is characterised by the arrangement of an unethical political economy – that is, the 
world is anti-black. As Wilderson III (2008:111) believes that „the world is sutured by anti-Black 
solidarity‟. The political victory of liberation in an anti-black world remains an oxymoron, since 
blacks cannot attain recognition because there is no integrity of humanity for blacks. „For the 
[b]lack, freedom is an ontological, rather than experiential, question‟ (Wilderson III 2010:23). 
For there to be humanity for blacks, Wilderson III (2010) calls for the destruction of relationality, 
since it is in opposition to blackness. The prevailing discourses of liberation allow „slaveocracy‟ 
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of blackness in a neo-colonised way. This is a form of liberation that parasitises on blacks and 
maintains black suffering (Wilderson III 2010).  
The relevance of Fanon in South Africa after 1994 
The relevance of Fanon in post-1994 South Africa needs to be discussed. Firstly, the extent to 
which Fanonian thought relates to race and blackness is useful to the local arena since 1994, 
as race and blackness have become increasingly contested terrains in South Africa, and there 
are many narratives regarding what they constitute, many questions regarding its relevance, 
and how race and blackness are linked to the lived socio-political reality.  
Secondly, in using the analogy of a parasite for the national bourgeoisie as a parasite, Fanon 
acts as a prophet of doom. The presence and modes of operation of the black elite and their 
middle class represent the predicament of the post-liberation era, as they act out of self-
interest. Their politics of eating and exhibition are obscene, as Fanon forewarned.  
Lastly, native intellectual consciousness in the post-colonial era is important because native 
intellectuals should offer a lens through which the complexities affecting political life can be 
engaged. Hence, Fanon‟s thinking can be grappled with in respect of the role of the native 
intellectual.  
These three themes are indeed topical in that they are issues that form part of the socio-
political discourse and are highly contested. They bring to the fore the importance of 
understanding Fanon, particularly in relation to the post-1994 challenges. This chapter has 
sought to provide a background from whence to engage some of the political questions 
confronting South Africa. It has also shed some light into the manner in which existing social 
relations or existing power networks are rationalised under the mask of validity, fact and 
objectivity.  
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While the context of Fanon‟s thinking is different to the one currently experienced in post-1994 
South Africa, his works, Black Skin, White Masks and The Wretched of the Earth have proved 
to show tremendous foresight. It is clear that some of the diagnoses he made more than fifty 
years ago are still relevant to the post-1994 era. Maldonado-Torres (2008) suggests that 
Fanon‟s analysis of social dialectics penetrates deep into coloniality, and it is for this reason 
that Fanon‟s work remains relevant in the post-1994 era. The black condition which is 
encapsulated in Fanon‟s political thought is the lens through which this study will engage the 
post-1994 era in South Africa, and the thinking of three native intellectuals in that era. 
The post-1994 era in South Africa does not represent liberation as much as a transition which 
is still half way. No existential freedoms exist as yet as far as the black condition is concerned. 
Being in solidarity with the masses and betraying capitalism has not been high on the agenda 
in the transition from apartheid to the post-1994 political set-up. The black psyche is not yet 
liberated, and the African National Congress (ANC) manifests a colonial mentality of 
reproducing the former conditions and a weak imagination vis-à-vis a radical resolution of the 
black condition. This is in line with Fanon‟s caution: 
The political party may well speak in moving terms of the nation, but what it is 
concerned with is that the  people who are listening understand the need to take part 
in the fight if, quite simply, they wish to continue to exists. (Fanon [1961] 1990:167).  
Fanon‟s radical thought is provocative in that it allows for many of the issues in the current 
discourses to be engaged with. The location of Fanon‟s thought within South African political 
discourse calls for a number of trajectories and phenomena to be engaged with, and this 
chapter has sought provide the background to doing so. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the political thought of Fanon in relation to race and blackness, the 
nationalist bourgeoisie, native intellectuals‟ consciousness and the pitfalls of liberation. 
Clarification of these notions is necessary for this study, because  they allow an understanding 
of how Fanon engaged with these ideas in relation to a post-liberation political era. This 
chapter has drawn on Fanon‟s theoretical underpinnings in order to explicate his thoughts in 
relation to the contemporary era.   
This chapter has located the notion of race and blackness in Fanon‟s thinking by unpacking 
them in the world of the oppressor and the oppressed, black and white, master and the slave – 
thus race and blackness can be understood as asymmetrical power relations in which race is 
the determining factor. This suggests that the condition of race and blackness cannot assume 
relationality, but will remain in the order of the colonial era, with the black faces doing the work 
for white supremacy.  
Fanon‟s warning with regard to the national bourgeoisie as figures who engage in the politics of 
eating insatiably in the face of the poor and hungry majority is relevant. However, this critique 
of the national bourgeoisie is a warning which is largely ignored. The presence of the national 
bourgeoisie is an anti-thesis to the life of blacks, not even shaking off the pathology which is 
the black condition.  
The importance of native intellectuals‟ consciousness lies in the role the native intellectual can 
play in awakening the people – that is, blacks who are entrapped in the black condition. In the 
socio-political landscape, the relations of the native intellectual and the people call for the 
removal of the lines between them, so that they can be fused in the interests of their common 
struggle. Fanon‟s prophetic articulation of liberation in terms of its becoming, the pitfalls and 
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the creation of a new world clearly shows that most states which claim to be liberated must still 
face the challenges that come with liberation.  
Fanon forewarns readers concerning the reactionary tendencies that will arise as a result of 
wanting to claim the successes of liberation when in fact liberation has not taken place, since 
the legacy of the past is reproduced or extended by the black ruling class. Fanon understands 
the complexities and dynamics that constitute liberation, especially in the post-liberation phase, 
and hence he calls for the emergence of the black subject. Hence, the next chapter focuses on 
the positionality of Seepe, Mangcu and Mngxitama in relation to the problematics of race and 
blackness.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
SEEPE, MANGCU AND MNGXITAMA ON THE PROBLEMATIC 
OF RACE AND BLACKNESS 
 
Introduction  
This chapter aims to critically analyse the ways in which three black public intellectuals, Sipho 
Seepe, Xolela Mangcu and Andile Mngxitama, articulate and apply the notions of race and 
blackness in South Africa‟s post-1994 political landscape. In doing so, this study seeks to 
explore the positionality of these three black public intellectuals in relation to race and 
blackness by examining selected newspaper columns they have written. The factors that 
inform their positionality are important to understand. These include the ways they imagine the 
political, as far as race and blackness are concerned. The eventual outcome will shed some 
light on the extent to which they engage with the post-1994 discourse through the lens of 
Frantz Fanon‟s thinking.  
Seepe on race and blackness 
The argument advanced here is that Seepe‟s positionality is clear, but that there have been 
some shifts in his rhetoric. Seepe‟s articulation of race leans towards the black consciousness 
philosophy, which he uses as a lens through which to analyse race and blackness. In Seepe‟s 
writings, race is considered fundamental to understanding South African political discourse. It 
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is clear from his writings that an understanding of race is important, because it continues to 
persist as a discourse in society. According to Seepe (2007b), the notion of race can be used 
in a seductive manner to justify or make claims by citing victimology and applying essentialism 
by those who possess political connections in gaining access to white privilege and the 
establishment without fundamentally changing it (Rottenburg 2003).  
Seepe has been grappling with race in the historical-contemporary South African situation. 
According to Seepe (2009a, 2009c), oppression does not have only physical and material 
dimensions, but also psychological and cultural dimensions which are part of socio-political 
discourse. It is clear that oppression in South Africa has been largely understood in material 
and physical terms. The discourse of domination was largely driven by slavery and colonialism 
before apartheid, which was a solidification of black oppression. The oppression of the black 
majority was institutionalised and normalised. Thus, Seepe‟s discourse deliberates on the fact 
that race and racism are issues that could be traced through history and have left undesirable 
effects on the psyche of the black majority.  
Seepe traces the presence of domination to language and culture, which he argues embodies 
the racialised black being. Historical realities are distorted to feature in the present frame of the 
post-1994 era in which the issue of race and racism are engaged in a manner that is apologetic 
to the sensitivities of whites, which are pandered to, creating silences in the discourses of race. 
There are claims amongst a large section of society, especially those who are not the victims of 
racism or those affected by racism whether individually or institutionally, that the debates 
around race are not important, since they do not take the country forward. Their major concern 
is building South Africa into a better country.  
Seepe (2008a) argues that race is deeply woven into the fibre of the South African political set-
up and that its effects are felt in every facet of black life, since it forms part of the reality 
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experienced by the black majority. Although there are a variety of factors that blur this 
perspective, race still largely informs the socio-economic and political landscape in South 
Africa. As Gordon (1995) points out, race has been the basis on which society is organised, 
and it has become a mode of living. Hence, the continuing effects of this institutionalised and 
normalised arrangement cannot be dismissed, since it now forms part of the social script. 
In Seepe‟s view, the existence of blackness in the 20th century has been characterised by 
being colonised, powerless, despised, poor and landless (Seepe 1999). As a result of blacks 
being systematically dehumanised, dispossession has become associated with blackness 
(Gordon 1995, 2000; Wilderson III 2003, 2008; More 2008). The redressing of socio-economic 
injustices caused by race and racism are an integral component of building the nation and 
ensuring the flourishing of democracy. According to Durrheim and Mtose (2006), exclusion, 
oppression and marginalisation are issues rooted in apartheid. Racial hierarchies of power are 
still in operation in South Africa after 1994, and their effects perpetuate the legacy of apartheid 
(Seepe 2000a). However, some dispute that these hierarchies continue to exist – nevertheless, 
such hierarchies seem to be implicit, even though blacks currently manage political power.  
One of the complex issues of the post-1994 era is whether the current pathologies continued to 
be blamed on the past, while the present black government continues to marginalise and 
exclude the black majority, with only a few being rewarded for patronage through political 
loyalty. Kasese-Hara (2006:245) argues that „redressing social, economic and psychological 
imbalances is seen as the huge task to be undertaken to ensure equitable, unified and 
democratic society‟. This means that society is still evolving and that claims to the contrary are 
a form of an illusion. The legacy of the past is a reality, and to address this, change has to take 
place at the social, economic and psychological levels. Kasese-Hara (2006) argues that often 
structures of segregation, racism and racial discrimination are seen as interchangeable. This 
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implies that one has to take into account that they are still in operation, even if they are not 
recognisable.  
Seepe (2008a) believes that a system that dehumanises some human beings produces 
dehumanised human beings across the board. Seepe argues that history is littered with abuse 
and the inferiorisation of blacks, which remains entrenched in the living memory of the majority 
of blacks. Gordon (1995) has expressed a similar view, arguing that institutionalised power 
squeezes the socialisation of blacks into a dehumanised form. This is a condition that creates a 
pathology in the lives of the black majority, whose everyday reality is signified in their everyday 
living circumstances in places such as Soweto, Alexandra, Evaton and Yeoville.   
JanMohamed (1983:3) argues that „[s]ocial pathology is produced by the facts of domination 
and race‟. The concern for Gordon (1995) is that the form of life that is attached to blackness is 
a phenomenon of racial oppression. This means that racism is a „phenomenon which has 
historical, economic and social political connotations, in-built into all social systems‟ (Kasese-
Hara 2006:248). In this state of affairs, what is often proposed is not only overcoming 
oppression and advancing the cause of liberation, but also challenging the systems of 
oppression even in the post-liberation phase. Social and political reality suggests that, due to 
race and racism, and its after-effects in post-1994 discourses, blackness is associated with 
pathology. 
Seepe (2008a:20) concludes that any „discussion on race and racism that fails to highlight 
whiteness as beneficiaries of racism would be grossly inadequate‟. Seepe makes four 
propositions in this regard. The first is that modern racism should be understood as a lived 
experience. This means analysing the manner in which blacks articulate their own suffering 
under racism, which is occasionally covert. In this way, it is concerned with how such a lived 
experience is understood and whether blacks who are at the receiving end have enough space 
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to articulate racism in their own terms. The second proposition is that the experiences of racial 
discrimination are not only painful and stressful, but also have an impact on the whole lived 
experience of blackness (Seepe 2008a:20). The third proposition Seepe (2008a:20) outlines is 
that daily experiences affect the manner in which blacks behave. Lastly, daily experiences of 
racial hostility and discrimination are constituent elements of interlocking social structures and 
processes. Thus institutional racism has an invisible face and hands, but is felt in terms of its 
operations and effects. Apartheid consistently institutionalised and normalised race and racism 
in all facets of life. This concurs with the view expressed by Gibson (2003) that whiteness, 
backed by power, privilege and resources is seen as normalcy. Whiteness and economic 
power and privilege are closely intertwined in South Africa in the post-1994 era, although it is 
not always clear how those who oppose such a reality may be entangled in it, or assimilated in 
it while the status quo remains.   
Maldonado-Torres (2008:136) argues that there is a „fundamental contradiction between the 
existence of the world at large and one‟s own existence‟. He argues that the concrete reality of 
the black subject cannot be diluted. Essentially, he argues that there needs to be a thorough 
understanding of the power structures and the lived experience of blacks, since this cannot be 
simply reduced to a hybrid or entanglement while the legacy of the past still persists in defining 
the black condition, despite the tenacity of racism which continues to suffocate blacks in the 
post-1994 era.  
Seepe (1999) argues that race should be discussed and debated in an open and frank manner 
in South African political discourse. Race-related matters and issues should be confronted, 
since they continue to operate and constitute a part of the country‟s reality. It is this 
confrontation that ensures that measures are devised to deal with race and racism, and not 
deny its existence in and impact on society.  
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Seepe (1999) accuses both black scholars and intellectuals of being silent about the issue of 
race. He exclaims that ignorance is not the issue, but rather a fear to point out race. This fear is 
linked to the fact that these scholars and intellectuals avoid appraisals which could in effect 
make them unpopular.  It can be argued here that this silence is a result of black scholars‟ and 
intellectuals‟ yearning for acceptance, since being unpopular because of pointing out racism 
will cause them to be marginalised. Thus, this silence often pushes black scholars and 
intellectuals to shift their focus to the domain of non-racialism, which in effect says nothing 
about racialised realities. Seepe (2009a:11) contends that „blacks whose views coincide with 
those held by a majority of whites are said to be independent‟. It is in the pursuit of this 
independence and walking a tightrope that they will do nothing to unsettle white sensitivities, 
which are intricately linked to the claims of blacks regarding their own experiences. To ensure 
that such sensitivities are not shaken, Seepe argues that blacks are required not to act outside 
the script.  
Kasese-Hara (2006) suggests that blackness is regarded as something that should be civilised, 
and should, in effect, be in line with the aspiration to be white, but not totally white. Yancy 
(2005) argues that whiteness is performed and need not to be grasped, as it is a norm.  
According to this view, blacks behave according to the will of the white gaze in the ritual sense, 
since blackness is policed by the white gaze. This in turn creates the boundaries of policing the 
black body, where rigid boundaries of inclusion and exclusion are erected under the guise of 
fluidity and non-existence, as if the black body were something that is a free subject, whereas it 
is not.  
According to Seepe (2008a:20), „political correctness weighs so heavily on our lives that we 
have (un)consciously banished certain words in our daily discourse‟. In this state of affairs, 
blackness must behave according to the white norm and standard, and the contradiction in this 
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is the marginalisation of blacks. The model of black life is regarded as a deficit and the 
construction of white culture is treated as superior and normative, as a template in which the 
totality of society should be accommodated. This essentially means that blackness must seek 
accommodation into whiteness. In such an accommodationist arrangement, there is no race, 
since there are no races. This clearly implies an absence of racism, since it is something that is 
outlawed in the non-racial context.  
Seepe (2009a:11) points out that „[n]onracialism requires a deeper understanding of racism, its 
effects and all its manifestations‟. This is something that is absent in post-1994 South African 
narratives, which suggests the embracing of the constitutional principles with its guarantees. 
Due to black rule, the claims of justice and reparations that are due for the marginalised blacks 
seem to be absent, even at the level of the national imagination, and this prepares the way for 
equal participation to be absent as well, although it is touted to be at the forefront of the 
political reality. In this regard, Durrheim and Mtose (2006:153) claim that „race and segregation 
have been outlawed and Affirmative Action and Black Economic Empowerment and other 
progressive policies for change have been legislated and implemented‟. It is under this rubric 
that the black lived experience is rendered incapable of articulating the notion of race and 
racism, which creates fertile ground for whites to believe it is appropriate to speak on behalf of 
blacks.  
According to Seepe (1999:7), „we have allowed ourselves to be hoodwinked by seductive 
phrases such as rainbowism and non-racialism as if evoking these phrases in our speeches 
and literary footnotes would magically transport the country to the idyllic future‟. In this 
arrangement, the black experience is something that will be rendered useless by both whites 
and blacks who see the black experience as something that does not concern them. Blackness 
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cannot be reduced to oneness with whiteness as the rainbow nation miracle suggests, and as 
the political narrative of non-racialism propagates.  
Though there are some blacks in power, based on political power, the very structures that 
militate against blackness still remain intact. Blackness matches exact historical accounts, and 
is masked as if to suggest that it is not part of a socio-political reality which is reproducing itself. 
Anti-blackness is something that is stained deeply into the black skin and is structurally 
embedded to entrench the pathological state of affairs facing the black majority, but it is not 
inherently natural. Instead, it is something that is historically linked, because the legacy of 
apartheid is something that has changed structural arrangements to maintain a system of 
relation that makes race a determining marker in the manner in which society is constituted. As 
Gibson (2004) argues, if apartheid ended with the apartheid laws, it did not end the law of 
capital, leaving the black condition to continue to be a predicament even in the post-1994 era.  
Seepe (1998) argues that „whites oppressed and whites spoke on behalf of blacks as a matter 
of course‟. He is of the view that this practice has been and still is pervasive. This view is 
informed by the tendency for issues to get more attention when they are raised by whites. 
Seepe challenges the ANC for its tendency to use white party members to articulate the 
conditions which the majority of black people were subjected to. Seepe refers to this practice 
as „rent-a-white‟ and poses the question of why a predominantly black African organisation 
should have to deploy a white person to speak on matters that directly affect and afflict the 
black African community. Seepe goes further, claiming that there is nothing „new‟ in the new 
South Africa, because the struggle about affirmation and the validation of experience 
continues. Oppression is something that has been internalised by blackness, and the 
consciousness of blackness is structured by oppression (Bulhan 1985; Maldonado-Torres 
2008). 
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According to Seepe (1999), the black experience can be dismissed and can be referred to as a 
false consciousness. Seepe (1999) concurs with Peggy McIntosh in her essay, „White 
privilege: unpacking the knapsack‟, which argues that whites are taught not to recognise their 
privilege. Such a situation implies that white purity is prevalent and that translates into white 
supremacy, where only whites count and others do not, or blacks must be trying – not very 
successfully – to be like whites. This scenario has permitted most whites to be sufficiently 
arrogant to mediate the black experience and therefore act as spokespersons for blacks, even 
going so far as dictating the terms in which the race discourse should be facilitated. This 
tendency creates a situation where whites continue to dominate, and such domination is 
conferred by a privilege which is regarded as normal. Where this situation prevails, those who 
dare to point out that this privilege exists are quickly accused of playing a victim role.  
Blackness is still the issue, as there are organisations such as the Black Lawyers Association, 
the Black Management Forum and the now banned Forum for Black Journalists. The existence 
of these organisations suggest that the issue of race and blackness are part of a larger socio-
political landscape. Deeming them to be absent and declaring them irrelevant is to engage in 
the obscene, an illusion at best, which masks reality as far as the black condition is concerned. 
Seepe (2008b) writes that the disbanding of the Forum for Black Journalists was informed by 
the practice of using black people to discredit other blacks – a tried and tested strategy.  
Seepe (2008b:11) adds that „whites could rely on some blacks to validate their experiences‟ as 
these are blacks who will be quick to condemn those who speak about their lived experiences. 
These are blacks who are referred to as champions of racial transcendence as they are quick 
to deny any experiences of discrimination and racism. They reduce race and acts of racism to 
mere isolated incidents and call for thinking beyond and outside race. These are blacks whom 
Seepe, drawing on Malcolm X‟s typology, refers to as the in-house Negros and field Negros 
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(in-house Negros is a term referring to slaves living and eating in the house of the master). 
These are blacks who are determined to defend whites, even at the expense of the legitimacy 
of the black experience. The term „field Negros‟ refers to slaves who do not like the master and 
would not even save the house of the master if it burned. Both are enslaved, even though the 
in-house Negros may be in a seemingly privileged position.  
Seepe (2008b) argues that this uneven treatment of the oppressed has been played out 
throughout history. In this scheme of things, if the field Negro dares to stand up against the 
master, he or she would be roundly condemned or even lynched. According to Rottenberg 
(2003:444), „[s]o long as blackness is coded as undesirable under white supremacist regimes, 
only those black-identified subjects who strive to embody attributes associated with whiteness 
will gain admittance to some of the benefits of privilege and power‟. Blackness in these terms is 
something that should collapse itself into whiteness. However, the very same proximity to 
whiteness or aspirations to access its spoils often leads blacks to rebel against blackness, 
because white supremacy wants to ensure the totality of whiteness.  
Blackness often engages in survival mode since it is centred on a desire for „a civilised and 
(white) cultured life‟ (Rottenberg 2003:444)  Blackness, even if it is assimilated into whiteness 
and is lactified (from the Latin prefix lac-, lact-, for milk, implying made milky white), is not 
wholly white. Seepe argues that although racist legislation has been eradicated, and other 
forms of discrimination are decreasing, subtle forms of race discrimination still exist. Seepe 
(2008b:11) warns that „we need to disabuse ourselves of the notion of a South African miracle‟.  
According to Kasese-Hara (2006), white conservatives provide a rationale based on biological 
terms and theological explanations. White liberals may reject these, but at the same time be 
complicit in it. This complicity perpetuates a culture of implicit racism. The effects of some of 
the white liberals‟ and white conservative actions become explicitly racist. Kasese-Hara (2006) 
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warns that explicit racism will continue to feature in South Africa for the foreseeable future. 
„The Reitz Saga‟ where five black employees were videotaped eating food that had been 
urinated on, the „Skielik Shooting‟ where black people were killed without any reason, and 
white police officers beating a prominent Vereeniging lawyer are only a few explicitly racist 
actions that elicited shock and condemnation, although the reactions did nothing to solve 
racism.  
Seepe indicates that the notion of blackness is influenced by the Black Consciousness 
philosophy. Seepe (2007c) argues that Steve Biko grappled with the question of blackness, 
concluding that being black is a state of mind – that is, there is a need for psychological 
decolonisation. What this understanding of blackness overlooks is that blackness cannot be 
repaired by mere psychological forces. Indeed, Wilderson III (2008) argues that no programme 
of self-worth or psychological empowerment can bring blacks into humanity, because the 
structures that militate against blackness are designed to keep the anti-black world unchanged, 
or even to solidify itself through various guises in the form of cosmetic changes. As Wilderson 
III (2003:111) puts it, blacks „cannot attain relationality‟. He makes this statement on the basis 
of the argument that human relationality is absolutely in opposition to black humanity. Thus 
blacks cannot be restored to humanity because race is a vertical distribution of values within 
humanity. However, the black is a sentient being positioned below: the „unethical structure of 
humanity lies in the fact that its Other is the black‟ (Wilderson III 2008:108).  
In Seepe‟s (2007c) view, blackness is related to the issue of identity and the manner in which 
dignity is affirmed by blacks in their realisation of aligning themselves with transformation. He 
claims that the pertinent question for black consciousness is the continued submission or 
complicity of blacks surrendering under apartheid. Seepe (2007c) argues that racial 
consciousness and a sense of pride are the weapons of a state of mind which are used to 
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challenge white racism. As political entities, blacks can see themselves even in the face of 
pathological narratives and experiences as agents of change and resistance: they have 
internalised oppression to the point of negation.  
Even though blacks are a numerical majority, this may not be enough to make them the 
political majority, rather than a minority of whites who have the upper hand in political and 
economic terms. In order to overcome this political minority, Durrheim and Mtose (2006) 
propose that a change in black identity is possible through class consciousness, rather than 
individual change. The overarching vision of blackness is, multiplicity and conflict of identity, 
which suggests that liberation takes away what stands in front of blackness. According to this 
vision, blackness knows itself in terms of whiteness. That is, the white norms and standards 
are the ones that construct the mode of the existence of blackness. 
Durrheim and Mtose (2006) identify three overarching visions of blackness, namely 
psychological inferiority, political minority and, multiplicity and conflict of identity. Psychological 
inferiority internalises oppression which results and perpetuates the effects of self-deprecation, 
self-rejection and low self-esteem. This even leads to a (re)creation of the black condition since 
the psychological surroundings are nothing but a concentration camp in that life itself is lived 
on the basis of a fatalistic kind of being. Blackness is a predicament which survives by means 
of wanting to appear in the world. That is, because blacks do not exist, they want the approval 
and the affirmation of whites. The second vision of blackness, political minority, is paradoxical 
regarding the term minority itself, since in population terms blacks may be a majority, but 
possess a marginal stake in the economy, which actually means that they account for less in 
political terms. Blackness is that which shares the experience of racial oppression. 
Seepe (2005) states that blacks do not matter and they have to know their place. He makes 
two propositions with regard to the notion of blackness. The first is that blackness is the 
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deviation from the norm, and it is something that should be objectified. Secondly, he argues 
that blacks aspire to be white or equal to whites. This is indeed the problem that has plagued 
blackness and it is in these terms that blacks who aspire to be white despise their fellow blacks 
and their blackness.  
Seepe (1995) claims that blackness has been glued together with centuries of denigration, 
dehumanisation and oppression. Similarly, Wilderson III (2010) argues that the predicament of 
blackness is informed by structural imposition, which goes with monotheism and gratuitous 
violence – something that threatens the agency of the black subject. This means that the 
humanity of the black subject, through the black condition, is animated. The black condition is 
that of the downtrodden and oppressed, and this is the normalised and institutionalised state of 
affairs. As Bulhan (1985:123) puts it, „[p]rolonged oppression reduces the oppressed into mere 
individuals without a community or a history, fostering a tendency to private[s]e a shared 
victimi[s]ation‟. This is what constitutes the black experience, and for blacks to move to 
forward, blackness needs to be filled with assertion of cultural reclamation.  
Seepe (2005) affirms that this assertion of black identity needs to be turned into a positive 
force. For this force to exist, Seepe argues that blackness needs to be rid of alienation and 
self-loathing. As such, blacks must take ownership of the native question in that the „new South 
African identity should be informed by South African realities‟ (Seepe 2005:9).   
It is confusing for all races to declare themselves one when there are structures and institutions 
that are in total opposition to with this „oneness‟. What is there to be transformed or liberated if 
there is oneness? Seepe (2008b) contends that the very initiative of building a nation that 
clearly indicates that there are differences. The black race was adversely affected by historical 
injustices – although a selected few blacks are now in power, this has failed to change the 
discriminatory institutional and structural arrangements. Blackness is something that cannot be 
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reduced to oneness, since it is linked to the experiential reality of landlessness, poverty, and 
illiteracy which is in turn linked to historical exploitation, creating dispossession and affording 
whiteness privilege. As Saldanha (2006:11) states, „[t]he embodiment of race therefore 
encompasses certain ethical stances and moral choices. It informs what one can do, what one 
should do, in certain spaces and situations‟. 
Mangcu and racial transcendence  
Mangcu‟s (2000a) articulation of race and blackness is still part of the political discourse and 
the fibre of South African society, despite the end of apartheid. He argues that race and 
blackness need to be transcended, based on the understanding that South Africa is a nation 
under construction. Thus, there is currently a contestation of identities and political means are 
used to agitate for the struggle for human dignity and justice, a principled stance that Mangcu 
claims to take. Although he acknowledges that racism exists in covert forms, he argues that 
there is a tendency not to transcend racial solidarity.  
Mangcu (2000b) points out that there is a need to address racially inflected opposition politics. 
Paradoxically, even though the issue of race can be avoided by calling for non-racialism, or 
diluted through a politics of transcendence, race still haunts post-1994 South Africa. The 
legacy of apartheid continues with potent categories in the post-1994 era, with debilitating 
binaries of that system and order (Geertsema 2004). According to Geertsema, in the post-1994 
era, race matters, and essentialist discourse is part of it – even though there are projects such 
as nation-building and the illusion of the rainbow nation.  
The black condition in itself is something which cannot be accounted for in that the narrative of 
the post-1994 era, which is that of non-racial unity under the banner of the rainbow nation, 
„does not require any form of sacrifice from whites beyond the rhetorical accommodation and 
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psyche adjustments‟ (Hill 1997:67). Therefore the post-1994 era, which is still haunted by the 
black condition, has demonstrated that liberation was stillborn, and that seeing South Africa as 
pregnant with possibility is a very remote hope indeed.  
Mangcu (2000a) argues that both blackness and whiteness must undergo some modification in 
order to build a non-racial democracy. The modification referred to here is racial syncretism, in 
which, according to Mangcu, the change of black people in relation to their identities is linked to 
the changing circumstances in which they find themselves. The transition that South Africa is 
undergoing, especially at the site of identity, goes hand in hand with white denial of the issue of 
race and historic injustice inflicted on the black majority. This may also be described as a 
denial of a crime against humanity.  
Dealing with race by trying to find ways to create a better South Africa without uprooting the 
country‟s institutionalised and naturalised hegemonic structures seems to be a mockery. The 
country is still divided socially, politically and economically, and these divisions are a testimony 
to the reality of the country. It is even hard to deal with the question of race in the country. 
South Africa is still caught in a dichotomy of white privilege and black exclusion which serves 
as proof that the legacy of the past is continuing under the black government.  
There is a tendency to believe that race is no longer the issue since apartheid has been 
dismantled, but this viewpoint is silent on the legacy of apartheid that is still part of the post-
1994 political era. „Whites claim that racism is the thing of the past and they are suffering 
reverse racism‟ (Mbembe 2007:2). Some whites have even resorted to emigrating to foreign 
countries such as the United Kingdom and Australia. These Whites have argued that they 
cannot be part of a system that aims to marginalise them and they would rather export their 
skills. Although this argument seems to be non-racialist, it does not interrogate the real 
condition which is that the imbalances of the past need to be redressed.  
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Mangcu (2004b) argues that to deal with the question of race there needs to be race-skeptical 
leadership that neither denies race nor relies on race, but deals with questions of race and 
racism. Mangcu does not agree with leaders who declare that South Africa has arrived at a 
racial nirvana and that racial discourse is irrelevant. He claims that even hardened non-
racialists would throw up their hands in despair, but he acknowledges that racism persists in 
the post-1994 era and that there need to be creative anti-racist strategies to deal with it. 
Mangcu (2010) argues that the fantasy of the rainbow nation was triggered by the illusion that 
racial barriers would be eradicated. The assumption is that the country will preserve a spirit of 
togetherness, since messages of peace, reconciliation and unity have been propagated. 
Amongst other things, speeches, policy documents, advertisements, and the ideological set-up 
echoed the notion of a new world – rainbow nation. Race and racism stood out in the discourse 
of the rainbow nation and non-racialism as issues that were supposed to be buried in the past. 
The main theme brought to the fore was building a new nation and how the legacy of apartheid 
could be silenced, but it continues to haunt the post-1994 era. 
Mangcu (2009b) boldly declares that he does not see himself „as a messenger carrying 
messages from the black world to the white world‟. He adds that he is not „the Uncle Tom – 
grinning from ear to ear to assure the master that all is well with the natives‟. This view 
suggests that he is neither a race denialist nor a racial blackmailer, but a race transcendent 
critic who speaks the truth to both blackness and whiteness, even in the face of injustice. 
Because race is central and dominant in the South African political discourse, it is central to 
Mangcu to point out that this discourse has produced race denialists and racial blackmailers.  
Race denialists are those who state that there is no race, and that all people are the same. 
They even claim that conditions facing the different races, whether social, political or economic, 
cannot be linked to race or racism. Thus, the problems that the black majority face are not 
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racial, but the cause and perpetuation of such problems is said to be black people themselves. 
Furthermore, though racial acts are clearly visible, race denialists cannot view them as such, 
and link them to the black condition which allows race and racism to function with impunity. 
Van Dijk (2002) argues that positive self-representation or keeping face (by those who are 
racist but do not want to be seen as such) and use of denialism and disclaimers (avoiding 
negative impressions) are dominant discourses in the post-1994 era. In this state of affairs, 
those who cry racism are silenced, because denialists challenge the legitimacy of anti-racist 
analysis and are part of denying discourse and race management. Thus, Van Dijk (2002) 
believes that race denialists negate or crush resistance through marginalising, ridiculing and 
delegitimising.  
Racial mobilisers can be described as paranoid black individuals and groups who tend to 
regard even legitimate criticism as racist. In instances when they are challenged by fellow 
blacks, they label their opponents „stooges‟ or „foot lickers‟ of whites. Racial mobilisation was 
prevalent in the era of Thabo Mbeki and was used as a deliberate strategy to disengage 
relevant criticism. Under the Mbeki administration, his intellectual sympathisers, Christine 
Qunta, Sandile Memela and Ronald Suresh Roberts were infamous for engaging in the politics 
of labelling. They referred to Mbeki‟s critics as „sell-outs‟, „coconut intellectuals‟, „foot lickers‟ of 
the white man and „white apologists‟, amongst a host of other labels.  
Mbembe (2001b) argues that the mobilisation of race can be a hegemonic political project. This 
creates a situation where conformity is preferred to criticism, since to criticise is regarded as 
racism. The location of such a project constitutes race as a part of political life, since it lives in 
„institutional, discourses and epistemologies, and officially sanctioned practices‟ (Mbembe 
2001b:9). Mbembe (2001b:9) argues that race as a technology derives its fantasy from power 
because it is associated with „complicated relationships between subjects and their symbolic 
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and unconscious structures‟. Besides being complex, race is something that assumes 
specificity, since the focus and the target is the black body.     
Mangcu‟s (2000a) positionality calls for political socialisation where the challenge is the 
creation of identity. His stance on the politics of race is changing, as he increasingly calls on 
South Africans to uphold their identities, at the same time becoming part of the broader 
identities. The challenge that South Africa faces is thus creating new identities. As Mbembe 
(2001b) states, different networks and social relations are ways of relating – changed and 
assimilated new forms of existence and life. Mangcu (2006b) points out that South Africans‟ 
identity is ambivalent, which refers to its cosmopolitan nature. Blackness is sought out and 
coupled with a vast array of identities. This is against the ideal of having a politics of inclusivity 
and diversity which opposes ethnic blackmail. Mangcu (2005b) states that a politics of ethnic 
blackmailing dominates the discourse and is politicising people along ethnic lines and will 
eventually create a situation where ethnic groups will converge in seamless conformity.   
The process of re-invention is needed to bring about the processes involved in building a new 
identity. Mangcu (2000a:6) notes that there is a need to link race and non-racialism in 
particular to the reality we live in and this new identity should be closer to the „experiential 
realities of colour-conscious groups‟. The post-1994 era, then, according to Bhabha (1994:43), 
can be regarded as society in hybridity – that is a society characterised by a „double 
edgedness‟ in the process of iteration and differentiation. Bhabha (1994:43) comments that 
hybridity „informs the political space of its enunciation‟. This, as Bhabha explains, is not self-
contradictory, since there is a contribution to the in-between.  
JanMohamed (1985) argues that the condition within which the coloniser and the colonised 
operate in the nexus of Manicheanism. This adds to the view that Bhabha reduces the colonial 
discourse to something that occurs in a vacuum. For whiteness to exist, it has to be an inherent 
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condition – in the case of South Africa, life has always been comfortable and the state under 
apartheid was secure. The same circumstances can be said to exist in the post-1994 era. This 
means for whiteness to live and survive in its surroundings, it needs to be secure.  
The best proposition put forward under the banner of race transcendence argues that the best 
way of overcoming apartheid is unifying the nation. This is a noble proposition, but it is devoid 
of actual content – it fails to spell out how this will be achieved. The proponents of race 
transcendence see South Africa as a nation that has untold potential for becoming the greatest 
nation in terms of fitting in the notion of cosmopolitanism where there is transcendence of race 
but celebrating difference. However, this potential is often detached from reality, which is 
experienced in all its harshness by people who are at the receiving end of racism and cannot 
condemn racism when it occurs or even voice their concerns in the presence of institutional 
racism.  
Mangcu (2006c) is of the opinion that the new forms of political life should not be about racial 
nativism. He suggests that nativism comes with a high level of political intolerance, and warns 
South Africans not to be drawn into racial nativism. Mbembe (2001b) argues that nativism is an 
ideology of difference par excellence. He states that disciplines that give life to nativism have 
led to its being perceived as a corpse which rises repeatedly. Instead of nativism, Mbembe 
proposes that there should be constructive cosmopolitanism, which seeks to construct the 
African identity in line with a universalist principle. This means that blackness is relational to the 
world, and implies that nativism fabricates social and political utopias, and is a fake philosophy 
(Mbembe 2001b).  
Mbembe negates the view that the universe is permeated by race – that is, that the world is 
anti-black. It is in this form that Parry (1999) criticises race transcendence for downplaying 
nativism and reducing it to a discourse of mere essentialism, racism and victimhood. Because 
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nativism dares to challenge hegemonic discourses, it is reduced to a mere reverse discourse. 
This form of critique promotes a politics of censure, which promotes hegemony „dependent on 
who is doing the remembering and why‟ (Parry 1999:218). In this state of affairs, nativism is 
made to resign from itself and is no longer part of the fibre of narratives of decolonisation. That 
is, the opposition must be muzzled, and therefore, no nativist alternative should exist. 
Blackness as a subject position which attracts anti-blackness must then deny itself a sense of 
agency and desist from counter-hegemonic discourses.  
Mangcu (2007a) argues that there is a need to think outside the racial framework. The vision 
that the nation should operate across all races is a vision of being non-racial, while in fact 
South Africa as a nation is „raced‟, hence the sensitivity to race itself. He adds that respect for 
each other‟s identities is more valuable than the pursuit of non-racialism (Mangcu 2001). 
Envisioning a non-racial South Africa involves recognising the open-endedness of the race 
question, which should be made visible and talked about. There should be a multiplicity of 
identities, and even ethnic values need to be multiplied – that is, „there should be multiple ways 
of being African‟ (Mangcu 2001:9). In this multiplicity, people will celebrate their identities and 
the histories associated with them, without violating others (Nuttall 2008).  
Mangcu (2000b) articulates the notion of double omission in the white community, which is 
predicated on a failure to act against apartheid and a refusal to act on that failure. Mangcu 
engages with the complicity of whites during apartheid, but his positionality in this regard 
appears to be changing. A critique of non-racialism should not deny the existence of racism 
and race being a nodal point in the South African political life. In terms of Mangcu‟s 
positionality, non-racialism is not colour-blindness, and race consciousness should remain, 
while not being essentialist. A non-racialist discourse claims that race should be transcended; 
its seductive power is that it argues that universal values such freedom, justice and equality 
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should be pursued. Race as the social marker is then reduced to irrational prejudice, while 
downplaying the institutionality and naturalisation of racism itself. Mangcu seems to reject non-
racialism in the liberalist sense, and prefers an approach in which there will be tolerance 
among different social groups. 
Rottenberg (2003) sees race as consisting of complexities and contradictions. The point of 
departure central to this thesis is the foundations of these complexities and contradictions and 
the question of whether they are in line with addressing the problematic presence of race and 
the identity marker „blackness‟. In such a stance, blackness is regarded as relative. Mangcu 
(2001) defines blackness as being beyond skin colour – that is, blackness is not a matter of 
pigmentation, as Biko envisioned and articulated it. Mangcu (2001) states that blackness is a 
political and ethical construct with which blacks identify in moving forward for self-definition to 
realise their freedom. He argues that blackness was well articulated by the Black 
Consciousness movement, where the values of self-respect, self-reliance and dignity were 
sought and reclaimed. He states that these are the same values that underpin the vision of a 
democratic society, and that these values go beyond political rights. Furthermore, he 
demonstrates the marriage between Black Consciousness and non-racialism through a cultural 
politics of meaning creation, since non-racialism was a dominant political concept. According to 
Mangcu (2001:9), „Black Consciousness and non-racialism stood toe to toe with competing 
visions of political and cultural identity‟.   
Mangcu (2001) points out that integration is something that Black Consciousness has rejected, 
as in it blacks are reduced to mere tokens. So, for integration to take place, it has to put both 
blacks and whites on an equal footing. Mangcu (2001) also propounds the view that both 
blacks and whites can build a common culture – which suggests that this is a culture that has 
to be sought and created for the benefit of this country-in-the-making. Mangcu‟s (2001) central 
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arguments are that race shapes experiences and that there is a need to accept and recognise 
racial identities, as these define people and their nationhood.  
The post-1994 era is a paradox of „in-between‟. Bhabha (1994) regards this kind of situation as 
a „liminal space‟ of „symbolic interaction‟. It represents a situation where the quality of change 
is still a contested terrain. The in-between provides the terrain for elaborating strategies of 
selfhood – singular or communal – „that initiate new signs of identity, and innovative sites of 
collaboration, and contestation, in the act of defining the idea of society itself‟ (Bhabha 1994:2).  
For JanMohamed (1985), the in-between, is the ambivalence and the confusion of the 
discourse. JanMohamed deploys the notion of Manichean allegory which is not a fixed binary, 
but rather a diverse and yet interchangeable opposition between black and white, good and 
evil, civilised and savage. According to JanMohamed (1985:64), Manichean allegory „functions 
as the currency, the medium of exchange, for the entire colonialist discursive system‟. Bhabha 
(1994) would argue that the post-1994 era, and its transition, constitutes hybridity, in which 
binary divisions are replaced and complicated by their own intimacy.  
In this way, the transition of space and time, results in complexities of criss-crossing which in 
effect undermine the Manichean structure. Hybridity refers to cultural forms emerging from 
cross-cultural relations. Such criss-crossing occurs at the level of „difference and identity, past 
and present, inclusion and exclusion‟ (Bhabha 1994:2). In this form, there is an inter-subjective 
negotiation of the collective experiences of a nation, community, interest and cultural value – 
the notion of the South African rainbow nation can be regarded as a case in point.  
In articulating the situation in the post-1994 era, Nuttall (2009) formulates the notion of 
entanglement, in which social relations are complicated in the sense that humanity is in its 
complexity. In relation to race, Nuttall deploys the notion of „racial entanglement‟ and also links 
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race to ways of being, modes of identity-making and material life. Similar to Bhabha, she states 
that the notion of entanglement unravels binaries such as coloniser and colonised, revealing 
that these binaries are simplistic. Nuttall (2009:30) also argues that theorists who engage these 
binaries in the socio-political reality focus mainly on „conflict, violence, social hierarchy and 
inequality‟. She proposes that the more racial boundaries are erected, the more there should 
be a continued search for transcendence.  
Both Bhabha (1994) and Nuttall (2009) regard race as a burden if it dominates the discourse – 
thus, they call for its erasure under the guise of diluting it, while reality expresses its 
concreteness as far as the black condition is concerned. Both theorists call for living together 
through difference to produce sameness. Nuttall (2009) goes further in arguing that the social 
involves mutual entanglement and that it is in its constant search of definition in which 
sameness and difference are entangled. Even though entanglement is „becoming something 
you were not in the beginning‟ (Nuttall 2009:58), it can be argued here that a flirtation with 
blackness does not necessarily mean all is equal and the same, since such a marriage occurs 
outside the black condition.  
The explicit acts and scenes of racism, the condition which denies the presence and the effects 
of racism, have pushed racism underground. This makes it difficult to eliminate and even point 
racism out, since its modes of articulation and expression are dismissed at first glance. 
Kasese-Hara (2006) argues that race continues to be a contentious issue in the post-1994 era. 
The reality is that blacks control political power, while whites continue to control economic 
power, since the 1994 transition left the benificiaries of white privilege untouched.  The country 
still has a long way to go in transcending race, as there are narratives that race has to be or 
should be transcended  (Bhabha 1994; Mbembe 2001; Nuttall 2009). The argument here is 
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that race matters and that affects the majority of blacks, and it is disingenuous to call for blacks 
to stop engaging in race and blackness.  
By contrast, Hill (1997) claims that the legacy of apartheid is too recent to be forgotten by the 
newly enfranchised black majority affected by the black condition. The world has been racially 
created, and those who were at the receiving end were, and still are, blacks. Geertsema (2004) 
makes the following contribution to the race debate issue: 
The idea of how the non-racial ideal is to be attained hinges on how essentialised, 
racialised, identities are to be overcome: by first insisting on them, violently if need be, 
or by „comfortably‟ letting them slide away (Geertsema 2004:754). 
Mangcu (2000b) maintains that there are whites who are committed to seeing racial equality 
without being recognised. Daniels (2006:26) posits that non-racialism is hard to define and that 
the „rainbowism‟ of the Mandela era was idealistic and did little, if anything, to engage with the 
issue of transformation. She states that key concepts in the Mandela era were reconciliation, 
nation-building and non-racialism: „The upshot was that Mandela, with [the] emphasis on unity 
and alleviating white fears and insecurities, did not engage with transformation issues, making 
non-racialism a sense on an empty space‟ (Daniels 2006:28).  
Mangcu (2010) believes that the notion of the rainbow nation as a generative metaphor 
dominates South African political discourses. Despite this dominance, it is a mirage in that 
underneath it „is replaced by appalling poverty, inequality and racism‟ (Mangcu 2010:19). This 
is the reality that centres the post-1994 political settlement, as opposed to referring to it as a 
rainbow nation, since the vision must inevitably be short-lived as the realities outweigh rhetoric. 
In this regard, Mangcu (2010) refers to Thabo Mbeki, who was highly regarded by the white 
media when he ascended to power, but whose fortunes turned as soon as he resorted to 
radical rhetoric in his call for transformation. Mangcu (2010) is concerned with the issue of 
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racial nativism, which he regards as problematic for the post-1994 democratic project. Mangcu 
(2007a) argues that the politics of racial nativism are given enough leverage to dominate South 
African political discourses, because there is race-denialism.  
Mangcu (2009a:11) claims that since 1994, „the burden of forgiveness has fallen on black 
people while white people and their leaders have remained instinctively punitive in this 
country‟. Cock and Bernstein (2002) argue that non-racialism is the new ideology of post-1994 
South Africa, given a commitment to building a nation and getting over the country‟s dark past, 
and that non-racialism is the spirit of the Constitution. In this way, the value of non-racialism is 
seen as something that South Africans are striving towards, since this creates a better society. 
Non-racialism strives to create a new struggle that is not based on race, but rather on an 
imaginary community where race is no longer the issue. In this community, which is „colour-
blind‟, identities are not based on race. It is in this notion of identity where all South Africans 
are facing challenges such as crime, HIV/AIDS, and a lack of service delivery.  
South Africa is said to maintain strong principles of non-racialism, although the discourse is 
racialised, because South Africa in the 1994 euphoria claimed that the country was new and 
thus far away from the dark past of apartheid. These claims, however, do not match the 
pertinent issue of the black condition and how to dismantle the apartheid legacy which 
continues to haunt the post-1994 era. Mangcu (2010) has expressed concern that in the post-
1994 era, racial thinking is pervasive and that it is a framework outside of which it is impossible 
to think. Non-racialism, by its very idealistic nature, creates a society in which discrimination 
finds no place, as people should live together in their differences and embrace diversity. South 
Africans are always reminded that they have the task of building a new non-racial society. Non-
racialism is against racial discrimination in that the principles of racial equality and the 
Constitution of the country suggest a commitment to non-racism.  
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Wilderson III (2008) concedes that Biko opposed non-racialism as a mere integration of black 
people into white values.  A non-racialist approach does not mean a denial of race, but calls for 
multiracial solidity and a common South African citizenship without colour or identity. Cock and 
Bernstein (2002) maintain that beyond ideology and the „rainbow‟, several demographic and 
economic factors make non-racialism more possible and more palatable in South Africa than in 
the United States of America. They argue that blacks are in a majority in South Africa, unlike in 
the United States of America. The ANC can also rely on a sense of place and history to unite 
all South Africans. Finally, South Africa cannot survive without black labour. This does not 
necessarily mean that non-racialism is working at its best – there are still some racial divisions 
and the race card is played by the ruling party in dealing with differences between blacks and 
whites on the issue of crime and migration.  
A non-racialist approach strives to create a new struggle that is not based on race, but rather 
on an imaginary community. In this community, which is „colour-blind‟, identities are not based 
on race, but rather on a notion of identity, where all South Africans are facing challenges such 
as crime, HIV/AIDS, and a lack of service delivery among black communities. Mangcu (2000a) 
is aware of the black condition, but believes that blacks in this condition should uplift 
themselves. He calls for values to create a new social vision so that the issue of racism is 
addressed.  
This kind of racial framework has been difficult to escape from. Mangcu (2010) believes that 
non-racialism was one of the attempts to escape race, although the values of the non-racialists 
remain. He argues that black nationalists in power use racial nativism in the manner that suits 
their own interests, using rhetoric such as „you are with us or against us‟. The view that 
Mangcu (2010) often expresses is that it is in the politics of transcendence that South Africans 
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should take the lead in terms of democratisation and cultural diversity.  This is a good political 
dream, but it goes against reality.  
According to Kasese-Hare (2006), the banning of explicit racism creates sophistication and 
increases the complexity of racism, in that it has assumed an implicit form, which is why whites 
react to racism through denial. They do not choose to engage it, but rather, they choose to 
retreat. They push for narratives which argue that the legacy of the past has been won over, 
and this is the new political dispensation and the important issue is to move on and build a 
better country. These sweeping statements are not only expressed by whites, but the argument 
proposed here is that it is these narratives that show the larger part of their political reality.  
Most of these narratives are silent on the narratives discussing the black condition and the fact 
that racism is still part of the socio-political condition, especially for the black majority. 
Furthermore, most whites argue that the engagement with the issue of race takes the country 
backwards, a sentiment echoed even by President Jacob Zuma. These are narratives which 
point to the fact that many consider race and apartheid an exhausted topic, without taking into 
account its effects and legacy.  
Furthermore, race denialism is an instrument used by blacks who deny the lived experience of 
the black majority. Black race denialists are often detached from the black condition, part of 
white privilege. There are even some who are totally reject the notion of blackness. These are 
blacks who want to escape their raced bodies, since these are the bodies which are part of the 
black experience. As such, these individuals are the gatekeepers of white supremacy and will 
engage in bad faith, even in crude injustices towards other blacks. Race denialists have a 
tendency to blame the victims of racism and they also absolve the perpetrators. They even 
point to the pathologies that are facing blacks as something that blacks have brought upon 
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themselves and do little to engage with the question of historical accountability or any other 
means  of redress that should be afforded to blacks.  
Mngxitama and blackness as the fatal attraction of the white gaze  
According to Mngxitama (2008b), race suffers from conceptual fidelity, as South Africans do 
not understand racism. Mngxitama (2008b:22) claims that „racism is a concept referring 
specifically to the violent encounter over the ages between blacks and whites‟. Race is part of 
South Africa‟s political reality, and as such it affects the black majority through the effects of 
racism. Racism, according to Mngxitama, is enmeshed in the totality of black life, which is 
pathological par excellence.  
Mngxitama states that there is no crime called racism in the post-1994 era – instead, acts of 
racism are given ludicrous names such as crimen injuria. Mngxitama (2009c:26) writes: „Yes, 
racism is not a crime in a country which has experienced more than 300 years of racism. As 
long as blacks remain a powerless numerical majority there is no hope that white racism will 
end.‟ He further argues that the psychological oppression of blacks allows them to continue to 
give power to whites to oppress and dehumanise them. This is of course, done with the help of 
black assistants who keep blacks docile. 
According to Mngxitama (2009c), blacks cannot claim dignity and cannot make claims for 
justice. Reconciliation without justice means a „politics [that] focuses on reassuring the 
beneficiaries and perpetrators of racism that they have nothing to worry about, all is forgiven‟ 
(Mngxitama 2009b:23). He adds that the interests of the black victim do not matter and are 
sidelined. The political rituals of condemnation are popular in the South African socio-political 
discourse, but fail to take decisive action in dealing with what they condemn. Mngxitama 
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argues that such political rituals normalise historical injustices against blacks, since they fail to 
locate the root of these injustices and clarify the place of blacks in the world.  
Furthermore, Mngxitama (2008c, 2009a) argues that the ANC as a party legitimises black 
exploitation and exclusion with regard to the post-liberation cosmetic changes for the majority 
of blacks. It leaves racist infrastructure intact. Hill (1997) indicates that the political discourse 
was supposed to be driven by a politics of justice, reparation and restoration, and that a 
liberalist political discourse dominated the site of constitutional rights and equality which 
prevailed in the post-1994 era.  
The effects of race and racism are not seen as done to‟ blacks because they are black. This 
implies that the post-1994 era claims blindness when it comes to the black condition, due to 
the fact that it sees class as an a priori reality, although there are some who claim that class 
and race intersect. The final analysis of this intersection is complicated when race is collapsed 
into class. The project of (re)constructing the post-1994 era is made difficult by the lack of 
certainty about whether there will be material change for what Fanon called the damned.   
The legacy of apartheid still continues, with a black government under the banner of the ANC. 
The black condition, which is a creation of white domination, is perpetuated by the ANC, who 
are said to protect the white racialist economy and infrastructure (Mbeki 2009), which is kept 
intact by „encourag(ing) the development of bloated middle and senior level management (and 
who are mostly politically connected to the ANC) and who are vastly overpaid‟ (Mbeki 
2009:91). Mbeki is essentially arguing that the social, economic, cultural and political spheres 
should be analysed, as they are the loci of existence, and black public intellectuals should be a 
relay to make things easier for those who are excluded.  
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The dehumanisation of the black body can be demonstrated to have formed the basis of 
slavery, colonialism and apartheid. According Mngxitama (2009b), the politics of 
dehumanisation are framed in such a manner that dehumanisation often goes unpunished, 
since the black body is the „fatal attraction‟. Gordon (2000:62) also argues that the black 
experience represents the nadir of a world of racial pollution in that blackness is the primary 
racial marker – a scandal.  
According to this logic, it seems that black public intellectuals cannot escape the predicament 
of the black condition; hence, they cannot be divorced from the raced body they find 
themselves in and which is caught up in the racist infrastructure. People have a choice to live 
freely or unfreely, and bad faith constitutes a „flight from one‟s presence and the assumption of 
thing-like existence or completeness in various situations‟ (Gordon 2007:199). Thus, the black 
subject should constantly pursue critical good faith instead of bad faith to realise the potential 
of becoming a new being in the midst of dehumanisation.  
As Maldonado-Torres (2005:159) states, „the task is to end up with inhumanity and to restore 
humanity‟. But this cannot be reduced to humanism, which is the popular consciousness and 
popular will which connotes the universal socio-political world, because humanism says little or 
nothing about the subject position of blackness, and, at worst, it also means the absence of 
blackness. What Maldonado-Torres proposes instead is the creation of a new life – the „effort 
to create a social structure that facilitates the location of power in the condemned‟ (Maldonado-
Torres 2005:162).  
Mngxitama (2010f) believes that „most South Africans cannot decode white supremacists‟ texts 
and actions‟, because what is condemned are overt acts of racism, while silence reigns on 
covert acts, which are normalised and naturalised. The social, economic and political 
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conditions reflect the fact that poor black communities are stripped of their dignity and 
humanity, as they are living in dire conditions.  
According to Mngxitama, the distinction between individual racism and institutional racism is 
important to understand in relation to how whiteness functions. He argues that individual 
racism occurs occasionally, while institutional racism occurs all the time, in everyday life, and it 
is often difficult to recognise. Mngxitama argues that the post-1994 era is characterised by 
paternalistic white supremacists who regard white supremacy as normal and therefore fail to 
challenge it. Mngxitama (2008a:21) argues that „[w]hite superiority is a state mind. But this 
state of mind is not just a figment of imagination. It‟s real‟. There is a lack of understanding of 
racism on the basis of its overt and covert nature. Mngxitama states that „racism reproduces 
itself through whiteness‟ and the system of oppression is carried out by the agents of white 
supremacy, who are both black and white. 
Blackness cannot be fully understood in the South African political discourse if the issue of 
white supremacy, which breeds privilege, is not analysed. There are dominant ways of thinking 
that deny the analysis of white supremacy which puts black people in bondage and which 
disconnects them from the past. White supremacy labels and categorises good and evil, and 
frames the manner in which what it does to blackness serve that supremacy in a material and 
non-material sense. As Wilson (1993:103) explain, white supremacy „requires that [b]lacks 
involuntarily and obsessively deceive themselves‟.  It is in this self-deception where blackness 
goes out of its way to script itself in a manner that is consistent with white expectations and 
also to be relationally distant from blackness. Wilson states:  
Once the ideology which rationali[s]es and legitimi[s]es a particular authority structure 
gains general social acceptance and the political appropriation of the ruling regime, it 
not only tends to deligitimi[s]e alternative or opposing ideologies but also tends to 
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empower and legitimate the ruling regime along with those who control its operational 
apparatus. (Wilson 1993:105) 
Wilson‟s (1993) contribution to the discourse is that although there is much rhetoric and the 
white insult, the right questions are not asked and it is in this state of affairs where things 
remain unchanged. To unpack the notion of race as the organising principle of colonisation and 
to bring about understanding and advocacy, creating a forum for human emancipation, is to 
start by separating from the oppressive aspects that condone the black condition.  
Mngxitama (2008b) argues that racism, if it becomes an elastic concept, loses its meaning. 
Mngxitama (2008b:22) argues that „blacks – by virtue of their historical position – can‟t be 
racist‟. He states that blacks can be nasty and capable of brutal oppression of their own 
people. He states that racism is about „how whites dominated and violated blacks and continue 
to do so by virtue of their historical power and privileges bestowed upon them through violence‟ 
(Mngxitama 2008b:22). The violence Mngxitama refers to is slavery, colonialism and apartheid. 
Race denialism allows race denialists to reduce the black experience in relation to racism as 
something that is an isolated incident or the ontological frozen subject. As such, there is a 
refusal to go beyond non-racialism, which is an ideology that induces forgetting, usually with 
some blacks as spokespersons of white supremacy. This is done to get applause and approval 
from whites and other black race denialists. The post-1994 era panders to non-racialism, but 
reality suggests that it cannot withdraw from racial politics, since the infrastructure of South 
Africa is racial and racist. 
The post-1994 era is characterised by a vacuum in terms of radical and pro-black political 
movements, and this is why there is no articulation of the „black grammar of suffering‟. For 
Mngxitama (2009b), the black grammar of suffering is one that ends dialogue and demands 
justice. „Such [a] grammar locates the creation of blackness at the vortex of three 
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dispossessions: land, labour and the sense of African being‟ (Wilderson III 2008). These are 
the dispossessions that he claims create and perpetuate black poverty on the one hand, and 
on the other hand, entrench white wealth. The post-1994 era in South Africa bears this out, and 
it is seen as normal – that is, blackness equals dispossession.  
Mngxitama (2009b) argues that blacks have no language and they cannot even articulate their 
lived experience. This language is a grammar of suffering, and the absence of this language 
means that blacks cannot be heard and cannot make their demands and hence must live in 
obscurity. This allows racism to continue under black government, which, in the service of 
white supremacy continues to deny dispossessed blacks the opportunity to articulate their own 
language of demands, which may unsettle the post-1994 set-up. Mngxitama writes: 
Racism is not going anywhere as long as the structures of white supremacy remain 
intact, covered in the language of democracy and nonracialism. But this is not the 
indictment of whites on whites. It‟s rather a reflection on blacks, a pathetic numer[ic]al 
majority (Mngxitama 2009b:23). 
Mngxitama (2007) argues that what blacks lack is a sense of ownership of the country and its 
wealth. Goldberg (2006) makes a distinction between non-racialism and anti-racism and 
argues that non-racialism is about forgetting, not recounting and redressing. Hence, it bans 
racism from the public domain, only to reproduce it in private. Non-racialism denies that racism 
exists, since it does not have the vocabulary to express both implicit and explicit racism and 
issues of equality.  
As opposed to non-racialism, anti-racism deals with racism directly, in that it demobilises and 
removes the structures of racism as a condition. It seeks reparations and justice and is fuelled 
by a spirit of resistance. The hegemony of the discourses in the post-1994 era downplay race 
in the quick chase for non-racialism, as if there are no problems confronting blacks trapped in 
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the black condition. South Africa is trying to move beyond apartheid while there is a resurgence 
in racialisation and ethnicity (Geertsema 2004).  
To engage the issue of race is to engage with racialised power networks – that is, the power 
matrix of coloniality and the Manichean structure. To study the black condition is to examine 
the ways in which blackness is interlocked and confused, only to remain in subservience. The 
black condition is the result of exclusion from, and subjugation by a system of power which 
determines or markets what form life should be assumed.  
The subject position of blackness has meant being restricted, excluded, dehumanised and, to a 
lesser extent, being acted upon. In short, blackness has been, and still is objectified. 
Maldonado-Torres (2008:99) argues that blacks have lost ontology; then this ontology became 
objectified and there was a need for subjectivity – that is, for the black body to be a living 
subject, the creation of the „new being‟. In the post-1994 era tagged as the new nation or the 
nation-in-becoming it is necessary to examine the lived experience of subjects with the black 
condition, and how black public intellectuals engage with the political discourse. Race is a 
pervasive concept, since it takes the guises of non-racialism, and even though it can take or 
materialise in a very secret and polarised forms, shifts between these polarised worlds are 
possible (Kane 2007). 
National symbols which aim to create a national identity, and the metaphor of the rainbow 
nation was coined by Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu, and it was based on reconciliation, 
nation building and non-racialism (Daniels 2006). This imagination was triggered by the hope, 
which was later exposed as an illusion, that racial barriers or racial discourse markers would be 
done away with. The assumption was that the country would preserve a spirit of togetherness, 
since a message of peace, reconciliation and unity was promoted. The condition in this state of 
affairs indicates how identities are lived, constructed and deconstructed. The notion of 
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tolerance and equality among different identities seeks to create order, the condition of 
harmony and the polity existing in peace while celebrating differences. There is a pretence that 
because the post-1994 state is considered a rainbow nation, race is no longer part of the 
national vocabulary.  
With this in mind, the historical condition in which most blacks find themselves makes the 
promises of the 1994 „miracle‟ a distant dream. Mngxitama (2008a) argues that institutionalised 
and legalised violence against black people is an important factor in the creation of modern 
South African society. He claims that South Africa and the condition of most black people 
should be understood on the basis of dispossession of land, labour and African being. 
According to Mngxitama (2010c), the ANC has failed blacks dismally, particularly farm workers 
who are landless. He writes: „Farm workers are regularly brutalised and murdered with little 
consequences‟ (Mngxitama 2010c:13). These are the current conditions that most black people 
live under and which exist under a black government. Thus, the notion of better life for has 
been a lie to society. There are gaps in terms of race and class – Mngxitama (2008a) states 
that although 1994 came and went, the structures of white power remained intact, arguing that 
it is under the very same democracy that poor blacks are harassed, imprisoned and shot with 
rubber bullets when they protest for their legitimate rights.  
Maldonado-Torres (2008:233) believes that the colonised in this sense are operating based on 
not being colonised directly, but exist within the effects of a colonial structure which continues 
its legacy. The black subject, Maldonado-Torres (2008) argues, is not a being or is simply 
nothingness.  The existence of blacks in this hellish zone becomes ordinary in a colonised 
world which wears a racial cap. The hell that Maldonado-Torres (2008) and Gordon (1995; 
2007) refer to is the anti-black world. The question this study now raises is what this means for 
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the post-1994 era and the possibility of not seeing race as a discourse marker, since there are 
loud cheers that apartheid has been defeated.  
Mngxitama (2008b) points out that black people have been „unpeopled‟ under democracy. The 
oppressed lose all their ontological weight in the hellish condition they exist in (Maldonado-
Torres 2008). This suggests that blackness as a centre of being does not exist, hence they are 
not human beings in the face of the white gaze. Therefore, blackness stands outside the rubric 
of being human, since its existence lacks the substance of being human.  
Mngxitama states that blackness has no analogy: „Black suffering on its own has no standing; it 
does not exist. In fact it doesn‟t matter‟ (Mngxitama 2009b:23). The normalisation and 
naturalisation of black suffering renders it unheard. Mngxitama states that most blacks who are 
trapped in black suffering are not seen and they are therefore forced to join the greater group 
of the forgotten masses who are caught in the pathology of destitution and even death. 
Wilderson III (2003) argues that blackness is an oxymoron because it lacks relationality. The 
pain and suffering that has been inflicted upon the black body cannot be related to any form of 
recourse or justice, since blackness is devoid of humanity. Therefore, the demands of blacks 
cannot be met. 
Blackness is not content with being viewed as something related to the status of being – that 
is, there is no ontology when it comes to blackness, which finds its objection from the world – 
the anti-black world. Blackness is at the margins of recognition and representation. To see is to 
see not a being, but a black person. The white gaze shapes the optical economy and its 
function is to police the black body (Rottenberg 2003).  
Identities of the marginalised seek to contest space and work their way towards asserting their 
identities to counter exclusion, marginalisation and humiliation if they are at the receiving end 
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of racism or other forms of discriminations based on identity. The condition in this state of 
affairs indicates how identities are lived, constructed and deconstructed. The notion of 
tolerance and equality among different identities seeks to create order, the condition of 
harmony and the polity existing in peace, while celebrating differences.  
Identity cannot be fully understood in the South African political discourse if the issue of white 
supremacy, which breeds privilege, is not analysed. There are dominant ways of thinking that 
deny the analysis of white supremacy, which tends to put black people in bondage, in that they 
are encouraged to forget about the past. The pretence is that race is not an issue any longer, 
since the post-1994 state is typified by rainbowism, while the historical condition that most 
blacks find themselves in makes the promises of the 1994 miracle a farce. Mngxitama 
(2010b:13) argues that institutionalised and legalised violence against black people is a factor 
in the creation of the modern South African society – as „the ruling party made a pact with the 
devil‟. Black powerlessness is considered normal in small towns and farms as the survival of 
blacks is wholly dependent on the white masters.  
Mngxitama argues that black powerlessness is characterised by fear and tension. According to 
Mngxitama (2010b:13), „blacks live in servitude‟. The lived experience of the black subject is 
that of the transportation and exportation of a negative image, in which the existence of blacks 
is dehumanised systematically. As such, blackness needs to be objectified and exploited, 
hence the continuous comparison between blacks and whites just to maintain the racist 
infrastructure.  
The treatment of these black communities who protest for their legitimate right is unjust in that 
these are people who are fuelled with hope that they will have a better life. It will be argued 
here that ontology counts less in the black experience, since blacks have always been denied 
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a human existence through slavery, colonialism and apartheid, and this ultimately slips into bad 
faith.  
The notion that race is a social construct fails to account for the manner in which racism 
continues to affect those who are at the receiving end. This perspective tends to turn a blind 
eye on the continued effects of racism which has been pushed underground. The perspective 
that race is a social construct tends to silence sites where agency is coming into being and 
where the black condition is put under the spotlight as people question their ways of being 
(Gordon 2000).  
Essed (2002) suggests that to understand racism is to understand its everyday operation and 
its location, and how it is experienced by those it affects. According to him, blacks are familiar 
with the dominant group interpretation of reality, and have an idea of and knowledge of racist 
ideas and interpretations of reality. Racism connects structural forces and everyday reality as 
things which are normal since it „involves only systematic, recurrent, familiar practices‟ (Essed 
2002:177). Essed further states that the Manichean structure – a force that gave rise to 
oppression and domination, makes racism exist in a plural way, rather than in a specific form. 
This ultimately makes it hard to see. That in itself is an aspect of the power matrix of coloniality 
and the Manichean structure. Van Dijk (2002), in examining the strategy and discourse of race 
denialism, claims that the discourse of racism and its denialism is prominent in reproducing a 
normalised and institutionalised version of reality. He argues as follows:   
The concept of everyday racism qualifies how ordinary situations become racist 
situations. The study and analysis of these situations can be disturbing to comfortable 
worlds of racial privilege. (Van Dijk 2002:461) 
In the post-1994 era, there is often a claim that South Africa is a rainbow nation, and 
everything should be buried in the past. This claim flies in the face of reality, since the 
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structures of white privilege remain intact, and the political economy of racism still haunts the 
black body. For Southall (2004), this leads to a paralysis in which realities on the ground do not 
reflect what is being advocated by these statements. For instance, it does not amount to a non-
racial issue if there is a lack of commitment in dealing robustly with the legacy of apartheid.  He 
argues that non-racialism can be regarded as a form of forgetting and moving on, instead of 
demanding justice and historical accountability. As More (2008) argues, addressing racism is 
not to address the basis on which racism rests (racialism). Rather, there should be the means 
to dismantle the structures that are perpetuating racism. 
Conclusion 
This chapter attempted to analyse the ways in which race and blackness are applied in the 
post-1994 South African political landscape. Furthermore, the positionality of Seepe, Mangcu 
and Mngxitama were analysed in relation to race and blackness. It was argued that race and 
blackness have not only been complex issues in the post-1994 political landscape, but are 
problematic if they are interrogated at a deeper level. Unpacking them should mean engaging 
with factors that are outside the script of the rainbow nation, nation-building and reconciliation, 
since the black condition is more problematic than this.  
Seepe‟s rhetoric and subsequent positionality regarding race and blackness is radical. His 
positionality helps to conceptualise race and blackness in relation to the lived experience of 
blacks, at the same time linking them to the political culture that the post-1994 era envisions. 
Race is fundamental to Seepe‟s positionality, as he believes it can be used by those in power 
to demean those to whom they are antagonistic. Furthermore, he argues that race can be used 
seductively through essentialist means, while engaging in a politics of labelling to defend and 
85 
 
justify political loyalty. Seepe argues that race and blackness must be engaged with in an open 
manner because they are part of the post-1994 political reality.   
Mangcu‟s positionality with regard to race and blackness raises the complexity of these 
questions in the post-1994 era, as is clear from his ever-changing views on race and 
blackness. Mangcu comes from a radical Black Consciousness philosophy background, which 
he often refers to, and he envisions the transcendence of race, if any, or, conversely, the 
deepening of racial consciousness, but a racial consciousness that is inclusive and pluralistic. 
The problem in South Africa has centred around the racial question of targeting blackness, and 
Mangcu‟s positionality can be read as ambivalent and contested. This country was and 
continues to be organised along racial lines, but claims non-racialism to be altruism, despite 
the fact that this discourse is contested.  
Mngxitama‟s positionality is consistent. He regards race and blackness as being tangled up in 
and embedded in the post-1994 era, which implies that the era is the epitome of white 
supremacy. Blackness is a creation of whiteness and therefore blackness operates as the 
gatekeeper of white supremacy. Mngxitama contends that blacks‟ race makes them targets of 
racism, since they find themselves in an anti-black world, and also makes them subject to the 
pathologies that define the black existence – the black condition.  
The problematics of race and blackness are not unique to South Africa. Their articulation in the 
form of public intellectual contributions by Seepe, Mangcu and Mngxitama highlight the 
realisation that these authors occupy different positionalities. Their positionality is informed by 
the manner in which they imagine the political, as far as race and blackness are concerned. 
Mangcu and Seepe emphasise the use of race as a tool to silence critics or to close down 
debate. Both Seepe and Mangcu imagine the possibility or at times the existence of non-
racism, but Mngxitama does not agree in this respect at all. 
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Race and blackness are problematic in the anti-black world, and the post-1994 era in South 
Africa is no exception. Claiming to transcend race as if there were no racism and systematic 
oppression would be an illusion, since the infrastructure of racism is intact. Furthermore, to 
condemn blackness as essentialist if it is evoked is denying the lived experience of blacks who 
are caught up in the black condition. Race and blackness will continue to be problematic if the 
black condition is not done away with by dismantling the logic and infrastructure of racism. The 
next chapter explores how Seepe, Mangcu and Mngxitama articulate the black elite in post-
1994 South Africa.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SEEPE, MANGCU AND MNGXITAMA ON THE BLACK ELITE 
 
Introduction  
This chapter seeks to explore and provide an understanding of the manner in which Seepe, 
Mangcu and Mngxitama view the presence and modes of accumulation of the black elite in the 
post-1994 era. The chapter commences with an examination of Seepe‟s positionality with 
regard to the black elite in terms of their connection to the state for the purposes of economic 
benefit. The dependency complex between the elite and the state is examined where there is 
some enrichment of the politically connected few at the expense of the majority. The extent to 
which Mangcu‟s contributions differ from or are similar to those of Seepe is also discussed. 
Here, the chapter focuses on Mangcu‟s fluid and shifting position regarding the aspirations of 
the black middle class. Finally, the chapter analyses Mngxitama‟s radical positionality with 
regard to the black elite.  
Seepe, the black elite and their connection to the state 
Sipho Seepe‟s emphasises how the black elite is trapped in state political patronage. In this 
scenario, the black elite are rewarded on the basis of political loyalty and they must, therefore, 
serve the interests of the state in exchange for a path leading to wealth accumulation through 
tenders and lucrative contracts (Seepe 2006b). As Calland (2006) argues, the black elite find 
itself in a dilemma of being caught between the state and old capital. Thus the black elite in 
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South Africa, for example, are dependent on the state and white capital, because what should 
enrich them is concentrated in white hands. Therefore, the remains of what should be (re-
)distributed in egalitarian terms, and in order to redress the predicament of the black majority, 
only benefit a politically select and connected few. There are some who engage in patronage, 
which is a gateway to established white capital. For the black elite to gain access to white 
capital, they have to show loyalty to the state or become agents of white capital.  
The concept of the black elite in the post-1994 era includes the ruling political elite and the 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) private sector elite or capitalists (Calland 2006). The 
emergence of BEE in the post-1994 era is widely regarded as a much-desired outcome of the 
liberation struggle (McKinley 2011). However, selling BEE as the solution to economic 
imbalances is a cosmetic solution, since the gap between the rich and the poor is widening 
continuously, so that the black majority are left at the margins of the economy – a bleak picture 
of economic transformation.   
According to Seepe (2006b), the members of the black elite are connected to the state, and it 
is through the state that they are able to extract what they need for their benefit. According to 
Gumede (2007:289), „[m]any post-liberation African societies continue to feature a small rich 
elite, often connected to the ruling elite and the poor masses, with a small middle class 
sandwiched between‟. Political patronage is pervasive, since the accumulated wealth of the 
black elite does not create benefits for the whole society. Their opulent lifestyle and a culture of 
materialism reduce the black elite to mere advertising billboards, displaying how they consume 
their wealth. This is the wealth that comes from political connections, and which does not 
benefit the masses, as it circulates only in the hands of a few.   
According to Seepe (2006b), this situation means that a consolidation of political hegemony 
where the state is the centre of the strategic goals and visions of BEE, and the BEE elite must 
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be reinforced by the state. In this regard, Calland (2006) argues that there is little space in 
which the black elite can move, and they therefore depend on the state, which is a gateway to 
capital accumulation. As a result, black elites have no political imagination beyond the 
framework of the capitalist economic template (Gibson 2006).  
Since 1994, South Africa has clearly demonstrated that it has failed to address the issue of 
economic emancipation, and instead the elite have rushed for political office. This state of 
affairs creates a situation in which the wealth of South Africa will not benefit the black majority. 
McKinley (2011) suggests that the ascension to and capturing of political power clearly 
indicates that the ANC has quickly abandoned the mandate of the people in a bid to embrace 
the quick upsurge of a small black elite. Although BEE was touted as a solution that would 
uplift the masses, it has instead led to a perpetuation of neo-colonial conditions where blacks 
who are trapped in the black condition are tightly squeezed in the pathology of this condition. 
As Mbeki (2009:16) exclaims, „African elites today sustain and reproduce themselves by 
perpetuating the neo-colonial state and its attendant socio-economic systems of exploitation, 
devised by the colonialists‟.  
The existence of a black elite has not transform the lives of the black majority. Since political 
power in the post-1994 era is not translating to economic power, Mbeki (2009) argues that 
State power thus becomes an instrument to re-distribute wealth in favour of the black elite, 
rather than to re-direct wealth from consumption to productive investment. The growing 
inequality between the black elite and the black masses is a clear manifestation of this wealth 
redistribution. The projection of the black elite through fronting and tokenism shows that this is 
indeed a trickle-down effect.  
As a result, the real change expected by the black majority is absent. As Butler states: 
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The liberation movement would protect private property and business freedom. In 
return, big business would not obstruct transition and would later help redress the 
racial injustice that characteri[s]e the economy. (Butler 2009:76)  
Seepe (2006b) refers to ANC comradeship during the struggle as being informed by the vision 
of liberating the country and redressing the imbalances created by apartheid. However, in the 
post-1994 period, these comrades are given government contracts, tenders and other private 
sector privileges, which result in the very antithesis of what they fought for: the perpetuation of 
the economic marginalisation of the majority of South Africans.  
Mbeki (2009) argues that the black elite are not property owners and do not own the economy. 
Moreover, he adds that they cannot use state power to create systems and structures that 
advance the property they do not have. The black elite are thus part of the political problem, 
since their presence and role in the post-liberation state are always suspect. According to 
Seepe (2006b), the state is used as a contact point to kick-start the path of members of the 
black elite, as it funds their establishment, existence and sustenance.  
However, although the state can be a source through which the enrichment of the small elite is 
realised, such a condition might be constraining to the state since the black elite is parasitic. 
This creates dependency on the state by the ANC and its comrade elites. Thus, the money 
from the state is a source through which the elite are able to display their wealth, which they 
have accumulated through political networks. As a result, this can ferment political corruption in 
which state coffers are milked to the point where socio-economic conditions cannot be 
addressed.  
Seepe (2006b) argues that a situation arises where the appointment of incompetent individuals 
occurs at the expense of capable individuals, whose only misfortune is that they are outside 
the political establishment. These skilled individuals are left at the fringes of the economy. The 
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politicisation of the economy along political party lines creates a condition where the political 
party will not consider technical skills, something there is a dire shortage of. Seepe (2006b) 
points out that the average skill level ratio of blacks in relation to whites in South Africa is one 
to five. Thus, for every skill that is lost, five individuals who could have benefited from such 
skills suffer. The fallacy leading to the creation of the black elite is that they are agents of and 
pillars in building a democracy and also ensure a deepening of non-racialism. However, the 
neglect of the poor majority and its being made invisible in the projection of wealth is the 
reality. Seepe‟s positionality centres on the fact that South Africa creates a false impression of 
itself through the emergence of a small black elite, whilst the vast majority in the country suffer 
poverty, unemployment, a lack of education and health services, exploitative working 
conditions and indignity, all of which are racially marked as belonging to the black condition.  
Gumede (2007:288) argues, that „the government has done well to advance the rise of the new 
black middle class, at the same time improving the lot of the white middle class, but it has a 
mixed record in terms of improving the living conditions of the poor‟. This is the picture that 
shows what is meant to improve the lives of the black majority is in fact a flawed socio-political 
project. The advancement of the black middle class is something that was, and is, done at the 
expense of the black majority. The formation and the existence of a black elite has been 
blamed on a foundation of weakness and vulnerability. According to Mbeki (2009), the rise of 
the black elite is a relatively new phenomenon in South Africa, under the tutelage and 
monitoring of white rule. The „natives‟ had to be good and act in the interests of the white 
master who afforded them missionary education and civilisation. The black elite has two 
factions, namely an accommodationist faction which is openly white (as it imbibed liberalism 
similar to that of the white British missionary) and the nationalist faction, which was arguing for 
black independence in the economy along the ideological lines of African nationalism and 
social democracy (Mbeki 2009). However, as Mbeki states, both factions were long weak and 
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vulnerable, since they did not have control of labour or capital, nor did they possess a strong 
institutional base.  The white elite did not leave to make way for the creation of a stronghold 
black elite, and even in the post-1994 era, it does not exist. „BEE creates a small class of 
unproductive but wealthy black crony capitalists made up of ANC politicians‟ (Mbeki 2009:61). 
It is this state of affairs that allows BEE not to threaten the economic hegemony of the white 
minority. It is in these terms that BEE cannot be regarded as a force that will lead to 
fundamental change, but is indeed one that will help keep the status quo.  
Mangcu, the black elite and contested aspirations 
Since most blacks are still trapped in the trenches of economic exclusion, they aspire to enjoy 
the benefits that come with economic privilege. As Mangcu (2005a) contends, the middle class 
position should inspire the majority of blacks to engage in upward mobility. He states that it 
should not be a problem issue when blacks have aspirations to be rich and accumulate wealth.   
Mangcu argues that the media fixation on the black elite is like an anthropological gaze 
peddling stereotypes which advocates, in undertones, the pauperisation of the black majority in 
which there should be no black elite. It is this pauperisation which has consolidated the white 
elite, since competition and modes of accessing capital are uneven, or at worst, non-existent 
for the aspiring black elite. The historical mapping of South Africa clearly shows the role that 
the state has played in helping English-speaking people and Afrikaners to accumulate capital 
whilst simultaneously excluding, exploiting and dispossessing blacks. The creation and the 
consolidation of the white elite was achieved on the basis of maximal state intervention. The 
state was a means to the accumulation of wealth by these white groups. The South African 
state of the past was used to advance, protect and entrench white privilege (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
2012 forthcoming).    
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Mangcu (2005a) argues that there is a tendency to make white capital immune to scrutiny, and 
to criminalise black capital accumulation, even if it is done in legitimate terms. Under the former 
white regimes, capital accumulation and the consolidation of elites was not regarded as 
corruption, nor was it racialised. However, in the post-1994 era, the discourse of corruption has 
become racialised, since a number of senior figures in the ruling party have been implicated in 
corrupt practices. According to Mangcu (2005e), corruption became rampant in the post-1994 
era and it is through this means that many of the black elite gain access to wealth. The upward 
mobility of the black elite comes with strings attached, and links to the political establishment, 
as access to wealth is gained through tenders and lucrative government contracts. This has led 
to the labelling of the black middle class or the elite as „tenderpreneurs‟ instead of 
entrepreneurs. Essentially, this means that the primary modes of accumulation for the black 
elite are tenders circulated among the politically connected few.  
The political lives of the black elite are centred on entitlement.  Schlemmer (1998) argues that 
this sense of entitlement is prevalent in the lower levels of the middle class. The emergence of 
the white elite, as stated above, happened along similar lines of entitlement. The discourse 
used to disguise structural inequality in the post-1994 era says little about white capital in 
explicit terms, if it is threatened by the black elite, who are considered parasitic. The prevalent 
tendency here is to project these structures of capital as if they are serving the interests of the 
whole nation.  
The discourse of corruption is located only in the post-1994 era and creates an impression that 
corruption is a recent phenomenon. The English and the Afrikaner South African states and the 
emergence and conduct of the white elite are not regarded as corrupt. Even those who were 
advocating apartheid have changed the terms of the debate in the post-1994 era claiming that 
the past should be forgotten and there should not be any discussion about race and white 
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privilege. This in turn creates a basis on which the black elite can get what they want, which is 
to get rich by accumulating capital. Mangcu (2005d) argues that the black elite have a social 
and political function. The emergence of the black elite has been historically interrupted, and 
the black elite in the post-1994 era is resuming the path to accumulation. In this emergence, 
the members of the black elite who are touted as the agents of change and transformation 
show little evidence to demonstrate that they fulfil this role. However, the advocacy for this 
change is met with resistance, since in the reality this change is regarded as very small, or at 
worst, non-existent.  
According to Schlemmer (1998), although there is a call for the emergence of the black elite in 
the economic engine, there is also a call for white power to remain. He contends that the 
advancement of the black middle class, and the emergence thereof is regarded with disfavour. 
The argument here is that the emergence of a black elite results in cosmetic changes, even 
though it calls for resistance from both white and black racial formations. The rise and 
consolidation of the black elite is thus not a threat to white capital. For Schlemmer, the position 
of a racial balance is complex, since there are black professionals in the apex of power, and 
there is the rise of the black middle class.  However, most of the black majority are excluded, 
while there is a small elite who project themselves as representatives of the black majority. 
This complexity should be read in its historical context, and reference should again be made to 
how the state assisted some classes to accumulate wealth at the expense of others. 
It will be argued here that political power is monopolised by the black majority, while the 
economy is in the hands of the white minority and a small black elite. According to Gumede 
(2007:289), „[m]any post-liberation African societies continued to feature a small rich elite, often 
connected to the ruling elite and the poor masses, with a small middle class sandwiched 
between‟. Mangcu (2005d) concurs with Seepe that the modes of accumulation and the mode 
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of being is something that flourished because of political patronage. As Gibson (2004) argues, 
BEE is a form of social treason, since it betrays the essence of upward mobility for the majority 
of blacks. Gibson also adds that the black elite hurriedly and greedily inherited the neo-liberal 
policy framework that determines the economy.  
As Mangcu (2005d) argues, the impulse of a black elite with middle class values is material, 
but it is also a repository of social and cultural values. According to Mangcu, there are varying 
dynamics within the black elite and thus they should not be understood as a homogeneous 
entity. The positive value that Mangcu ascribes to is the fact that the black middle class are a 
beacon of hope to the black majority. The emergence of the black elite with middle class 
values in South Africa indicates some level of content and discontent that the aspirations of the 
black majority needs to be reflected upon. Interestingly, Mangcu is not against the idea of a 
black elite. However, he argues that their enrichment should not come at the expense of the 
black majority. Even though there are some blacks who rise above poverty, exclusion and 
dispossession to enter the ranks of middle class and even the elite, their numbers in proportion 
to the black majority who are in the trenches of the black condition needs to be engaged. What 
informs the aspirations of the black elite in general is the issue of ownership of material forces. 
The black elite are, in a way, the ones in a dilemma.  
Even though there are indeed improvements in the lives of some blacks, large gaps still remain 
in respect of the socio-economic condition that reflects blackness. BEE is regarded as the 
centrepiece of this redistributive strategy. However, as the African elite are not historically an 
entrepreneurial class, the wealth diverted to them is used for consumption, not investment 
(Mbeki 2009). According to Mangcu (2005d), to suggest that the black elite are the source of 
inspiration for blacks trapped in the black condition is a view that is limited in two regards. In 
the first instance, the rise of a black elite will not inspire those who are trapped in the black 
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condition since their means of accumulation are an insult to the black majority. Blacks in the 
black condition cannot be proud to look up to those who treat them with contempt and insult 
them in the manner which they consume capital and their display of how wealthy they are. 
Secondly, the black elite emerges from the structures which do not create an enabling 
environment, thus confining the black majority to their current position. 
According to Mangcu (2005a), because the black elite have a loyalty pact with the ruling party, 
they often pay allegiance to the party. This is similar to what Seepe alludes to, but the point of 
convergence, as far as Mangcu‟s positionality is concerned, is the complexities that the black 
elite find themselves in. Initially, the issue of black aspiration centres on the issues of a black 
elite who are emerging and engaging in upward class mobility. The same can be said of the 
English and Afrikaner elite: they pay allegiance to the ruling structures of the state. Mangcu 
(2005d) is concerned about the fact that the black elite trigger extreme reactions, while there is 
silence on the white elite who control the economy. In this instance, the black elite are 
detached from the communities they come from in terms of contributing as agents of change, 
instead they display opulence. In fact, the elite fear the masses, as the elite are clothed in 
consumerism and parasitism.  
Southall (2006) argues that blacks were excluded, and the racial bargains in the South African 
political reality came as a response to address the oppression that befell the black majority. He 
states that there are two strands of criticism with regard to BEE. The first is that BEE has 
created a tiny clique of the rich who are connected to the ANC, and they are dependent on the 
ANC to extract these riches. The ANC is said to be breeding the elite, who are not seen to 
realise the aspirations of the black majority. The second criticism concerns the fact that BEE 
distorts the logic of the market, and as a result has a negative impact on the efficiency and 
growth of the economy. This is linked to the fact that the BEE class is inept and does not 
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contribute to the strengthening of the economy, but is merely trapped in consumerism. 
However, these criticisms should not be taken at face value, but instead should be understood 
in the South African socio-political context, since the status quo is being preserved. In fact, 
there is a need for socio-economic redress, which lies at the heart of the aspirations of the 
black majority. 
 Gumede (2007:291) argues that, „sadly, in a country where the majority of blacks live their 
entire lives in abject poverty and drudgery, many of the nouveau noir rich shamelessly flaunt 
their wealth‟. The black elite are obscene and cruel since they are quick to resign themselves 
to the predicament of the black condition. Their lives are centred on illusion, since they think 
that what they have gained is the power that they were anticipating in the war of liberation. 
However, there is no liberation for those who are trapped in the black condition. Their lives are 
like fiction, since they are embedded in an array of fashion parades and prestigious luncheons. 
The lifestyle of the elite is an embodiment of consumption, and characterised by a lifestyle of 
opulence and greasy political wealth which has no foundation, since it depends on political 
power as the access point. The BEE class come out to flaunt their „bling‟ – that is, the tendency 
to show off their politically created wealth, in a form of the life of display of crass materialism.  
This life is in direct opposition to the daily hardships of the majority of blacks. According to 
Mbeki (2009), the detachment of the black elite from the local population is indeed a 
detachment from the economy itself, since their role and presence preserves white capital. The 
national economy that they must produce, one that is reflective of the black population, 
becomes a fossil in the crude state of decay. As Mbeki (2009) counsels, there is no emphasis 
on the elite‟s and the state‟s to invest in the upliftment and the development of services that are 
beneficial to the nation, such as education, healthcare, housing and infrastructure.  
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The legitimacy of the black elite always comes into question, and that silences the question of 
whether the white elite are also engaging in a politics of excess. Mangcu accuses the media of 
engaging in the racial double standards, since they focus on the excesses of the black elite 
while remaining silent about the white elite. Essentially, the media‟s role here implies that the 
black elite should not be in white spaces and forms of life.  
According to Durrheim and Mtose (2006), exclusion, oppression and marginalisation are seen 
as things experienced under apartheid, because black rule has been regarded as absent since 
the issues of equal participation and the emergence of the black middle class have taken 
centre stage. The view expressed by Durrheim and Mtose (2006:153) is that „[r]acism and 
segregation have been outlawed and Affirmative Action and Black Economic Empowerment 
and other progressive policies for change have been legislated and implemented‟. This view 
suggests that there has indeed been progress, but the structural conditions which entrap 
blackness are absent. These are the structures of the past which are viewed as intangible, and 
which should not be taken into account. However, the reality is that they are still in operation 
and the black elite functions on the basis of not meddling with such rigid structures.  
The positionality of Mangcu signifies a shift in the justification of the middle class, whom 
Mangcu argues to have some historical relevance. He argues that the existence of a middle 
class triggers the aspirations of the black majority. Mangcu also warns against a culture of 
discouragement which gives the impression that being rich is morally wrong and alien to 
blackness. He argues that the aspiration of affluence in the black population should be 
encouraged. Nevertheless, this can only be beneficial if it is done in a responsible manner and 
which has the effect of changing the lives of the marginalised. However, this is far from 
articulating the manner in which structures of white capital should be dismantled, for the 
economy to benefit and work in order to address the black condition. The black elite will 
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continue to be an oxymoron as long as the black condition remains. The black elite serves 
white economic interests, and it is in these terms that they are a buffer zone in relation to black 
aspirations.   
Mngxitama, the black elite and untransformed capital  
The positionality of Mngxitama (2010d) suggests that BEE is a deliberate project created by 
the old white settler capitalist class to maintain its power over the economy by creating an 
illusion of a united country. This is done achieved by the co-option of the black elite into a white 
economic infrastructure. The black elite is at the apex of the socio-political strata and they 
engage in a politics of accumulation, consumption and serve their own interests. According to 
Mitrovic (2010:5), this group „is a predatory class of the nouveau riche and often bon vivant and 
parasitic upstarts‟. Mngxitama agrees with Mitrovic that the black elite, who often display their 
wealth, form only a fraction in the larger context and are usually politically connected. 
According to Mngxitama (2010d:1), „blacks could only become part of the economy through 
political connectivity, by getting a tender and scheming‟.  
Mngxitama (2010d) goes further than Seepe and Mangcu in arguing that capitalism is a 
historical injustice to the black majority as it was enmeshed with apartheid and the black elite 
are its managers in the post-1994 era. The white elite were created and sustained through the 
dispossession of blacks. White dominance rooted in apartheid precedes political power, since 
political power of the black political administration of the ANC is devoid of economic power. 
The interests of white capital in the post-1994 era were guaranteed in apartheid and even in 
the post-1994 era, white privilege remains untouched. However, this raises the question of 
beneficiaries.  Kasese-Hara (2006) argues that blacks do not possess economic production. 
Thus, those who own the means of production are those who benefit. This includes both the 
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white elite and the small black elite. The business community which has capital indeed has an 
advantage over the rest of society (Fine & Levin 2005). Both Fine and Levin posit that although 
business has advantages, business is not, in its capitalist sense, a monolithic whole, but rather, 
a site where competing interests intersect. This even relates to the manner in which business 
operates the relations between the state and capital. As Fine and Levin (2005) argue, relations 
between the state and capital are in tandem at particular points in time, as they are 
simultaneously harmonious and conflictual. They claim that the partnership is mutually 
beneficial, in that for the capital to exist, it needs the protection of the state. Capital is also 
important for the survival of the state. 
Black capitalists, as Mngxitama argues, are in fact the anti-thesis of blackness and they are 
acting in a manner that is blind to the black condition, since their only interest is parasitism. 
The black elite rely on the un-transformed economy to make their gains, which occur at the 
exclusion of the black majority. Mbeki (2009) argues that the black elite are on the fringes of 
the economy, as they are not property owners. Mbeki‟s (2009) view suggests that the black 
elite cannot use state power to create systems and structures that advance the property they 
do not have. In the hands of the non-propertied black elite, state power thus becomes an 
instrument used to re-distribute wealth in favour of the elite. The growing inequality between 
the black middle class and the black masses is a clear manifestation of this wealth re-
distribution. He proposes that there should be an effort to re-direct wealth from consumption to 
productive investment. 
Mngxitama (2010d) argues that the black elite are modern slave catchers, who seek inclusion 
in the capitalist and untransformed white economy. They eat the crumbs of the economy 
through their politics of being the spokespersons of white interest, while using the language of 
victimhood. According to McKinley (2011), the post-1994 economy is a capitalist political 
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economy grounded in apartheid‟s socio-economic formation, which keeps the economy 
unchanged. The black elite legitimises black exclusion and are recruited into whiteness as 
exhibits who will counter the claims of the legitimacy of the black condition as they engage in 
primitive accumulation.  
According to Mitrovic (2010), the black elite are a comprador bourgeoisie who are peripheral to 
capitalism and who rule societies which are heavily segregated and exploited. The black elite 
are heavily dependent, corrupt, and they are managers of the structures that militate against 
the well-being of the majority of blacks. Mitrovic (2010) focuses on the elite in the Third World 
countries who are appendages of capitalism, which leads him to conclude that they are 
pseudo-elites. In this sense, they are a rigid administrative clique ignorant of power structures. 
In this context, they are ignorant of the white capital which is necessary to transform the 
pathologies that exist in societies.  
The black elite, as Mngxitama (2010) argues, are incapable of articulating the grammar of 
black suffering. They always take the easy option of leaving the structures of the white system 
untransformed: „In other words, the fundamental logic of the apartheid and colonial economy 
would remain intact as a few blacks were allowed to accumulate and consume at the rate of 
old white capital‟ (Mngxitama 2010d: 1). Black elite are to a large extent mere tokens who drain 
the nation‟s wealth, which could have been (re-)distributed. Calland (2006) adds that they are a 
comprador bourgeoisie who are dependent on political patronage and clientelism. They form a 
class which amasses capital and exhibits an opulent lifestyle, but are not creators of such 
capital. Furthermore, they cannot function on their own, since they do not possess nor do they 
work towards the creation of the forces of production. They are enmeshed in the 
untransformed capitalist system, which does not work for the benefit of those disadvantaged by 
their socio-political condition. Rather, as Calland (2006:264) argues, the comprador 
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bourgeoisie „are turncoats: people who lose sight of their revolutionary ideals, ensnared by the 
drive for personal profit‟.  
According to Mngxitama (2011), the BEE class is a creation of white capital, and this creation 
enables the BEE class to manage legalised thieving practices. Mitrovic (2010) argues that this 
class survives through massive exploitation of the workforce. Secondly, this class is driven by 
profit motive and consumption. Finally, this class is not sympathetic to the plight of the workers 
and the poor. This testifies to the fact that the existence of the BEE class is a social, political 
and economic defect which perpetuates the historical arrangements of apartheid. This is the 
class that follows its interests and fails to consider a national consciousness that can in some 
way bring meaningful change to the lives of the black majority.  
The black elite are a minority claiming to represent the interests of the many, they are 
appendages of the white capitalist economy and are reduced to mere tokens. They are mere 
clones, which, in fact, do not come close to reflecting originality. According to Gumede 
(2007:290), in „many empowerment companies, whites ran the operational and management 
functions and held the posts of executive directors, with blacks in non-executive positions‟. 
Gibson (2004) further states that although the end of apartheid ended apartheid laws, it did not 
end the law of capital. This means that the law of capital from the apartheid era applies in the 
post-1994 political reality. Mbeki (2009) argues that BEE was not created by blacks, but by 
white oligarchs. The black elite does not represent the change in the black condition, or even 
the face of the economic ownership.  
The black elite are a buffer zone, as they serve the old white capital, and this reduces them to 
mere tokens of white capital. The alleged „trickledown effect‟ of capitalism is used as a 
justification, while in fact there is opulent consumption. The desire to accumulate more wealth 
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at the expense of the poor is the moral code of primitive accumulation which is embedded in 
capitalism. So the capitalist mode of production must always be present to create an enabling 
environment for primitive accumulation. Ndlovu-Gatsheni comments as follows:  
A few black people were able to take advantage of favourable state policies such as 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and Affirmative Action (AA) to climb up the social 
and economic ladder into the middle stratum/middle class status. Examples include 
Cyril Ramaphosa, Patrice Motsepe, Irvin Khoza and others termed the „black 
diamonds‟. These people were used by dominant white groups as showcases to 
counter accusations of racial discrimination and to hide continuations of racial 
discrimination. (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012 forthcoming) 
Mngxitama (2010d) argues that the black elite are managers of the untransformed economy 
and that the continued dispossession of blacks is legitimated by the black government in their 
elite clique. That is why a few trusted natives who are not a threat to white capital will be co-
opted to run the untransformed economy and eat the leftovers of capital, since they neither 
drive the economy nor produce capital. The spatial economy which breeds and perpetuates 
inequalities between black and whites and amongst blacks is something that leaves the 
majority of blacks at a disadvantage.  
The black elite in the post-1994 era run what Mitrovic (2010:4) refers to as „bandit economy‟, 
which is politically, structurally and developmentally untransformed. Mitrovic states that this 
stems from the fact that the neo-elite accept their former oppressors to be their mentors. As a 
result, instead of bringing about radical reform, this transitional state results in „mass 
unemployment, enormous exploitation, social inequalities, [and] the rise in social contradiction‟ 
(Mitrovic 2010:4). These pathologies affect blacks who are trapped in squalid conditions and 
are condemned to a life of non-existence in townships, shacks and RDP houses, which are an 
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insult to the dignity of blacks. When the black majority rise to protest their legitimate and basic 
demands, by demanding basic services such as water, electricity, sanitation and housing, they 
are met with police brutality. This clearly shows that the legacy of the past is still haunting 
those at the bottom of society.   
The legacy of the past, through structural and institutional arrangements, thus remains intact, 
since the spatial settlement patterns in South Africa in general remain the same, with few 
blacks gaining the point of access. This is made possible by the presence and the 
establishment of the oligarchs who have been, and who are still, in control of the economy. 
Mbeki (2009) points to the establishment of New Africa Investment Limited, which was formed 
before the ANC was awarded political power in 1994: 
The object[ive] of BEE was to co-opt leaders of the black resistance movement by 
literally buying them off with what looked like a transfer to them of massive assets at no 
cost. To the oligarchs, of course, these assets were small change. (Mbeki 2009:67) 
The revolution or liberation is betrayed, since there is an absence of those ideas which were 
the driving force of the liberation struggle. Therefore, another language, the language of 
capital, is engaged upon. This is an antithesis to overcoming the black condition, since this 
black elite does not understand in clear terms the language of capital, since they are not the 
creators of capital or its forces of production. By being mere mediators, they stand outside the 
theatre, since they do not understand the script, and as a result, their performance will leave 
much to be desired in the audience.  
According to Gibson (2004), the black elite seek empowerment in that it is a parasite on the 
state. They are also dependent on white capital – the real locus of power. As McDonald 
(2006:177) argues, by „re-organising state power, making it democratic and “non-racial”, 
105 
 
capitalism was re-grounded and sustained. But the political economy was not de-racialised, it 
was multi-racialised‟. 
According to Mngxitama (2010d), primitive accumulation of the black elite is essentially 
following the tendencies of the white elite, but not benefiting the larger part of the majority in 
order to address the black condition. Mngxitama argues that this form of accumulation serves 
white interests and worsens the black condition. Bonefeld (2001) argues that primitive 
accumulation is not just a period of transition, but a systematic and constitutive part and 
process of capitalism. It is the foundation of capital and the way in which it is accumulated. 
Bonefeld (2001) points out that there are two forms of accumulation which are interconnected, 
namely accumulation by dispossession and accumulation by valorisation. Though they negate 
each other in dialectic terms, their interconnectivity produces something new.  
However, this occurs under the same structure and the mode of accumulation, that is, primitive 
accumulation. Mbembe (2001a) argues that the modes of accumulation in general and 
primitive accumulation in particular suggest that humans are caught between bare life and 
sovereign power. Primitive accumulation continues in the process of expropriation, since that is 
what informs its logic and mode of operation. Bonefeld (2001) argues that under these 
conditions, the masses are divorced and alienated from the means of production, since this is a 
result of primitive accumulation, which works on the logic of accumulation by any means, and 
the logic of dispossession.  
The politics of the enrichment of the few at the expense of the masses is indeed a form of 
existence. In the post-1994 era, the black capitalists are, in a way, pursuing primitive modes of 
accumulation where they consume without producing and even exhibit their wealth and their 
modes of consumption. For Bonefeld (2001), there is interconnection between capitalist 
accumulation and primitive accumulation, because capitalism consists of primitive 
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accumulation, which then gave birth to capitalist accumulation. Bonefeld (2001) argues that 
capitalist accumulation and primitive accumulation co-exists in the forms of social relations, 
even if when they are declared changed, since the infrastructure of capitalism (which always 
forms part of accumulation) will exist in the logic that it desires (material wealth). Since the 
post-1994 era has a residue of capitalism inherited from the racist economy of apartheid, in the 
transition period between 1990 and 1994 it allied itself with the neo-liberal paradigm, which 
resulted in cosmetic changes. 
As Southall (2004) argues, the emphasis by the ANC-led government on national reconciliation 
after 1994 meant that the BEE initial ideals were non-threatening to white interests. Primitive 
accumulation was legitimated by capitalism and it has been turned into a myth which is seen 
as indisputable because of its proclaimed altruism. In that form, the myth is legitimated to the 
extent no alternative is seen outside its modes of operation, since it has been embedded in a 
sacrosanct political economy. Essentially, it is institutionalised and naturalised at a level at 
which inequalities and socio-economic injustices are justified. 
Mngxitama (2007:24) argues that „[c]apitalism thrives by excluding and impoverishing the 
majority and in our case the black majority‟. He also states that the post-1994 state has been 
trapped in the chasm of capital. Bonefeld (2001) explains that abstractions take a leading role 
in determining social relations, which can be regarded as the market forces in which capital 
takes on a life of its own which attracts the existence and all the abstractions of the universe, 
with the intention of making them rational to itself. As Bonefeld (2001) argues, capital assumes 
a persona, that is, it becomes a subject or structural power that defines social relations and 
becomes constitutive of society.  There must be exploitation through primitive accumulation for 
capitalism to exist and to justify itself based on the genesis required to transform its mode of 
existence, and to become a product of its own production (Bonefeld 2001). Primitive 
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accumulation resists demystification, and presupposes a concentration of wealth in the hands 
of the few. Capital should be accumulated and primitive accumulation creates and sustains the 
infrastructure of that capital.   
Furthermore, political power provides the path to the accumulation of capital if it creates an 
enabling environment. The foundation of capital and the modes of accumulation – that is, 
primitive accumulation – create a situation where the status quo is entrenched. As Mngxitama 
(2007:24) comments: „How else do you develop capitalism if not by theft and plunder?‟ The 
South African political economy inherited from apartheid a racist infrastructure which serves as 
the template.  
Primitive accumulation relies on the foundational basis of a racialised economy, as it originates 
from capitalism. This form of accumulation is based on structural violence and power which 
mutate their content, form and mode of operation across time and space to be relevant. Thus, 
there has been no fundamental change since 1994, as the presence of black capitalists is 
indeed still peripheral, since, although the economic infrastructure has changed cosmetically, 
the possession of capital is still the preserve of the white economy.  
Mngxitama (2011) points out that the critique of the black elite should also point to the real 
beneficiaries, who include the white oligarchy which commanded the South African economy 
during and after apartheid and who are not mentioned when there is an outcry about the rise or 
the existence of a black elite. Mngxitama complains that there is a resounding silence about 
the white rich who live in a safe „heaven‟, whereas blacks live in a hellish condition – that is, the 
black condition. Mngxitama (2011) therefore accuses the ANC of being the gatekeepers of 
white privilege and bodyguards who serve white interests. He argues that this condition allows 
the country to be governed in the interests of a white minority.  
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Mbeki (2009) agrees with this outlook and states that the wrongdoer will not pay reparations 
while still maintaining a privileged position. Mbeki raises a red flag for a brief moment when it 
comes to reparations, issuing a stern warning in the problematic relationship that the black elite 
have with the state. The black elite continue to see themselves as the sole beneficiaries, at the 
expense of the black majority. He also criticises the presence of Previously Disadvantaged 
Individuals (PDIs) in the elitist circles. Mngxitama (2011) agrees with Mbeki here and argues 
that they use the language of victimhood while desiring inclusion in the white economy. Their 
role is that of keeping the status quo intact. As Mbeki (2011) states, „the approach of the black 
elite to the state is, therefore, not that of using the state to serve the needs of the people but 
rather of using it, in the first instance, to advance the material interests of the PDIs‟. 
Mbeki (2009) states that BEE was a bribe offered by the white economic oligarchy to the black 
middle class to erase their call for nationalisation, which would have meant the transformation 
of the economy at the secretive Codesa II. As McDonald (2006:177) rightly argues: „Forced to 
choose between preserving racism and saving capitalism, conservatives in business and the 
state opted to negotiate a new constitution with the ANC.‟ 
It is argued that the blacks cannot be left on their own, as they cannot be trusted. So they must 
follow the script written by whiteness, since to them it is about meeting the expectations. 
Although blacks may reach high positions, white men remain in control (Roberts 2007).  The 
emerging black elite must align themselves or change their values to fit those of their white 
counterparts. Roberts (2007:249) argues that this helps to alleviate the anxieties of the old 
establishment, since the natives are non-threatening and they speak in their master‟s voice – 
the „black must be likeable‟.  
Capitalism is ontologically corrupt. Capitalism‟s modus operandi is exploitation, dispossession 
and expropriation (Bonefeld 2001). The post-1994 era in its economic crisis is something that 
109 
 
shows that its policy choice, neo-liberalism, is a part of the creation of the BEE elite. Kasese-
Hara (2006:245) argues that „redressing social, economic and psychological imbalances is 
seen as the huge task to be undertaken to ensure equitable, unified and democratic society‟. 
Mngxitama (2010d) argues that corruption should be seen as the apartheid-inherited part of the 
logic of the accumulation path that is pursued by the black elite, and which is now legalised 
and protected by the ANC. Capitalism is, by its very nature and origins, corrupt, in that it is 
based on over-accumulation and exploitation. It is impossible to regard capitalism as an 
economic system just needing reformation to best serve humanity based on erasing 
inequalities and injustices, because capitalism cannot be matched with an ethics in line with 
addressing socio-political inequalities and injustices.  
Capitalist accumulation can only occur and fatten itself through unjust means, and its evil 
profiteering has never stopped in the post-1994 era (Mngxitama 2010d). In relation to post-
1994 South Africa, the ambition was to create a black capitalist class in a so-called mixed 
economy, which was in a way, and continues to be, neo-liberal. Since the fall of apartheid, the 
residue that the apartheid infrastructure has left is in a sense defining the current reality.  
Mngxitama (2010d) concurs with Mangcu that the scandals of small examples of corruption will 
often be revealed. However, there is silence on the issue of addressing corruption on a larger 
and historical scale, as such large-scale corruption is normalised – there is no mention of the 
creation and the sustainability of the apartheid theft which has been protected by the ANC, 
which in turn facilitates the continuation of this theft. The presence of the black elite serves 
white supremacy and white capital which they must not disturb.  
Alexander (2004) argues that the black elite do not reflect blackness and that they cannot 
change white capital. She argues that this creates a situation where blacks have no space and 
they must function in a manner that warrants white guidance and supervision: „Just like colonial 
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administrators, African leaders embarked on state consolidation that privileged the freedom of 
a clique of people and the clients and patrons rather than expansion of frontiers of freedom to 
the citizens‟ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2012 forthcoming). This is a top-down approach, where the 
masses are neglected, and what really matters is the image of the black elite, and that in itself 
is regarded as being progressive.  
White privilege creates the black condition, and this means that white capital is privileged over 
and against blackness (Rottenburg 2003). According to Rottenburg (2003:446), in order to 
access privilege, it seems, subjects interpolated into the symbolic order as blacks must 
constantly endeavour to embody attitudes associated with whiteness‟. Essentially, this means 
that to access privilege, blacks must aspire to be white in order not to be prevented or 
discouraged from accessing many privileges enjoyed by whites. Nevertheless, when it comes 
to its enjoyment, this should be done in a just and equitable manner. The black elite are 
irrelevant with regard to the black condition, since to them this is an issue they are ashamed of 
and thus they seek inclusion into whiteness. It is in this inclusion where the black elite will 
project their success onto the black majority. They therefore become exhibitionist, and as a 
result, downplay the serious condition of neglect and exclusion that is part of the black 
condition.  
Gibson (2004) argues that the black elite has emerged at the expense of the black majority, so 
their wealth does not have the desired effect on the lives of the black majority. Black 
billionaires remain mere managers of white capital, and they inherit a legacy that is exploitative 
and does not eradicate poverty, but exacerbates it. Mitrovic (2010) therefore calls for a radical 
change in the modes of production, but for this to occur, the entire political and economic 
infrastructure needs to be changed. This call for action is in opposition to the notion of gradual 
economic reform that sometimes allows a number of piecemeal changes. For there to be 
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serious economic change, there needs to be a radical re-thinking, instead of a situation where 
society is haunted by an immature pseudo-elite which serves white capital.  
Conclusion 
Seepe, Mangcu and Mngxitama agree that the creation and the emergence of a black elite is 
not beneficial to the country, but is rather parasitic to the state. The dependency complex 
suffered by the black elite is embedded in parasitic modes of accumulation and renders the 
black elite largely powerless. The black elite are non-productive, but parasitise on the state, 
which they must pay allegiance to. Seepe and Mangcu seem to criticise the black elite and 
their BEE project without relating the rise of the black elite or BEE to the continuity of history. 
This suggests that there is a need for perspectives which go deeper into the complexities that 
brought about the existence of the black elite and their modes of operation and may even 
question who benefits from white capital.  
Mngxitama‟s positionality goes further than that of Seepe and Mangcu, as he argues that BEE 
is a post-1994 predicament, since it leaves white capital untouched, and the elite few are used 
as a front as if they were representative of the excluded black majority. This means that the 
black elite are an oxymoron. It is white capital that has brought into existence the black elite, 
who lack the political imagination to overhaul the capitalist system. In addition, the black elite 
are not a threat to white capital, and their existence is the perpetuation of the black condition. 
The creation of white capital and the emergence and consolidation of the white elite was made 
possible by the exploitation and exclusion of the black majority. The same logic operates in the 
post-1994 era, where the black government is in power, with the black elite engaging in 
primitive accumulation in parasitic terms. Thus, the economy is untransformed, as it remains 
under the control of the white elite.  
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It is important to note that the genesis of the formation and consolidation of the black elite 
cannot be understood outside of the English and Afrikaner elite. The state played an 
interventionist role to ensure the formation of the white elite, and the same applies to the black 
elite, who are paradoxically serving white interests.  
The notion of the black elite has been considered in the post-1994 political discourse. The 
black condition will remain as long as the victory of 1994 lies only political power, but cannot be 
articulated in economic terms. There will continue to be small cosmetic changes which must be 
regarded as irrelevant to genuine transformation and which only serve to exhibit the opulence 
and the modes of consumption of the black elite. It was noted that the black elite are a creation 
of white capitalism, and that, as a result, their existence is not a threat to white capital. That is 
why they are reduced to mere managers of an untransformed economy. Therefore, the black 
elite are an oxymoron. The next chapter will focus on the role and nature of black public 
intellectuals in the context of power and ideas. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
POWER AND IDEAS: THE PUBLIC INTELLECTUALISM OF 
SEEPE, MANGCU AND MNGXITAMA  
 
Introduction 
This chapter seeks to explore and analyse the dilemma of Seepe, Mangcu and Mngxitama in 
the post-1994 era in relation to the notion of power and ideas. The dilemma of black public 
intellectuals in the post-1994 era in South Africa is that whilst they claim to speak truth to 
power, they are caught in the centre between the state, white capital and neo-liberal ideology 
and the black majority. To understand the locus of power and the ideas of these black public 
intellectuals, the post-1994 era „needs to be thought through threefold: socio-economic, 
political and ideological‟ (Mamdani 1999:126). 
The problem this chapter engages with is that there is a belief that democracy has come to 
South Africa, and hence there is no need to engage with the legacy of apartheid any further. 
Moreover, there is a belief that since the state is led by a black government elected by the 
black majority, the black government should not be criticised by blacks, because this is disloyal 
or unpatriotic. As Mkandawire (2005a:20) explains, there „was always tension between the 
intellectual‟s critical mentality and his/her affinities, especially among those who insisted on 
sycophancy and blind faith‟. 
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Nowhere in the discourse of the post-1994 era has the idea of public intellectual emerged as 
strongly as in the politics of the Native Club, which was housed in the Africa Institute of South 
Africa (AISA). The Native Club, which was accused of reverse racism, arose out of the belief 
that there was no black public intellectualism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008). This chapter therefore 
also engages the discourse of the Native Club, which arose among other think-tanks which 
were formed both before and after 1994 and the chapter attempts to establish why there was 
such an uproar concerning the founding of the Native Club.  
Seepe and speaking truth to power 
Seepe (1995) believes that there is a lack of interrogation and concrete definition of black 
public intellectuals, particularly when it comes to issues affecting post-1994 South African 
political discourse. A black public intellectual has to negotiate the contested space between 
power and ideas. This is a unique feature of the post-1994 era, and the battle lines are blurred. 
The positionality of black public intellectuals should arguably be on the side of the black 
majority, but as it happens, in many cases, they are distant from that majority. 
Nzimande (2005) maintains that during apartheid black public intellectual discourse was 
informed by strategies and tactics to defeat the apartheid regime. For Nzimande, the post-1994 
political discourse should also be informed about issues facing this era. This suggests that 
public intellectuals should ask questions that have not been posed and fearlessly engage with 
such issues in an intellectually vigorous and rigorous manner.  
Seepe (2007a) also argues that public intellectuals should not be on the periphery in matters of 
influencing ideas and knowledge production, for example, on the periphery regarding matters 
relating to the black condition. They regard themselves as being in the centre when they 
feature in or make some contribution in matters that are considered part of a „national debate‟. 
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This raises the question of whether, if anyone engages society on the matters that affect 
society, such an individual can be regarded as a public intellectual. Furthermore, is the public 
(broadly, in terms of interests) affected by the same matters? Particularly in a society such  
South Africa, which is highly differentiated racially and ethnically and in class terms, can public 
intellectuals be spokespersons for the whole society, and at what vantage point will they be 
positioned? 
In the era of former president Thabo Mbeki, Seepe was more critical of political power than he 
is at present. Seepe‟s critique was directed particularly at Mbeki‟s HIV/AIDS stance, his foreign 
policy on Zimbabwe, including those who sympathised with it, and he was even harsh to others 
who spoke truth for power.  Under the current president, Jacob Zuma, Seepe is no longer a 
fierce critic of political power and he defends such power. The stance that Seepe adopted after 
Zuma was elected as the South African president puts Seepe on the opposite side from that 
which he occupied before. Black public intellectuals are always caught in a dilemma of 
metamorphosing from being critical of power versus becoming its ideologues and then its 
propagandists.  
Seepe (2000b) argues that systematic attacks launched against black intellectuals were fuelled 
by Mbeki‟s paranoia, who often called on black intellectuals to engage in the issues of 
transformation. According to Seepe, the agenda of black public intellectuals and other 
intellectuals alike should not be prescribed by those in power, but should be something that 
exists in the public domain. Those in power include the state, white capital, institutions and the 
ideological apparatus which are finding a political life in post-1994 political discourses.  
The formation of the Native Club in 2005 elicited controversy regarding the role and relevance 
of such a club in post-1994 political discourse. As already mentioned above, the formation of 
the Native Club arose out of a belief that there were no organised black public intellectuals, 
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based on the fact that although there are black intellectuals in some intellectual circles, their 
agenda was not in line with the aspirations of the black majority. Mamdani (1999) argues that 
most black public intellectuals are a product of colonialism and that their ideas enable and 
advocate assimilation to the colonial construction of the intellectual thought.  
According to Seepe (2007a), the formation of the Native Club was a sharp relief for black 
[public] intellectuals who had withdrawn from public engagement. He adds that its formation 
created a meaningful dialogue between and among black intellectuals. Mamdani (1999) 
amplifies this view by noting that public intellectuals should engage in a re-awakening of 
thought, and be drivers of social change.  
Thabo Mbeki was seen as the brain behind the formation of the Native Club, which allowed it to 
operate as a presidential initiative and as an ANC project. The Native Club was meant to 
provide impetus to his ideas concerning the African Renaissance and those reflecting African 
society. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2008) argues that the Native Club was in fact a call to focus on the 
issues that are of concern to the African society. This even included a call to „produce ideas 
that drive African society‟ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008:70). According to Roberts (2008:266), „the 
Native Club was an attempt at bringing blacks and whites together for deconstruction of some 
racial legacy‟. He states that the members of the Native Club made an error in suggesting that 
there are only black indigenous Africans. Roberts‟s claim is refuted by the reaction and 
resistance that came from most whites, and some blacks, who had a problem with the word 
„native‟, while others went further in suggesting that this was a „blacks only‟ initiative.  
Seepe (2006a:9) explains that the „Native Club is a presidential project that aims to realise a 
vibrant critical consciousness among Africans‟. He also warned that the Native Club could be 
reduced to a mere apologetic platform, loyal to the president, instead of being a robust 
intellectual platform. Although Mbeki made it publicly known that everyone was welcome, there 
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was still resistance from whites, which can be attributed to the word „native‟. Roberts (2008) 
argues that Mbeki corrected the inaccurate perception that the Native Club was subordinate to 
him, as exemplified by Gumede (2007), who regarded the Native Club as an invitation-only 
club of black intellectuals and argues that everything was „presidentialised‟, as the office of the 
president was given more powers. 
Fair Lady Magazine covered a debate feature titled „So what‟s all the fuss about the Native 
Club?’ Both Seepe and Jonathan Jansen were interviewed using the same set of questions. 
Seepe claimed that „the fuss around the word native is misplaced arguing that naming oneself 
is an act of liberation‟. He stated that there was a need for the Native Club, since white 
privilege and dominance are pervasive. He added that comparing the Native Club with the 
Broederbond was nothing but intellectual dishonesty and mischief. Seepe emphasised the 
importance of redress of past injustices and indicated that a look should be taken at evident 
racial disparities in the post-1994 era. The assertion of an African identity and turning it into a 
positive force requires the total eradication of the state of alienation and self-loathing that has 
afflicted the black majority (Seepe 2005). Jansen strongly attacked the members of the Native 
Club for labelling themselves as „native intellectuals‟, while excluding others as „settler 
intellectuals‟. He claimed that the Native Club divided rather than united and described it as the 
president‟s project. Jansen argued that people do not want the Native Club, because its 
intentions do not concern the future of the country.  
According to Masango (2009:2), the source of the furore surrounding the formation of the 
Native Club was „its perceived link to the ruling party and the office of then President Thabo 
Mbeki‟. She states that much of the commentary concerned the motives and the relevance of 
the Native Club. The argument here is that there would be no need for the Native Club if there 
was no concern about the legacy of the apartheid.  
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According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2008:66), „black intellectuals of South Africa have always 
reacted to white racial nationalism with their own black populist strategies of black liberation, 
designed to mobilise across class divides and ethnic divisions‟. Thus the formation of the 
Native Club was informed by an ethos of being resistant in the mode of operation of the Club 
against the institutionalised and normalised legacy of apartheid.  Ndlovu-Gatsheni points out 
the following: 
The supporters and the critics of the Native Club focused their attention on the murky 
present with a view to prescribing the mysterious future. No one historicised and 
contextualised the Native Club in the complex history of the South African liberation 
struggle. (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008:54) 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni draws attention to the fact that the Native Club should be understood in 
relation to black political thought rooted in the tradition of resistance that has informed and still 
informs the ideologies and the politics of most black liberation movements. These traditions 
stand in opposition to the idea of the rainbow nation, since they advocate for the ideas of 
radicalism which can be labelled racial nativism, although not always in essentialist terms. 
Thus, the injection of black populist thought into political discourse, though it often fits more 
into the marginal discourse, is part of a black intellectual political tradition.     
Seepe (2006a) expresses a similar view by stating that issues that were at the centre of the 
Native Club were the following: the contribution of African intellectuals to African liberation and 
development, the idea and the relevance of the notion of the „native‟, African identity, African 
languages, gender politics, knowledge production and a vibrant intellectual culture. Ndlovu-
Gatsheni (2008:54) argues that, „dismissing nativism as fake philosophy and as anti-racist 
racism is too simplistic‟. He points out that rainbowism found itself in a state of tension with 
nativism and populism, which led to the rise of Native Club. 
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Seepe (2000b) states that when Mbeki raised the question about the whereabouts of black 
intellectuals, he was searching for those who shared his views and not for critics. It will be 
argued here that Mbeki challenged black intellectuals to define themselves, and called on them 
to engage in critical issues facing society. In this regard, Mamdani (1999) comments that the 
„only guarantee of deracialised knowledge is an African focused intelligentsia‟. It is according to 
such a view that the contribution of black public intellectuals is fundamental to the process of 
social change. Mamdani argues as follows: 
There is a need for urgent action by the state, but not only the state, to create 
enabling conditions for the nurture of an African-focused intelligentsia. These 
conditions will need to create an institutional context receptive to such thought. 
(Mamdani 1999:134) 
It is evident that what was of concern and what Mbeki raised in particular, was the absence of 
black intellectuals in determining and shaping the agenda of the political discourse and the 
direction of the country (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008). In amplifying this view, Masango writes: 
In many speeches he had presented at various forums, former President Thabo 
Mbeki, consistently asked the black intelligentsia to be more visible and vocal in the 
socio-political arena. Mbeki had not only made the call in South Africa, but throughout 
the continent as well. In one of his earliest attempts to call for the vigorous 
participation of intellectuals, Mbeki used the forum of [the] Z.K. Matthews Memorial 
Lecture held at the University of Fort Hare on the 12
th
 October 2001. (Masango 
2009:3) 
Masango (2009) argues that this call appeared to influence some of the intellectuals, since the 
intellectual discourse had previously been white-dominated. However, although this was a 
genuine call, it was received with scepticism in some circles, because Mbeki was infamous for 
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dismissing and labelling those who criticised his government as if they were enemies of the 
state (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2008; Ndebele 2007; Daniels 2006; Kadalie 2001).    
Seepe‟s (2000b) response was that Mbeki was calling for praise singers, since those who 
criticised the government were demonised. For Kadalie (2001), independent and critical views 
were marginalised and the use of the race card was deployed whenever suitable in the Mbeki 
era. Kadalie (2001) highlighted the fact that political power might be consolidated and abused 
in subtle ways in what she called „Democracy of a Special Type‟, which she argued was 
prevalent in post-independent eras where those in power are sensitive to criticism, and such 
criticism will also be silenced in subtle ways.  „People do not speak as easily for fear of being 
called racist, right-wing, sell-out, disloyal and unpatriotic‟ (Kadalie 2001:224). 
Seepe (2000b) believes that public intellectuals should not be dictated to in terms of the activity 
that they must carry out. Though this view is not far from the truth, it missed the importance of 
such a question posed by Thabo Mbeki. This view further creates the impression that Thabo 
Mbeki should not engage in political discourse, because he was a very opinionated president 
who made his views known every Friday in ANC Today, a mouth-piece journal, writing in a 
column called „Letter from the President‟.  Although public intellectuals have the right to speak 
in public, since this is not the exclusive domain of politicians, this does not mean that they are 
all agents of truth. Seepe (2000b) subscribes to the ideal formulated by Said that there should 
be a „free floating‟ intellectual who guards against the interference of their independence since 
independence is an indispensible aspect of public intellectualism. They are agents who speak 
truth and they enlighten society (Said 1994).  
The notion of intellectual autonomy is problematic, since it is always seen as confronting 
political power. Nothing is said about independence, in so far as it applies to the institutions 
that public intellectuals are attached to – white capital and even neo-liberal ideology. Black 
121 
 
public intellectuals cannot be relied on as independent voices in society, since they can act in 
the interests of the power of the state, the market and the hegemony of popular ideology or 
ideologies.  
Even though it is claimed that their ideas tower over those of politicians, little is said about 
black public intellectuals who have no power to rise above being caught in the demands of 
white capital, the state and the neo-liberal ideological apparatus. Although they are defined by 
the ideas they disseminate and exchange in society, it is important to establish whose ideas 
they propagate in ideological terms and what interests they serve.  
The role of public intellectuals is problematic in most liberal democracies, and the post-1994 
era is a case in point. Masango (2009) conceptualises power as the power of the government 
authority or state power, because intellectuals often cross swords with this form of power. 
However, economic or institutional power, which is also ideological, under the mission and 
vision or unwritten rules of thumb, are absent from Masango‟s conceptualisation.  
Thus there is silence regarding the institutions that public intellectuals are attached to and/or 
the companies that fund them, if any; and whether they are independent from them. South 
Africa has a large number of think-tanks in Africa and some of them were already present in 
the apartheid era. This includes the South African Institute of Race Relations, the Centre for 
Policy Studies, the South African Institute of International Affairs, the Helen Suzman 
Foundation, and the Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research. Most of these institutions 
subscribe to the values of liberal democracy and do not allow for Marxist, pan-Africanist or 
black consciousness ideologies or world views. However, the Africa Institute for South Africa is 
informed by pan-Africanist ideals, hence it even accommodated the Native Club. These think-
tanks host, employ, consult and provide a forum to black public intellectuals. Subsequently, it is 
important to know who owns these institutions, whose interests they serve, who funds them 
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and for what reasons. Radical black intellectuals are in the margins of these institutions, since 
they did not determine their agenda and ideological content (Mamdani 1999). Some feared 
being on the margins and they were co-opted and even reduced to the level of native 
informants even though they held high positions. 
According to Mamdani (1999), a change of pigmentation cannot be equated with 
deracialisation. A public intellectual might be black but his/her products might not be black 
enough or touch the pulse of the black condition at all. The structural constraints remain even 
in institutions representing the interests of society. Black public intellectuals should frame and 
engage in debates on their own terms (Seepe 2009b). 
What motivates public intellectuals who are in conflict with the state or political authority is a 
„state of creative tension with the rules and restrictions imposed by the prevailing institutions on 
everyday life‟ (Ferudi 2004:32). Seepe (2000b) agrees with Ferudi that distance from the 
conventions and pressures of everyday life is necessary, since detachment informs 
positionality. Detachment involves defying the dictates or schedules of institutions or other 
locations and modes of power in the political scene.  Black public intellectuals need not be 
detached, but should be allied with progressive forces and oppressed groups. However, it is 
arguable to what degree such detachment is possible, since public intellectuals do not operate 
in a vacuum. Ferudi (2004) sees autonomy as the ability to pursue the public intellectual‟s own 
life. However, linked to the above mentioned institutions are the ideological apparatus and 
white capital. These are forces operating in hidden forms which inform the agenda and 
perspective of a black public intellectual. Even though black public intellectuals take pride in 
their work and ideas, there needs to be some engagement in relation to how such pride is 
consistent with the institutions they are attached to via the notion of independence. 
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Seepe (2000b) called for intellectuals and more black public intellectuals in particular to be 
detached and critical of power. Despite this call, Seepe himself has became attached to power 
under the Zuma administration. Public intellectuals should not be co-opted or be praise 
singers, because otherwise they may betray their intellectual principles by means of well-
reasoned intellectual deceit. The state is the embodiment of power, and it is therefore 
necessary that public intellectuals should be non-aligned and „should clearly define their 
political allegiance and stand out as independents‟ (Masango 2009:12).  However, due to the 
dilemmas they face, this is not always the case, as public intellectuals are aligned with 
structures such as those of power, particular institutions and/or market forces.  
It is in these terms that the notion of independence becomes blurred. Furthermore, their 
ideological stances do not allow all public intellectuals to be wholly independent, as they are 
influenced by their socio-political acculturation. The idea of detachment and independence is a 
liberal bourgeois ideal. Black public intellectuals need a clear locus of enunciation – that is, 
they must be embedded in the location that they speak from.  Black public intellectuals should 
speak on behalf of the oppressed groups; they must be the voice of the voiceless. 
This is in line with the potential agenda of the public intellectual that Seepe indicates that the 
nature and character of each black public intellectual is not the same, and that also applies to 
the issues they engage upon. Seepe (2009d) suggests that the government should not engage 
in intellectual suppression, because this creates the symptom of intellectual withdrawal, and 
then intellectual space is reduced to a mere recycling of ideas. Intellectual suppression creates 
a conspiracy of silence, which allows vulgarisation and political correctness to take centre 
stage. According to Seepe, black public intellectuals should not affirm the ideas of the 
president or the powers that be. Seepe states that politicians clamour for uncritical 
endorsement, but that criticism raises and enriches the level of conversation and rigour of 
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thought. But what does Seepe mean by power? Seepe, who is infamous for his systematic 
attack on Mbeki, justified this form of intellectual tradition based on Edward Said‟s notion of 
„speaking truth to power‟. Seepe (2008c:11) argues that the truth and complexities 
characterising the post-1994 era can be reduced to dispensable inconveniences, in which 
„deliberate misrepresentation and pigeonholing are the order of the day‟. This, in Seepe‟s view, 
breeds a situation where only the views that protect the government are allowed to prevail. The 
notion of speaking truth to power connotes the idea that the public intellectual has the 
prerogative to enjoy the privilege of being free-spirited – a free-floating intellectual.  
As Said (1994) argues, the public intellectual has the conviction of speaking truth to power and 
should not be compelled or expected to toe a party line, utter some slogan, hold orthodox ideas 
or be constrained by fixed dogma. In terms of speaking truth to power, „the first imperative is to 
find out what occurred and then why, not as isolated events but as part of an unfolding history 
whose broad contours include one‟s own nation as an actor‟ (Said 1994:99), because the 
public intellectual is supposed to appeal to the wider public and is an individual with a specific 
role in society.   
According to Nzimande (2005), the role of black public intellectuals in Gramscian terms as an 
organic intellectual is that they articulate public interests from the class they serve and they are 
shapers and contesters of ideas. Fuller (2006), by contrast, argues that public intellectuals are 
those related to ideas, and they motivate political action with those ideas. Said (1994) argues 
that tolerating the tempering and abandoning of freedom of opinion is a betrayal of the 
intellectual exercise. The intellectual role is that of „questioning, not to say undermin(ing) 
authority‟ (Said 1994:91). Thus, speaking truth to power in this sense is to raise issues which 
political authorities are not paying attention to or choosing to silence. The notion of speaking 
truth to power only speaks to political authority, such as that of the ANC, for example, not to 
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power in totality. The notion of speaking could have just been called „speaking truth to political 
power‟; however, the notion of speaking should be applied to speaking truth to power in its 
totality.  Africa is a location of coloniality and imperial power in place since the fifteenth century.  
Power also manifests itself in different forms that public intellectuals are not aware of or choose 
to ignore, but they do feel the effects of such power structures.  Therefore, speaking truth to 
power should mean a confrontation with political power and authority in their varied 
manifestations, in order to avoid concentrating on criticising only the most visible or organised 
political institutions. It means not choosing consensus, but operating outside the „space 
controlled by experts and professionals‟ (Said 1994:87).  
Since the norms of power conform or accept what is already institutionalised, the norms of 
public intellectuals should aim to disrupt narratives of organised (and sometimes disorganised) 
authoritarian forms of political power. This is pertinent if public intellectuals serve the public 
good and in good faith. Said (1994) points out that public intellectuals should be positioned in 
relation to the concept of justice and fairness. However, he acknowledges the impracticalities 
and challenges of such a positionality, as public intellectuals are located in various socio-
structural conditions and dynamics.    
Seepe (2008c:11) exclaims that „[o]ne can be critical of a party without becoming the enemy„. 
Seepe also argues that for the intellectual engagement and for the purpose of sanity prevailing, 
elements of arguments which are bereft of truth or logic should be exposed. In their 
commitment and principles as the agents of truth, which they often speak to power, Du Toit 
(2000) adds that they are known as figures representing the marginalised with the mandate of 
following truth and justice. This implies that the positionality of the black public intellectual is an 
alternative stance that should breed the space of speaking truth to power.  
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Said (1994:102) declared that „[y]es, the intellectual voice is lonely, but it has resonance only 
because it associates itself freely with the reality of a movement, the aspirations of a “people”, 
the common pursuits of a shared ideal‟. This is the basis upon which the public intellectual 
does not owe any allegiance to or solidarity with the institutionalisation of power. Ashcroft and 
Ahluwalia (2001) argue that criticism is the key function of public intellectuals since this 
provides a location in or from which such a figure speaks truth to power. Speaking truth to 
power is the means by which public intellectuals are exercising their freedom of expression and 
opinion. This is informed by the power of resistance, and „this means taking a stand against 
one‟s own government‟ (Ashcroft & Ahluwalia 2001:39) and other expressions of oppression 
and authoritarian tendencies that can shift into private spheres.  
According to Tendi (2008), speaking truth to power means engaging with public opinion, which 
entails acting as a guardian of the public good in the face of excesses of state power and 
which frequently undermines the interests of society. Currently, black public intellectuals are 
expected to be state-aligned, and to benefit from its propaganda machinery. In this form, they 
will be distorting their analysis and maintaining the status quo. Due to political differences or 
maintaining dissent, engaging in intellectual debate is often reduced to a liability. This is an 
ideological positionality that can be transcended by public intellectuals who choose to be 
critical of power and oppression in all its manifestations.  
Similarly, Ashcroft and Ahluwalia (2001:39) argue that „[t]he point of speaking truth to power in 
contemporary societies is to effect better conditions to achieve peace, reconciliation and 
justice‟. These authors acknowledge that the positionality of a public intellectual can be very 
complex and ambivalent, but the key is for the public intellectual to assume the positionality of 
„politics [that] links criticism to the possibility of a different world‟ rather than a politics of 
attributing blame (Ashcroft & Ahluwalia 2001:40).  
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Furthermore, they suggest that public intellectuals should act to remind us of the evils of 
colonialism and „its continuing effects as well as to clarify and expand space with which to 
check post-colonial societies have been able to carve out for themselves‟ (Ashcroft & Ahluwalia 
2001:40). Black intellectuals in the post-1994 South Africa are far away from taking the debate 
up to this level of engaging with the invisible colonial matrix of power.    
Seepe (2007b) sees the notion of speaking truth to power as essential to the intellectual 
project. Lazarus (2005) regards the notion of speaking truth to power as not being critical 
enough from its own introspection, since intellectuals are located in the sphere of power and 
serve power according to an ideological script. He questions the romanticisation of the 
intellectual and argues that intellectuals benefit, as they are in possession of cultural capital. 
The notion of speaking truth to power is mere sloganeering in that it means „speaking truth in 
the face of power‟ (Lazarus 2005:120). Lazarus argues that the practice of public 
intellectualism is materially implicated. The notion of intellectual autonomy is problematic, 
because black public intellectuals are caught up within the complexity of the institutions of 
power, both as critics and propagandists. Lazarus posits that the notion of speaking truth to 
power displays flawed logic, since power can also speak its truth through which it manipulates 
ordinary people and intellectuals to agree with it in a relation of coercion and consent (Gramsci 
1971). Mbembe (2001a) adds that the relationship between public intellectuals is not always 
adversarial, because intellectuals can toy with power in a relationship of conviviality.  
This suggests that the mode of ideological insertion of the South African public sphere can be 
contradictory; it can involve or manifest, simultaneously, the politics of resistance, adaptation, 
co-optation and collaboration (Hall 1994). Furthermore, Lyon (2009) asserts that speaking truth 
to power is fraught with complexities and contradictions, in that if the views of opponents are 
deemed dangerous, opponents may be labelled public enemies.  
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According to Seepe (2000b:10), public intellectuals „should also not be friends with those in 
power since these individuals do not seek validation and affirmation from the powers that be, 
including the presidency, that some find them threatening and irksome‟. Seepe adds that 
political and intellectual authority do not mean the same thing. Seepe pleads that black public 
intellectuals should not be propagandists and ideologues in power contestations. He further 
argues that public intellectuals should not be praise singers, just like those who serve power. 
However, considering the current position that Seepe holds as a policy advisor to the 
Department of Defence and Military Veteran Association Minister Lindiwe Sisulu, the ministry 
which is in the centre of political power, it is problematic for him to propose steering clear from 
being an ideologue or propagandist in defence of power.  
Tendi (2008) provides a distinction between two types of intellectuals, the first being 
commissars who serve power and the second being dissenters who are opposed to power. 
According to him, power privileges political commissars and defies dissenters. Seepe (2000b) 
warns that the intellectual tradition can be easily disarmed, and reduced to silence – buried in 
an intellectual graveyard. Dissent may be demonised and even, at worst, crushed.  
The current position that Seepe occupies is contrary to what he has advocated in the past. 
Although he may be linked with political power with a view to remaining independent, the 
notion of the meta-intellectual applies to Seepe.  As articulated by Farred (2009), a meta-
intellectual is the one who exercises an intellectual duty from the centre or a location closer to 
political power. Seepe provides his intellectual labour in the service of the state, while at the 
same time engaging in a public intellectual function. Thus, Seepe thinks and performs in the 
service of the state and the public.  
According to Farred (2009), political power can be disguised as intellectual rigour, since there 
is some contestation of ideas in post-1994 political discourse. The coming into being of the 
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meta-intellectual is a modality of intellectuality. „This is to say, the intellectual takes another 
shape, a different articulation‟ (Farred 2009:73).     
The public intellectual is aware that the state changes both internally and externally since the 
state often experiences institutional changes. Such changes include change in terms of a 
transfer of power, socio-economic crisis or political revolution. These dynamics often pose or 
create problems for public intellectuals, no matter what their relationships with the state are. In 
their desire to speak truth to power, public intellectuals may be driven by something individual, 
rather than institutional, to say something in the contested place of ideas (Lyon 2009).  
Seepe (2000b), like Said (1994), argues that black public intellectuals should, in their 
intellectual endeavour, ask embarrassing questions. Secondly, they cannot be dictated to and 
are not obliged to toe the party line and follow party orthodoxy. Thirdly, they must be of the 
conviction that speaking truth to power is a vital principle and that no world power is immune 
from criticism.   
Bennett (2007) states that changing uses of mutable relations between government and social 
rather than social control arising from a general historical closure of state or society relations 
can also complicate the identities of public intellectuals. This can happen because institutions 
of public culture sometimes assume or depict both past and present discrimination as 
unacceptable; they call instead for new forms of living the political life. For Bennett (2007), the 
activities of the intellectual working in the cultural sphere should neither be that of critic nor that 
of bureaucrat.  
Black public intellectuals, and Seepe in particular, find themselves with a vibrant discourse, 
they cannot be manufactured by order, and yet there is a need to engage the post-1994 
political discourse. Bennett (2007) states that Said‟s work on the intellectual appropriately 
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places the politics of the intellectual life in the context it finds expression in, despite its being 
fraught with ambiguities and contradictions. He argues that Said only sees the adversarial role 
of the intellectual. This is also the case with Seepe, and it will be interesting to analyse his 
views now that he is a meta-intellectual.  
Mangcu and racial nativism  
Mangcu (2004a) argues that intellectual history should be given a place and ideas should be 
fought for in political discourse. It is not clear who the contenders in this battle of ideas are, but 
the state, with the potential of its excess of power, is seen as being antagonistic to critical 
ideas. Mangcu (2004:12b) states that „to be an intellectual is something out of the ordinary for 
black people‟. Mangcu‟s positionality has been that of the public intellectual, a title which he 
has claimed for himself. His work has been likened to the practices of Cornel West, a 
prominent black public intellectual in the United States.  
Mangcu (2004c) offers a critique which seeks to change the landscape of the politics of 
identity. According to Banks (1995), public intellectuals should be committed to ideas and they 
should be grounded in grassroots issues. The ideas that black public intellectuals are 
committed to may be ideas which might not have relevance to the black condition and such 
ideas might not be regarded as important.  
False universalism is a form of institutionalised power that black public intellectuals often 
succumb to by „distancing themselves from the groups of their origin‟ (Banks 1995:77). This 
prevents them from connecting with the black community. The black condition is something 
that the universalism of freedom, justice, equality and fairness has no relevance for. Banks 
also points out that although black public intellectuals have imbibed universalism tutelage, this 
is a matter of positionality which forces them to embrace hegemonic discourses. As such, in 
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their acculturation, they „would tend to confirm the effect of institutionali[s]ed hegemony on the 
intellectual trajectory of (black public) intellectuals‟ (Banks 1995).  
The positionality of black public intellectuals may express strong advocacy for or close affinity 
to the black condition. However, in an environment where the black condition is regarded as 
unimportant, a black intellectual will not make it the centre of his/her intellectual labour. 
According to Mangcu (2005c:14), „[p]ublic intellectuals have often remained the only truly 
independent voices of their societies, sometimes even towering over heads of states‟. This 
view is narrowly focused on the heads of states, instead of looking at colonial matrices of 
power and global imperial designs at the apex of institutional and ideological apparatus. These 
are the sites of power which determine the agenda, which in turn shapes the articulation of 
black public intellectuals ideas. It has to be stated that such an agenda might not be put in 
written or verbal terms, but operates as an unwritten rule and according to what is relevant in 
the post-1994 era.  
The dominant view in reference to black public intellectuals is that they work with the truth. 
Truth is something that differs, depending on the location that the intellectual finds himself in, 
and truth depends also on the position of the state, institutional and ideological apparatus. The 
questions then arise – whose truth? Which truth? The argument here is that there are various 
regimes of truth. According to Mangcu, 
The intellectual engagement would occur in its full complexity inside the triangle. For 
that interaction to be fruitful and productive there would have to be an understanding 
that government intellectuals, independent intellectuals operate according to their 
own logic. (Mangcu 2006a:12) 
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This means that the intellectual sphere that Mangcu regards as a triangle is in fact a contested 
terrain and there are different lenses through which intellectuals located in this triangle see the 
political world. Mangcu continues to explain this difference: 
Government intellectuals tend to be informed by the logic of practicality, organic 
intellectuals tend to be informed by the wisdom that emanates from everyday 
struggles, and independent intellectuals tend to be informed by the logic of critical 
autonomy. But all this requires government intellectuals who are willing to enter the 
inside of the triangle fully prepared to be taken on both by the independent and the 
organic intellectuals, without a resort to name calling. (Mangcu 2006a:12) 
From the distinction above, the positionality of Mangcu is unclear. For Mangcu to be positioned 
as a critical intellectual, what then needs to be explored is the site of power. Public intellectuals 
are engaged in public opinion, acting as the guardians of public good, yet this occurs in the 
face of the excesses of state power which undermines the interests of society (Tendi 
2008:381). Tendi (2008) is silent about the excess of capital or what Gordon (2010) refers to as 
market colonisation of the intellectual. Lyon (2009) explains the relationship between public 
intellectuals, the state, civil society, both in the form of manifestations and the public. The role 
of the public intellectual is social engineering, that is, to make society to politically conscious. In 
their role, „public intellectuals are driven by something individual to say in the contested terrain 
of the market place of ideas‟ (Lyon 2009:83). However, this view seems to gloss over the 
reality that public intellectuals serve ideological interests even if they pursue the truth or 
engage in a blatant lie by means of intellectual deceit, and they work within their frame of 
reference, something which is not a universal truth but applies to and differs from one context 
to the next. 
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Mangcu (2005c) suggests that public intellectuals should use public lectures as they are 
powerful deliberative platforms. As a „cross-section of individuals, the public lectures become a 
microcosmic enactment of a pluralistic, deliberative, democratic national community‟ (Mangcu 
2005c:14). Nzimande (2005) argues that the recommended development in the post-1994 era 
is the development of progressive public deliberation platforms. He writes that what „is 
heartening about these developments is that progressive foundations, notably the Nelson 
Mandela Foundation, the Chris Hani Institute and the Harold Wolpe Memorial Trust, lead these 
new progressive platforms for debate‟ (Nzimande 2005:1).  
According to Mangcu (2005c), democracy should be pluralistic and deliberative, as this will 
harness the cross-sectional democratic national community. Public lectures are even a forum 
where the centrality and closeness of power is undermined, since citizens ask those in power 
critical questions. Public lectures are, in a way, elitist discourses accessed by a selected 
portion of the public whilst claiming to be representative of the whole public. There is not a 
single public deliberative platform, since existing platforms feature some issues at the 
exclusion of others, whether they are of national importance or not. The public platform is 
informed by plurality, difference and heterogeneity, with some similarities, and cannot be 
reduced to homogeneity.  
Gumede (2009) argues that in a democracy, public intellectuals should provide ideas on how to 
deal with the maladies in the polity and develop alternative frameworks. Like Gumede, Crick 
(2006) suggests that public intellectuals should be responsive to problems and challenges in 
society, and even to exigent problems and they must be the exigent managers. He calls on 
them to be broader in terms of space and time, thus being capable of transforming the socio-
historical situation(s). Gumede (2009:12) further argues that public intellectuals, which he 
frames as „progressive intellectuals‟ are important in building a democratic political culture. He 
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adds that a culture of criticism, dialogue and discussion is necessary with regard to social, 
political, cultural and economic problems or challenges facing the polity.  
As Mangcu (2004a) argues that public intellectuals should expose their ideas in the public 
domain and should contribute to the culture of public debate. They should goes further and 
argues that they should be seen as partners in search of the truth and should not be given 
labels such as coconuts or ultra-leftists. Gumede warns of the regression effect that 
characterises most post-liberation societies, a phenomenon which gives birth to ghost 
democracies. This leads the progressive intellectual space to become limited. He cautions that 
intellectuals may find themselves in situations in which „they are labelled disloyal, anti-
revolutionary, enemies of the state‟ (Gumede 2009:15).  
Mangcu (2007a) views this as a problem of political intolerance in the political discourse 
stemming from conflictual political and intellectual identities. Mangcu believes that black public 
intellectuals are often labelled when they speak truth to power. The problem centres on the fact 
that those critical of racial nativism are not equally critical of longstanding white racism. This is 
due to racial nativism which he argues is anti-intellectual, since it creates a condition where 
there is political intolerance. The criticism of racial nativism is not accepted, but there is silence 
when it comes to white liberal prejudice. Mangcu complains that public intellectuals are driven 
by the enterprise of ideas which is characterised by rational analysis rather than ideological 
outcomes. According to Mangcu (2006d), new forms of political life should not be based on 
racial nativism. He argues that racial nativism comes with a culture of political intolerance.  
Mangcu proposes that South Africa should take a lead in democratisation and cultural diversity, 
and this will prevent it from being absorbed into the new racial nativism. This absorption is, 
according to Mangcu, a contamination of the new public culture. The political culture of 
intolerance negates debate or dissent, and as a result, this creates withdrawal or silence. It is 
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important to understand the origins of racial nativism and further the interrogation of what 
allows racial nativism to occur in the post-1994 domain.  
The importance of black public intellectuals and their role in society is to make the public 
vigilant and enlightened. However, this does not mean that society is homogenous. There must 
be a contestation of ideas as the prerogative to speak in public is not that of politicians alone, 
but the domain of the broader citizenry. However, it is this „broader society‟ where the black 
condition is still suffered in silence.  
For Mangcu (2006d), black public intellectuals are vital in terms of the domestication of power, 
and they must grapple with the contemporary issues that society faces. Black public 
intellectuals should reframe the political discourse, in that when an intolerant political culture 
arises, there should be debate and dissent rather than a withdrawal from the political 
discourse. In terms of where black public intellectuals can stand, what they can speak, and 
how they can articulate – that is, their positionality, this brings to mind the role of the black 
public intellectual in the post-1994 context. Davis (2009) argues that their role is providing a 
basic frame which can contribute to civil society discourse, mediating emancipation and 
repression.  
Mangcu (2005a) argues that intolerant political cultures often provoke debate and dissent. This 
comes from resistant and counter-power circles of public intellectuals who are bent on 
defending their stances, even if they are unpopular. This view triggers agency for public 
intellectuals who retreat in fear of being politically incorrect and also prevents their being made 
irrelevant. The discourse around the issue of the black public intellectual has been a trend of 
decline and retreat. However, the stances of the black public intellectuals are informed by the 
interests they serve, advance or defend.  
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Mangcu charges that during the Mbeki era, the intellectual sphere was one of retreat and 
decline, something which gave Mbeki the power to claim absolute truth immune from 
intellectual challenge and criticism. This implies a sense of decline, deficiency, even crisis and 
that intellectuals have lost credibility, also the ability to speak with authority and the right to be 
heard (Davis 2009). The decline of the intellectual is not seen only in the context of the state‟s 
interference and no mention is made of the institutional and ideological apparatus. The terms 
of authority and the desire to be heard are situational because even the institutions that black 
public intellectuals serve and/or represent might not legitimate their authority and hear or 
accept their ideas.   
According to Coetzee (2000:109), „people function as intellectuals in social discourse insofar 
as they relate our present and our future to our past‟. Park (2006) argues that public 
intellectuals should be understood in terms of communicative connection – which negates 
past/present purity and understanding complexities. This is a turning away from a „traditional 
emphasis on the ostensibly independent intellectual‟ (Park 2006:127). This allows for an 
understanding of the public intellectual‟s connection to society. Park argues that the decline 
narrative is useful in providing a historical context from the past for the role of the public 
intellectual. According to Park (2006), the narrative of decline is informed by socio-cultural 
authority – and this is why it becomes the dominant understanding of the public intellectual. 
The public intellectual debate has focused more on decline, since people‟s needs are ignored, 
but the remedy is direct contact with the people.  
Park (2006) applies communication theory to understand public intellectuals, firstly, by 
comparing public intellectuals and journalists. He argues that public intellectuals are free-
floating, while journalists are committed to the public they serve, in the public interest. Free-
floating intellectuals cannot have an interest in influencing society. This seems idealistic, since 
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public intellectuals are there for the purpose of influencing the public, whether positively or 
negatively.  
Lyon (2009) cautions that in the contemporary world, the public is not a passive collection of 
individuals who will simply listen to a public intellectual who translates and disseminates 
universal truths. That is, the arena in which the public intellectual is engaging with ideas is a 
contested terrain, since there is a contestation of ideas. Crick (2006:129) argues that public 
intellectuals are not only valued for their ideas, but rather, „for their ideas-in-practice-with-
others‟. These are ideas which are not accepted easily, due to their abstraction, so for them to 
have any impact they must be given concrete expression. Fuller (2006:149) argues that public 
intellectuals should be responsible „for their ideas, since the fate of those ideas is taken out of 
their hands and placed in some reception of community, who may chose to adopt, amplify, 
distort, or simply ignore them‟. Simply put, they should not only explain democratic rights to 
citizens, but should also reinforce the idea that power should be limited (Gumede 2009).  
Mangcu (2005a) argues that the substance and style of public intellectuals differ, and even 
black public intellectuals cannot be reduced to a homogeneous whole. Dikeni (2009) identifies 
four types of intellectuals in the post-1994 era. For Dikeni, there are pseudo-intellectuals, 
whom he describes as the celebrity intellectual, the commercial intellectual, the policy analyst 
and the new gender activist. These are the intellectual groups whom Dikeni states have 
dominated post-1994 socio-political discourse. Celebrity intellectuals are driven by a desire to 
„gain face and not to lose face‟ (Dikeni 2009:36) and their focus is to track the scandals in 
society. Their intellectuality is based on their popularity. The commercial intellectuals on the 
other hand, who claim the monopoly of the truth, as they seek to make a profit in the 
marketplace. Dikeni argues that commercial intellectuals do not have a „social consciousness‟ 
and, as a result, they contribute to the decline of the intellectual. A policy analyst is an 
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intellectual who is close to power, and policy analysis is put before anything else. This 
intellectual exercise, Dikeni (2009:41) argues, is confined „to an elitist and pragmatic 
paradigm‟. A gender activist is a new intellectual who has questioned the exclusion of gender 
politics or black women politics from mainstream thought.  
Mangcu (2007a) clearly states that the intellectual is someone who should uphold the principle 
of independence, since this lends credibility. The issue of the independence of the public 
intellectual is contested and, as has been mentioned earlier, independence is problematic, as 
public intellectuals do not operate in a vacuum. The political economy of public intellectuals 
suggests that they promote their material interests and serve the ideological hegemony, 
including those who are in institutional, economic and/or political power.  
Mangcu (2007b) argues that in the case of Batho Bonke shares, there was no link in the public 
intellectual‟s writing and these shares. He states that intellectual ideas cannot influence the 
public to think otherwise about the owner of the shares, who is Tokyo Sexwale. Mangcu went 
on to say that his writings cannot influence the public to support Sexwale who was suspected 
of having ANC presidential ambitions and putting his money behind those who would be likely 
to endorse him. Mangcu (2007b:12) writes: „However, I am also smart enough to know that the 
extent of my influence is grossly exaggerated.‟ Mangcu rejects the idea of being bought by 
Sexwale to lobby for him for the ANC presidency. Mangcu‟s defence is that he accepts as a 
matter of principle, only legitimate and legal donations, as long as there are no strings 
attached. He argues that he made unpopular decisions by criticising the Sunday Independent 
for not promoting Mathatha Tsedu to take up the editorship position. Secondly, he resigned 
from a R800 000 per annum salary job at the Human Social Research Council when he was 
told to follow its media policy of not criticising the government. Lastly, he states that he hailed 
Steve Biko‟s legacy in the middle of silence. It is on the basis of these defences that Mangcu 
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states that he values independence and claims that his public intellectual agenda cannot be 
tampered with.  
Du Toit (2000) claims that public intellectuals in the post-1994 era are failing to discharge their 
roles.  Mangcu did not advocate the agenda of the black condition and expose the hidden and 
contrary political agendas of the post-1994 era, including injustices which are part of the black 
condition. 
Mngxitama and the failure to ask the right questions 
Mngxitama (2010b) suggests that black public intellectuals are failing to ask the right questions 
in relation to the state of the country. In neglecting this duty, they shy away from the questions 
that are in fact part of the black condition. As Mngxitama charges, the ink of the black public 
intellectual becomes dry when they need to write about the black condition, because they are 
far removed from this condition. Essentially, Mngxitama‟s positionality suggests that black 
public intellectuals often engage in abstractions which are peripheral to the black condition and 
that they do not have the power to pose questions which should fuel agency. He argues that 
this could make them irrelevant in the market place of ideas which is colonised by ideas that 
cannot attack the Constitution or the total failure of the post-1994 state.  
Black public intellectuals keep avoiding the black question and the black condition and seek 
solace in the practice of fence-sitting whilst claiming objectivity. They are praised for speaking 
truth to power in their systematic attack on the ANC, despite the fact that they fail to address 
the historical question and questions of white privilege and wealth, which are served and 
guarded by the ANC. 
Mngxitama (2010a) argues that black public intellectuals are happy to accommodate betrayal, 
which is in fact the backbone of the post-1994 domain, instead of penetrating deeper into the 
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existential question and the conditions facing the black majority. The black condition persists 
indefinitely even when liberation is claimed to be in place, with some occasional cosmetic 
changes. Crick (2006:133), with the black condition in mind, argues that „situations certainly 
come and go in the moment, but they also develop and linger over time‟. Reflecting the 
qualities of the black condition or preparing a way to change such a condition, black public 
intellectuals as agents should also keep in mind the politics of memory, which are located in 
the past, present and future. 
 According to Crick (2006), public intellectuals should, in their abstract intellectual work, 
produce a productive or tangible art form which will be beneficial to public consciousness, by 
means of transforming the habits and common sense of a culture. Crick (2006) adds that 
memory, which is essential, should not only be about the past, but should be about the fluidity 
of time, place and context. Such fluidity refers to how the past, present and the future connect 
and influence one another. This also extends to understanding what can be learnt from these 
three to build a better future – where public intellectuals will influence the manner in which 
another world is possible.  
According to Mngxitama (2010a), the work of black public intellectuals should be informed by 
posing difficult questions which centre on historical injustice, reparations and the demand for 
land. If black public intellectuals raise such questions, their work, which takes time to influence 
the broader society, needs to be internalised in the psyche of those who need awakening. 
Public audiences are those who are already aware or are at the centre of the public sphere or 
have access to it. „However, once the ideas of the public intellectual work their way into the 
culture over time, they begin to take over a life of their own‟ (Crick 2006:136). Such ideas need 
to be given concrete expression by the public intellectual to have a lasting impact. This calls for 
new forms of life – a new language and political imagination. The damned, those who are 
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under the yoke of the black condition, can thus derive some form of consciousness from this 
new language and political imagination.  
According to Mngxitama (2010e), the black experience is reduced to rational logical 
abstractions which have no bearing on the extraordinary reality befalling the black condition. As 
such, these abstractions are detached from reality. Public intellectuals in their public role 
should engage with reality as they see it.  The black intellectual is in dire need of a definition, 
something which is related to the black condition. This is a condition which has no grammar of 
suffering and cannot speak on itself – a condition which has no urgency due to its 
naturalisation and normalisation. In this mode of existence, it is a continuous systematisation 
and institutionalisation, viewed as requiring change but not agency – a drive towards radical 
change.  
Tillman and Tillman (1972) posit that the black condition is the absence of ontology. There is 
an intimate relationship between the social object and the perceived subjects in which the 
power to define determines how the social object will be engaged. They charge black public 
intellectuals of often being complicit and of not having a sense of the urgency to change the 
black condition. Tillman and Tillman (1972:58) argue that black public intellectuals are on „a 
balancing wheel‟, which finds enough ground in race denialism. Intellectuals are driven by the 
„race relations improvement motif‟ and as such, the black public intellectual will fear to call 
things as they see them, and would rather drown in abstractions than try to explain the 
complexity and universality of the race issue (Tillman & Tillman 1972:59). This creates enough 
ground for the issue of race not to be debated; hence, the post-1994 era, with its non-racial 
ideal, shies away from the issue of race and its pigmentation, which is blackness which 
positioned as a reception of structural violence.  
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As Mngxitama (2010e) states, there is a fear of calling white racism what it is, and there is 
some sophistication in race denialism, which as a result comes a priori, as it is projected as 
something complex, hence the black public intellectual driven by upward mobility claims to be 
emancipated, while most of their fellow blacks are a powerless majority. This is a situation 
where the issue of race is deleted from the political discourse and this allows more ground to 
deny or negate the black condition.  
According to Mngxitama (2010e), there is a fear amongst black public intellectuals to argue 
that Constitutional rights are not in line with the aspirations of the black majority. He argues 
that if black public intellectuals fail to unmask the making of the discourse, they have failed „to 
speak truth to power‟.  
Park (2006) firstly introduces the notion of the political economy of the public intellectual. He 
then argues that it is related to three common trends. Firstly, there is the rise of celebrity 
intellectuals. Secondly, there is the commoditisation of the public intellectual. Finally, the 
ideological position of intellectuals is moulded to fit the position of the media industry. This 
suggests that the ritual approach of the public intellectual is the connection with society and 
this connection is subject to congruence and incongruence. Park further states that public 
intellectuals are not expected to maintain or possess „objectivity‟. Their commentary is 
subjective and is essential for their value as public intellectuals.  
Du Toit (2000) asks: if the intellectual is singled out as the only agent, what about the 
discourse itself? This invokes a specific social basis and institutional setting within which the 
intellectual work finds itself. Intellectual production is not neutral, as the socialisation and 
worldview of the public, like that of an individual member of the public, is socially, politically, 
culturally and ideologically embedded. „It should be clear by now [that] the notion of the 
universal and representative public intellectual is a naive and romantic fiction‟ (Du Toit 
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2000:93). It is argued here that the black public intellectual cannot claim universality or avoid 
particularity: 
In the context of post-apartheid South Africa, this issue has been further complicated in 
a number of ways: former struggle intellectuals have had to make rapid and ambiguous 
accommodations in turning themselves into constructive policy analysts if not senior 
officials of government departments. (Du Toit 2000:95) 
According to Tendi (2008), public intellectuals who are aligned with the state stand to benefit 
and they will pursue their intellectual trade in defence of the state. Tendi (2008) does not 
mention that these intellectuals are not only aligned with the state or with party machinery, but 
some are also institutionally and/or philanthropically aligned. Hence, they will propagate 
ideologies and not offend the values which create the image of these institutions.  Even though 
they may not overtly defend their institutions, sponsors and donors, they will use sophisticated 
means of intellectual engagement while treading carefully to maintain beneficial relations.  
Mngxitama (2010e) states that the post-1994 era has given birth to a breed of professional 
black, anti-black public intellectuals who serve white interests. These black public intellectuals 
propagate the notion of a „raceless‟ society which is embedded in entanglement and 
ambivalence. According to Posnock (1997:329), „[t]his perspective sponsors a raceless society 
without erasing the historical experience of racism that unites all blacks and coloni(s)ed 
people‟. Most black public intellectuals fear to engage in race openly from the perspective of 
the black condition as Mngxitama does, since this is labelled as anger and victimology.  
As Tendi (2008) argues, public intellectuals do at times adapt their analysis or their intellectual 
work and this reduces them to pleasing and protectionist agents who are reluctant to challenge 
and disrupt the status quo. Hanchard (1996) points out that the fear of challenging the status 
quo arises because marginalisation looms large and the discourse is saturated or remains 
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closed. This is the comfort zone of the black public intellectuals. Moreover, black public 
intellectuals depend on the media, since the media chooses which public intellectuals are 
relevant and which are not. Park (2006) highlights the fact that most of the media are owned by 
corporate or other institutions – hence, public intellectuals do not control the media. The shape 
and dynamics of a media organisation are „linked to patterns in intellectual communication‟ 
(Park 2006:120). As McClay (2002) argues, the political pressure and the pressure of the 
market place puts black public intellectuals in a precarious position, where public intellectuals‟ 
lust for exposure and popularity compromises their integrity and vigorous standards of 
intellectualism.  
Farmer (2002:203) adds that public intellectuals open themselves to attack in the act of 
„respond[ing] to what the media rewards‟. Such a reward has little to do with the quality and the 
contentment of intellectual work, but has everything to do with fame and celebrity status. In that 
case, sound reasoning, mature and valid conclusions and predictions are left on the wayside 
(Farmer 2002). This state of affairs renders public intellectuals powerless. Oslender (2007:118) 
argues that „the intellectual‟s celebrity status has often come hand in hand with a loss of critical 
position, and an eroding radical edge in public interventions‟.  
For Mngxitama (2010e), rational logical abstractions involve the erosion of critical thinking, in 
that rationality is used as a weapon. In the political discourse and for the public; this has led to 
a crisis of public intellectualism. This is because the unprecedented media demand for 
„experts‟ on all sorts of topics has given rise to celebrities in the public sphere and a media 
frenzy imagination. The media creates this kind of intellectual to fulfil its demands, desires and 
ideological orientations. Gordon (2010) argues that public intellectuals are in the job market, 
which governs everything they produce. This means that the ideas the produce and articulate 
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do not possess power, but are possessed by power. As Gordon (2010:4) puts it, in „a market-
oriented society that means knowing how to play the game of making oneself marketable‟.  
Mngxitama (2010e) suggests that the fear of black public intellectuals is that of challenging the 
status quo. This creates a powerless position since their ideas should be in line with this status 
quo. Hanchard (1996) presents a similar argument, namely that the political powerlessness of 
some black public intellectuals is the result of their fear of sanction and exclusion from the 
apparatus they are affiliated with or serve. It is this complex apparatus for which the market is 
the maternity ward. As such, if public intellectuals raise views contrary to the hegemonic 
discourse or that of the logic of the market, they will be rendered irrelevant and shut out from 
the public platform or spotlight, losing their celebrity status. As Gordon (2010) argues, public 
intellectuals have bourgeois aspirations and their epistemology should fit that of the market 
logic. This is done on the basis of selling their intellectual labour and intellectual goods, since 
the service of capital is a priori.  It is in this conundrum that they seek refuge in the notion of 
speaking truth to power, whilst also entertaining the white audience by not engaging white 
sensitivities – which are too important to keep the rainbow nation intact.  
Looking at the coordinates and meeting points of the public discourse and state power, 
Hanchard (1996) posits that black public intellectuals are rendered powerless. They are often 
trapped in pandering to neo-liberalism, and in the South African context, they are only 
concerned with the threat to the Constitution. It is in this activity that there is often a failure to 
unpack ideology in relation to the black condition, an expression of political imagination to 
overhaul their whole ideological apparatus complex. This is the role of the black public 
intellectual if the ideological apparatus complex does not make an impact on the lives of the 
black majority. In the face of the excesses of state power, it should be their task to stand for 
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humanity and justice, and fight the dominant discourses. Independence from state power is the 
main source of leverage that an intellectual has.  
For Mngxitama (2010e), the black public intellectual should support the struggle of the black 
majority who are trapped in the black condition. The role and the position of the black public 
intellectual is an important issue. To maintain relevance, Banks (1995) deploys the Gramscian 
notion that intellectuals should be grounded by maintaining historical ties, which rejects the 
universalist idea as hegemonic. For Hanchard (1996), the struggle of the black public 
intellectual is one of engaging and challenging institutional power relations, and such a struggle 
defines the intellectual‟s strength and weaknesses. An understanding of speaking truth to 
power does not take institutional power relations and ideological apparatus complexes into 
account.  
For institutional power relations and ideological apparatus to be understood, there needs to be 
an understanding of the totality of power. In other words, various manifestations, locations, 
expressions and effects of power should be understood in terms of how they operate in 
isolation and in tandem to create complexity. It is in this complexity that the totality of power is 
constituted and lived, and which hegemonises itself for it not to be recognisable between the 
relations that form part of the subjected and objectified.  
Record (1954) argues that black public intellectuals do not, in many cases, have the power of 
choice and flexibility to deal with the black condition, since it is complex. Each form of 
intellectual choice is important in its own right. The notion of a passionate intellectual inquiry 
and ultimate social practices should inform the discourse and the nature of the black public 
intellectual. Crick (2006) argues that the ideas of public intellectuals need to be given concrete 
expression to have a lasting impact.  
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Mngxitama (2010e) charges that black public intellectuals are vocal in denying racism as an 
experience that is unique to black people. He regards these black public intellectuals as 
professional black anti-black intellectuals. He writes: „In general, they speak on behalf of the 
white racist liberal section of society. They are sophisticated hired guns of the post-1994 white 
racism‟ (Mngxitama 2010e:35).  
According to Fuller (2006), convenient forgetfulness is the strategy applied by black public 
intellectuals to serve the racist infrastructure. It is in this form that the circumstances they find 
themselves in should always being rewarded with incentives. As Fuller explains, convenient 
forgetting is a deliberate choice public intellectuals make in their path towards celebrity 
stardom. This is a different path from that of the people they have pledged to serve.  
Mngxitama (2009b) states that the discourse in South Africa is one of denying historical 
injustices and accommodation betrayal with the impression that all possible gains have been 
made. This suggests that black public intellectuals can be propagators of the integrationist 
programmes of the post-1994 discourse. This path can at times be initiated on their behalf by 
means of co-optation. The dictum in this process is that „the key to progress is not to look back 
and to never regret‟ (Fuller 2006:153).  
In Gordon‟s (2010) terms, if the agenda of the intellectuals speaking against and unravelling 
racism and its infrastructure is contrary to the logic of the market, then public intellectuals will 
defend the market logic, since they are rewarded for doing so. This means that these 
intellectuals are in secure intellectual spaces and regard those who speak truth to power in its 
totality – that is, critiquing the market logic, as reckless. Thus, they fear to „bite the hand that 
feeds them‟ by speaking truth to totality of power, because speaking truth to power is a risk 
which is high when compared to the benefits of silence or collusion (Fuller 2006).  
148 
 
Mngxitama (2010e) argues that black public intellectuals who are race denialists are protected 
by a hegemony which makes the act of denying racism something that seems logical and 
philosophical. As a result of this protectionist and denialist role, they are in the service of the 
structures of white supremacy which deny agency to those in the black condition. The 
incentives are a „rapid intellectual progress and greater professional recognition‟ (Fuller 
2006:152). This allows these black public intellectuals to defend the hegemonic post-1994 
social script and the status quo. In other words, they will not raise views that are contrary to the 
dominant ideas, or the institution(s) they serve.  
This tendency, as Fuller notes, is informed by a high form of self-deception. This means that 
public intellectuals might claim to be free from government and other forces, but at the same 
time they are tied to the lure of the market forces (Fuller 2006). „Nothing in my view is more 
reprehensible than those habits of mind in the intellectual that induce avoidance, that 
characteristic [of] turning away from a difficult and principled position which you know to be the 
right one, but who decide not to take‟ (Said 1994: 101).  
In most post-liberation states, intellectuals want to maintain the status quo, and do not want to 
appear too political. Mngxitama (2010a) amplifies this view in the light of the fact that the 
silence of black public intellectuals is not a silence in literal terms, but the silence of not asking 
critical questions. These are questions which are fundamental to the post-1994 era, and 
include the issue of land, justice and reparations which rightfully belong to the black majority. 
Black public intellectuals have a tendency to be silent on what the dominant narratives do not 
say. The silence of the black public intellectual is often a dilemma that is self-imposed and this 
is based on a self-conscious perception of something that is invisible and/or non-existent 
(Mkandawire 2005b).  
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Gibson (2007) warns that even a militant public intellectual can be co-opted or silenced, and 
the struggle is demobilised, which this means a collapse of new forms of life.  In this condition, 
black public intellectuals are silent or become ideologues and propagandists of the state and 
other sites of power – that is, the apparatus complex of power. With the call for public 
intellectuals to ground their intellectual works, Gibson (2007) challenges intellectuals to locate 
their site of the struggle with the poor. Intellectuals are often in a dilemma of rejecting the 
unjust world and at the same time being in collaboration with it.  
Mngxitama is an open critic of the post-1994 discourse. This includes racism, white supremacy, 
capitalism, injustice to blacks and blacks who are native assistants who keep the legacy of 
apartheid alive by reproducing its structures. The post-1994 discourse inherited apartheid 
infrastructure, which must be destroyed. According Gibson (2007), intellectuals who reject 
colonialism sometimes fail to understand the notion of the anti-colonial struggle and the 
contradictions which inform it, or which are part of the struggle itself.  
Gibson adds that most black public intellectuals may be seen as opportunistic and as 
haphazardly packing up the aspects of culture through a populist rhetoric which holds no 
benefits for the national struggle –rather there will be creative mutations for the mutation of 
culture. Black public intellectuals are often silent about the post-1994 racist infrastructure. They 
rather hide behind the rhetoric of defending the Constitution and consolidating democracy, 
while paying scant attention to issues that are really affecting the nation, especially if these are 
a legacy of apartheid which is managed by the ANC and some members of the black elite.  
According to Farmer (2002), public intellectuals should trigger local agency to effect social 
change. He argues that directing intellectual efforts for the purpose of bringing to public 
discussions and issues of societal importance is essential for social change. This does not 
suggest that issues have to be common or universal, but they must be issues which are 
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pertinent in engaging with the lived experience, which is unique. Alcoff (2002) argues that black 
public intellectuals should open up new vistas of life for the marginalised and those in the 
underside of the lived experience by exposing marginality.   
Being outspoken, Mngxitama is one of the few black public intellectuals who consistently 
defends their positionality and intellectual agenda. He engages in innovative analysis involving 
genealogy and problematises the black condition. This is going beyond a snapshot analysis 
that leaves the mode of existence at the wayside and analyses symptoms.  Alcoff (2002) 
argues that public intellectuals are always faced with the demand to act in the service of their 
community and confront injustices in it. In this sense, the issue of social responsibility and 
accountability looms large and it is a matter of concern. However, public intellectuals are able 
to survive in defiance of this, as they regard themselves as independent. This is sometimes a 
dilemma in that some dislike biting the hand that feeds them.  
Gibson (2007) argues that the pitfalls for intellectuals and middle class are their 
unpreparedness with regard to national liberation, and it will be added here, their lack of 
political imagination. The problem here is whether a militant will not be a spokesperson for the 
poor under the guise of revolution while benefiting from their exploitation and exclusion.  To 
elaborate this point, former ANC spokesperson Smuts Ngonyama is infamous for stating that 
he did not join the struggle to be poor. The militant, Gibson (2007) warns, is co-opted or 
silenced, and the struggle is demobilised, and this means the collapse of the new forms of life. 
As a result of this, „[t]he honest intellectuals are imprisoned, the military takes over and the 
demonstrations are crushed‟ (Gibson 2007:40). These issues are common in post-colonial 
societies and have been prevalent in the post-1994 state, coupled with police brutality. Gibson 
(2007) emphasises the emergence of the new world through agency as the organising force in 
the political movements of the damned, excluded and dehumanised.  
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According to Mngxitama (2004), white leftist intellectuals in their role of struggling with the poor 
are in fact mediating black identity and aspirations. They act as a buffer zone, and negate the 
agency and demands of poor blacks in the black social movements. It may be argued here that 
intellectuals and leaders of movements project social movements in romanticised terms. It is in 
this manner that the suffering of blacks is commercialised. Tillman and Tillman (1972) submit 
that white liberals often act as spokespersons for blacks. In this particular form, which is often 
paternalistic, the black and white encounter no matter how concealed under the racist 
infrastructure cannot be the one that allows the black voice to speak for itself.   
The black intellectuals seek to experience the world as if they occupy the social, political and 
economic superstructure like their white counterparts (Tillman & Tillman 1972). They are in 
search of the truth while they pander to the ideology of whiteness which perverts the black 
mind of the intellectual. West (1993) argues that public intellectuals should live the life of the 
mind, which is the isolated and insulated world between the great minds and the people they 
transmit and popularise philosophical knowledge to (Crick 2006). 
Crick argues that public intellectuals are a modern product of the Enlightenment as they 
enlighten the state about public opinion by replacing traditional rational society. In other words, 
they popularise a given discourse, instead of making it a closed circle to include the public as 
the recipient of their ideas. Today‟s intellectual representation is rarely exceptionally heroic, 
due to being rendered banal. 
Ferudi (2004) argues that the complacency and conformity of public intellectuals is brought 
about by a number of things. Firstly, they do not have a mission, project or desire to uphold the 
truth. Secondly, public intellectuals fail to uphold authority by making those who are in authority 
accountable. Lastly, they lack engagement in pursuit of truth. Public intellectuals should have 
enough political imagination „to see beyond the sober realities of everyday existence‟ (Ferudi 
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2004:32). Becoming a black intellectual involves a „self-imposed marginality resulting to 
marginality in the black community and also to it‟ (West 1993:67).  
In addition, West also points out that there are two camps among the black intellectuals, 
namely successful and unsuccessful ones. The former are distant and condescending towards 
black community. The latter are disdainful of the white intellectual world, and they are scornful 
of white rejection. Both dangle between two worlds as they have no institutional infrastructure. 
For Posnock (1997), black public intellectuals become alienated if their intellectual engagement 
is distanced from the black condition.  
According to Mngxitama (2010a), most black public intellectuals fear to state that Constitutional 
rights and protection are an illusion to the defeated black majority.  He also argues that they 
fear to call white supremacy and racism for what they are. Ramphele (2000) argues that 
citizens advocate the notion of a „good society‟, and they are different from individuals who 
happen not to live for their own sake because those who do not advocate for a good society, 
but the preserving of their individual interests. Citizens speak freely without fear, they live the 
truth as they see it „and are not simply voices for other people‟s sense of discomfort‟ 
(Ramphele 2000:105). 
There cannot be a declaration of speaking freely without fear when most black public 
intellectuals are alienated from the black condition and are not interested in engaging it. To 
resolve this predicament, black public intellectuals have the need to be grounded in the 
struggle with the lived experience of the black condition. A black public intellectual is not like 
any other intellectual, in that such a figure is rooted in the black condition, since blacks are 
judged by their skin colour.  
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The nostalgic projection or propagation of an idealised African past does not help to engage 
the black condition. Posnock (1997) explains that this production of nostalgia distracts black 
public intellectuals from joining forces with those who are trapped in the black condition. For 
there to be an end to the black condition, black public intellectuals should raise matters that 
bring an end to it, not intellectual abstractions which have no relevance.  
Conclusion  
This chapter examined the problematic of the black public intellectuals‟ dilemma in relation to 
power and ideas. It also sketched the role, nature and character of black public intellectuals in 
the post-1994 era in relation to the positionality of Seepe, Mangcu and Mngxitama. The 
landscape of black public intellectualism often points to complexity which leads to continuous 
contestations, which suggests the futility of having a homogeneous intellectual tradition. That 
is, the positionality of these three public intellectuals is also seen in the manner in which public 
intellectuals view and understand post-1994 discourse.  
Said (1994) suggests, though with pessimism due to impracticalities, that public intellectuals 
should be positioned on the side of justice and fairness. The black public intellectuals should 
be at the centre in terms of contesting and setting the terms of the debate in political discourse 
and play a meaningful role by operating in the interests of pursuing the public good. As such, 
the black public intellectual is the guardian of the public interest, and should not be dictated to 
by those in power. It is a popularised view that public intellectuals engage and critique the 
dominant narratives or orthodoxy, as they are independent and free-floating (Said 1994). 
However, this view is limited in that it does not take into account the complexity of relations and 
systems that public intellectuals are aligned with, whether it is the state, an institution, white 
capital or ideology.   
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Seepe, Mangcu and Mngxitama do hold the same view that the black public intellectual should 
critique the status quo, and have the audacity to pose questions. This is informed by the view 
that there should be a space for debate and deliberation – a public sphere through public 
lectures and other public intellectual registers. However, a question arises regarding what 
„public‟ a public intellectual is representing or engaging. The spaces for intellectual 
engagement are not public as they claim; they are still only accessible to a public few instead 
of being pluralised.  
Post-1994 political discourse is a contested terrain and the positionality of these three black 
public intellectuals differs in terms of their questioning. That is to say, they differ in terms of 
what questions to ask, how to ask them and in what spaces or location such questions should 
be asked. Hence, the duty of the public intellectual is to speak truth to power. Nonetheless, and 
as indicated in this chapter, speaking truth to power should be done in totality. The notion of 
speaking truth to power should not be understood as speaking truth to political power only.  
Both Seepe and Mangcu regard the notion of speaking truth to power as Said coined it, which 
is simply speaking truth to political power. This is evident in their systematic critique of Thabo 
Mbeki as a person who has created a culture of intolerance, fermenting nativism, and also his 
politics of labelling. Such a perspective does not allow for the understanding of power in totality 
which involves looking at other avenues where power is embedded and expressed.  
In Mngxitama‟s terms, there can be no speaking truth to power without looking at whose 
interests are being served. In other words, there needs to be a speaking of truth to those who 
are served by political power. This then goes to the problematic presence of the celebrity 
intellectual, the one who lives for popularity, fame and money by means of commoditising 
his/her intellectual labour. It is in these terms that the issues of black public intellectuals‟ 
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independence, truth and objectivity are problematised, since market forces are in place and 
intellectuals dance to the tune of the market for fear of exclusion and marginalisation.  
Mngxitama believes that black public intellectuals often leave the structural condition 
unchanged. This can be attributed to the fact that they support the dominant narratives which 
are created and re-created to be the part of the social scripting. In some cases, the apparatus 
of power determines the agenda of the public intellectuals, but in post-1994 discourse, an 
attack is made on the black government which is seen as a threat to the Constitution due to its 
alleged excesses of power. Most importantly, the target of black public intellectuals, if they are 
on the side of the oppressed in their thinking and writing, should be power in its totality. This is 
not limited to speaking truth to power, which targets only political power.  
The modes of articulation of the black public intellectual should be mean-spirited to open the 
vistas of political imagination, rather than debating for the sake of debating. The position of 
black public intellectuals as far as the black condition is concerned is that they should be 
located in a positionality that aims to unravel the complexities which are a mere buffer zone in 
the post-1994 era, instead of being the seat of objectivity and speaking truth to political power. 
The positionality of the black public intellectual should be clearly known and it should be 
embedded in the black experience, since being a black public intellectual implies that they are 
raced in the same manner as all other blacks with regard to their raced black condition.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION  
 
This study has reached four sets of conclusions which highlight Fanonian insights on a post-
colonial state. Fanon was used as lens to understand the positionality of Seepe, Mangcu and 
Mngxitama as black public intellectuals in relation to race and blackness, the role of the black 
elite and black public intellectuals in the post-1994 political dispensation in South Africa. This 
application of Fanonian thought to the post-1994 era was informed by the relationship between 
text and context. Although the text and context span different times, the text (Fanon‟s ideas) 
remains relevant to the context (the post-1994 era in South Africa). Fanon‟s thoughts were 
articulated in writings done more than five decades ago, in which he engaged with the 
conditions he was experiencing. Therefore, this study uses as its point of departure these 
thoughts to create a deeper understanding of contemporary African realities in general, and the 
post-1994 South African experience in particular.  
The first set of conclusions is that the study shows that the context which Fanon referred to 
reveals tremendous insight in its critique of the colonial condition and its aftermath. The post-
1994 era in South Africa follows the same logic of „repetition without difference‟ which is also 
relevant to other post-colonial states – that is, a betrayal of the revolutionary ideals to make 
way for an elite pact, such as a negotiated settlement. A systematic deployment of Fanon‟s 
ideas to the post-1994 era enabled a new reading of South African national liberation as a 
tragedy rather than a romance, because of its failure to bring a new life to the black condition. It 
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is a tragedy because liberation has resulted in a form of neo-apartheid, with blacks as a 
powerless majority possessing only political power, whilst cosmetic changes have been all that 
has been achieved, and fundamental socio-economic transformation is absent. Fanon ([1952] 
2008:171) affirms this sense of tragedy with his warning that „the black man (sic) was acted 
upon‟. 
Although blacks in South Africa have been given political rights, these rights do not translate 
into a means for dismantling the legacy of apartheid, which remains evident in the black 
condition. As an elite project, the national liberation struggle underwent an embourgeoisement, 
which culminated in a negotiated settlement that is now equated with liberation. In the post-
1994 era democratisation, black depoliticisation and pacification has led to liberation becoming 
a mere illusion. Although South Africa celebrates the post-1994 era as a triumph of democracy, 
its history is still too closely bound up with colonialism, racial segregation and apartheid (Pillay 
2004). Liberation cannot occur when those who are in the black condition are brutally crushed 
by the state apparatus when they demand conditions of a better life. It has become normalised 
in the post-1994 era for the police to shoot and even kill unarmed protesters who demand 
basic services such as water, electricity, houses and even toilets. This is where the black 
condition is located, a hellish zone of existence, where black humanity is trapped in structural 
violence which crushes black life into objecthood. 
The bourgeois-imagined liberation does not possess the capacity to imagine a total overhaul of 
the anti-black structures that perpetuate the black condition. It is this imagination which results 
in liberation being an illusion, since it intends only to reform the colonial infrastructure, instead 
of dismantling it. This repetition of past patterns signals and brings to the fore the betrayal of 
liberation which is managed by a black comprador bourgeoisie, whose sole aspiration is to 
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capture state power and manage it, and in doing so fail to fundamentally change it in line with 
the aspirations that informed liberation.  
In the post-1994 era, blacks are a political majority, but in economic terms, they are 
marginalised, with only a few members of a black elite included in the mainstream of the 
economy. If the post-1994 era is plagued by the black condition, it means that apartheid was 
reformed on the basis of continuing its legacy by means of this pseudo-liberation. The victories 
of South Africa are said to be non-racialism, a „progressive‟ constitution, free and fair elections, 
freedom and equality. However, Fanon had tremendous foresight regarding this kind of 
situation when he stated the following: 
The white man, in the capacity of the master, said to the Negro, “From now you are free”. But the 
Negro knows nothing of the cost of freedom, for he has not fought for it. From time to time he has 
fought for Liberty and Justice, but these were always white liberty and white justice; that is, values 
secreted by his masters. (Fanon [1961] 2008:172) 
The post-1994 era has a romantic view that is premised on the notion that diverse people 
should be united to create a rainbow nation. However, this process will not continue indefinitely 
and for the rainbow to transform there should be incentives to think in unitary terms. The black 
condition must not only symbolically disappear, but must also disappear in realistic terms. 
Economic freedom, reparations and justice must ensure that collective goods benefit all 
people, not only a small black elite. Thus far in South Africa, there has been a consistent failure 
to bring about a total end to the black condition.   
To counter the existing black condition, there must be a clear understanding of the structures 
of oppression (hooks 1996). The only way to unmask these structures of oppression is to have 
the „new self-invention and alternative habits of being‟ (hooks 1996:15). By contrast, Gibson 
(1999) argues that the subject in its fragmentation constitutes, or is in a dynamic dialectic 
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rather than a static one. The black being is supposed to become a new being, since his or her 
ontology was a mere „thing‟ – the object in the colonial condition. Subjectivity becomes 
objectivity through revolutionary praxis, where those who are engulfed by the black condition 
become the agents of their own liberation. 
The second set of conclusions in this study reveals that in terms of race and blackness, there 
is a crisis of co-presence. Seepe, Mangcu and Mngxitama have indeed kept the debate and 
discourse on race and blackness alive. With regard to race and blackness, Seepe‟s radical 
positionality points to the fact that the problematics of race and blackness are part and parcel 
of the post-1994 era, and they are a predicament to blacks. He confronts and engages with 
white supremacy as a legacy of the past which continues to haunt the present. Seepe‟s lenses 
help him to conceptualise race and blackness in relation to the lived experience of blacks, 
linking them to the political life of the post-1994 era which continues to demonstrate the effects 
of apartheid.  
Seepe‟s positionality is that race and blackness must be engaged with in an open manner, as 
they are part of the post-1994 political reality. Seepe opposes a tendency to deny and ridicule 
the experiences of racism, and to regard them as a normal fact of life present in the post-1994 
era. Since race affects the black experience, blacks should engage in the issues of race and 
racism in line with their lived experience. However, not all blacks are experiencing racism, 
since there are black race denialists who believe there is no racism; post-racialists who claim 
that there is a need to transcend race; and even black anti-blacks who vilify their fellow blacks 
when they raise questions around race and racism.   
Mangcu‟s positionality with regard to race and blackness brings to the fore the complexity of 
these questions in the post-1994 era, and this is clear from his fluid positionality. Simply put, 
his views are constantly changing, since he calls for blacks to transcend race because there is 
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a new meaning to blackness, not a meaning which deepens racial consciousness, but a 
meaning which is inclusive and pluralistic. Although the problem in South Africa has centred on 
the racial question of targeting blackness, Mangcu‟s positionality can be regarded as 
ambivalent because the black condition calls for justice and reparations, rather than 
transcendence. Since South Africa was and continues to be organised along racial lines, it is 
the country that claims non-racialism as a form of altruism, although with some contestation in 
other sites of the discourse.  
Mngxitama‟s positionality is consistent. It is a negation of Seepe and Mangcu‟s views, as he 
regards race and blackness as two issues that are inextricably intertwined in the post-1994 era, 
which remains the epitome of white supremacy. Mngxitama argues that blackness is a creation 
of whiteness and, therefore, blackness is linked to the dispossession of labour, land and 
African humanity. Blackness is always there, and it is a fatal attraction to the white gaze. 
Before the human is seen, blackness precedes everything in that what is seen is black. 
Mngxitama contends that blacks‟ race makes them targets for racism, and they find themselves 
in an anti-black world. Furthermore, this makes them a magnet for the pathologies that define 
the black existence – the black condition. There is a failure in his work to articulate and engage 
racism openly since sensitiveness is seen as important to preserve the illusion of a rainbow 
nation.  
It becomes difficult for blackness to absorb other races around the nodal point of the black 
nation which the post-1994 claims to be, whereas it is not. There is no possibility for the 
entanglement of races. This raises a question of white sensitivities which are accommodated 
even in the face of black aspirations, which are in fact sometimes regarded as impossible 
demands to meet because they are informed by the notions of reparation and justice rather 
161 
 
than just service delivery. They call for the end of the anti-black world, which is the end of 
apartheid infrastructure and the invention of a new black being.  
The ideology of non-racialism does not address the issue of race and blackness. The 
discourse of non-racialism assumes that race has been dealt with and blackness is no longer 
relevant. However, the structures of the legacy of apartheid continue to affect blackness. The 
conundrum of the post-1994 era is that race is still an issue, but there are ways to avoid 
discussing it. This conundrum fails to link blackness with „being, freedom and reason‟ (Gordon 
2010b:198). This situation is permeated by economic inequality, so it is an illusion to believe 
that it is possible to transcend race and to treat blackness as if it is irrelevant. The striving of 
the nation is in fact to go beyond where blackness exists in the hellish conditions – the black 
condition.  
The third set of conclusions arising from this study is that, linked to the issue of race and 
blackness, the post-1994 era is fraught with another predicament, the problem of modes of 
accumulation by the black elite. The black elite has become the centre of race and blackness 
and they even mask the black condition, as they create the impression that they represent the 
black majority. This blocks the aspirations of the black majority and also perpetuates the 
structures of exclusion that have been layered over one another by white capital.  
The black elite have no problem with race and blackness and they articulate these concepts in 
terms of racial nativism only if their path to accumulating white capital is threatened. They only 
seek inclusion in the modes of white capital and are not concerned with changing its logic and 
structures, which perpetuate the black condition. They project values which are contemptuous 
of the black majority who are trapped in the black condition, as they engage in their politics of 
opulence.  
162 
 
Seepe and Mangcu are critical of the black elite and their BEE project, without relating it to the 
continuity of history. This suggests that there is a need for articulations which go deeper into 
the complexities that brought into existence the black elite and their modes of operation and 
even to question who benefits. The post-1994 era black elite symbolises the material lack and 
gravity of the black condition, since it was the white elite, with maximal state intervention that 
led to their creation. Both the Anglicisation and Afrikanerisation of South Africa saw the state 
playing a major role in ensuring that the white elite accumulated wealth ahead of and in 
exclusion of the black majority.  
Mngxitama‟s positionality goes further than that of Seepe and Mangcu, since he argues that 
BEE is a post-1994 predicament, as it leaves white capital untouched.  He argues that an elite 
few are fronted, as if they were representative of the black majority. Essentially, Mngxitama 
argues that the black elite are an oxymoron, since it is white capital that brought them into 
existence. Moreover, the black elite do not have the political imagination to overhaul the entire 
capitalist system, which would be necessary to achieve economic emancipation for the black 
majority. Mngxitama does not regard the black elite as a threat to white capital, and their 
existence is the perpetuation of the black condition. The creation of white capital and the 
emergence and consolidation of a white elite was made possible by the exploitation and 
exclusion of the black majority. The same logic operates in the post-1994 era, where a black 
government is in power, with a black elite engaging in primitive accumulation. The black elite 
does not have the political imagination to change the status quo. They are mere managers who 
perpetuate structures of exclusion by means of structural violence. Primitive accumulation is a 
long-standing pattern and logic of accumulating capital. The black elite have imbibed the 
colonial logic of primitive accumulation and they have become alienated from the black 
condition.  
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Blacks often argue that when one of them emerges from the black condition, they are 
constantly monitored. White capital not only attracts a black elite, but also creates a wedge 
between the black elite and blacks still confined to the black condition. This furthers the 
impression that the black elite is responsible for impoverishing the black majority. The effect of 
this is that it absolves white capital from its historical sins regarding the manner in which the 
capital was accumulated. This accumulation was facilitated through structural violence, 
systematic exclusion, dispossession and exploitation. It is on this basis that race was used as 
the organising principle, with the state playing a maximal and interventionist role to create and 
sustain the white elite.  
In the post-1994 era, white capital is immune, since the discourse of this era focuses on 
forgiveness of the past, as opposed to a claim to justice and reparations due to blacks. The 
discourse of corruption is racialised and selective, in that it naturalises and normalises the 
corruption of white capital. It is considered almost blasphemous to question the past and 
present accumulation of white capital. The present accumulation is criminalised, whereas the 
previous accumulation is immune from scrutiny.  
It is not only whites who monitor the moves of the black elite. The black majority who are 
trapped in the black condition also monitor the emergence of the black elite. The predicament 
of the black elite is the question of nearness to white capital. Any black person emerging from 
the black condition or means of accumulation is placed under severe scrutiny by the media. 
When they try to move out of the hellish black condition, they are constantly questioned. The 
discourse of corruption is similar to a speed trap which aims to regulate black mobility.   
It is important to note that this study does not condone corruption.  The discourse of corruption 
should not be racialised, since apartheid was a grand project of white corruption.  Modes of 
accumulation, both before and after 1994, should be criminalised if evidence of corruption is 
164 
 
found. The notion of primitive accumulation should, therefore, however be criminalised as a 
whole, since it is, by its very nature, corrupt. Furthermore, it is also embedded in capitalism, 
which is ontologically corrupt.  
If South Africa is a capitalist system, the logic of primitive accumulation will always operate. Is 
there any other path to accumulation rather than primitive accumulation in the capitalist 
system? The issue is structures such as white capital were not dislodged during the transition, 
but were rather entrenched. These structures perpetuate primitive accumulation, a process 
which in itself produces similar results of corruption and inequality. The debate that is not 
present and that is needed in South Africa is one on ethical modes of accumulation. Thus, 
further research is needed on such modes.  
The fourth set of conclusions of this study concerns black public intellectuals in the post-1994 
era and their dilemma with regard to the locus of power and ideas. Seepe, Mangcu and 
Mngxitama hold the view that black public intellectuals should be critics, and should have the 
courage to pose difficult questions. This is informed by the view that there should be a space 
for debate and deliberation – a public sphere including public lectures and other public 
intellectual registers. However, what is considered a public arena that public intellectuals 
represent. In relation to power and ideas, it is unclear how public such intellectuals are and 
what public they serve. In the post-1994 era, black public intellectuals cry out for 
independence. The question is independence from what?  The notion of speaking truth to 
power has limits, since it only focuses on political power, but neglects the institutional, white 
capital and the ideological apparatus of power. For there to be true independence, black public 
intellectuals would have to challenge and to separate themselves from the hegemonic power 
structures which shape the realm of ideas.  
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Political discourse in South Africa since 1994 is a contested terrain and the positionality of 
Seepe, Mangcu and Mngxitama differs in terms what questions they ask, how they ask these 
questions and in what spaces or location such questions should be asked. Thus, the role of 
black public intellectuals also invites and requires political action and agency in order to create 
the possibility of a new world.   
Both Seepe and Mangcu value the notion of speaking truth to power, as Said (1994) called it, 
which is simply speaking truth to political power. In Mngxitama‟s terms, there can be no 
speaking truth to power without looking at the totality of power, which goes beyond political 
power. Speaking truth to power seems irrelevant in the post-1994 era, if power is seen only in 
political terms. The interrogation of structural power and its vested interests is what a black 
public intellectual should speak truth to. This will then allow an understanding of power in 
totality which looks at other avenues and arenas where power is embedded and expressed.  
In terms of Mngxitama‟s positionality, black public intellectuals often leave the structural 
condition unchanged. This then leads to the problematic presence of the celebrity intellectual, 
one who lives for popularity, fame and money, commoditising his or her intellectual labour. 
Market colonisation is what has trapped the black public intellectual. The logic of the market 
results in black public intellectuals not being the militant intellectuals they need to be. A militant 
intellectual is one who is located in the black condition, who is a bane to the powers that be by 
engaging in politics from below. Such black public intellectuals engage oppressive structures 
and the post-liberation logic of repetition without difference to understand the socio-political 
complexity of the post-1994 era.  
Controversial as it was, the Native Club was formed on the idea encapsulated by Mamdani 
(1999) that for an African Renaissance to be realised, there was a need for a focused African 
intelligentsia. This is because there was a need to enunciate the black position in social, 
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political, cultural and economic conditions. The critics of the Native Club saw it as a backward 
move which does not contribute to nation-building, based on the view that there is a zero point, 
one where to enunciate the black intellectual agenda, since this agenda is not seen as a neo-
liberal democratic site of struggle.   
The black public intellectuals who speak and write about, for and with the people trapped in the 
black condition are marginalised from the mainstream discourse. Even if they are involved in 
the mainstream discourse, their ideas can easily be branded nativist and do not take the 
country forward – the vilification that was directed to the Native Club. Most black public 
intellectuals are part of the black elite, who are ideologically aligned with hegemonic ideas as 
they fear to be marginalised and vilified.  
Having engaged Fanon and the columns of Seepe, Mangcu and Mngxitama, these four sets of 
conclusions suggest that the post-1994 state is essentially post-colonial in nature. This study 
rejects the view that post-1994 South Africa is different from any other post-colonial state. It is 
this exceptionalism that suggests that the bad past is gone and that there is a good future 
waiting ahead to be discovered, while, in fact, the past continues to haunt the present. There 
was no miracle in 1994 which gave birth to a new South Africa. The old refused to die and the 
new is not yet born. Post-1994 South Africa is marked by failure to bring about material 
changes and benefits to the black majority. The elite pact in a form of a negotiated settlement 
is seen as liberation, whereas it was an event where a small black elite compromised with their 
former oppressors. It is in this arrangement that the former oppressors retained their economic 
power and gave political freedoms to the black elite, with only a small black elite benefiting 
from the exclusion of the black majority. The black majority, who are trapped in the black 
condition, are oppressed by the leaders through the state force apparatus when they pressure 
the post-1994 ANC government to deliver on its own promises. These issues point to the fact 
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that there is nothing exceptional about post-1994 South Africa. It is essentially a post-colonial 
state.  
Post-1994 South Africa under ANC rule does not have the political will or imagination to bring 
about fundamental changes, for fear that this will disturb the status quo. In the post-1994 
political discourse, the curses of racism, land dispossession and the monopoly of capital are 
not engaged directly. There is silence, or in absence of it, self-censorship on these 
fundamental questions, which are considered sensitive. As a result, this pretence is a mere 
sleight of hand, claiming to defend one of the most progressive constitutions and deepening 
democracies in the world, whilst in fact, there is a crisis in the black condition. Post-1994 South 
Africa is marked by failure to learn from Fanon (1967) who warned against phantom freedoms. 
The year 1994 was coined a „South African Miracle‟, with Nelson Mandela becoming a 
worldwide brand. However, this miracle did not change the black condition and the 
infrastructure of racism.  
A re-reading of Fanon in application to Seepe, Mangcu and Mngxitama with regard to race and 
blackness, the black elite and black public intellectuals is the contribution that this study has 
made. Complex as it is, the post-1994 era needs to be re-thought and re-analysed on a 
continuous basis, since the issues dealt with in the study are complex in their own right and 
enable us to make sense of a problematic past and the murky present, and to make some 
forecast on a mysterious future.   
Therefore, it is necessary to engage in future research taking the stance that post-1994 South 
Africa is not born from liberation but rather from compromise. Further analysis of the structures 
that reproduce the effects of the post-colonial state and the causes for it. The contribution in 
this study does not claim to be completely novel but rather adds a Fanonian perspective to the 
readings of post-1994 South Africa and the writing of three black public intellectuals. It is 
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therefore recommended that studies of this nature should explore how to resolve the 
paradoxes, dilemmas and tensions that characterise the post-1994 political discourse with the 
intention of understanding the lived experience of those who continue to be trapped in the 
black condition. 
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